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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Vietnam's membership of ASEAN is a striking illustration of the impact of the 
changes in Southeast Asian affairs since the end of the Cold War and the 
attainment of the Cambodian peace agreements in 1991. It will assist greatly 
Vietnam's efforts to consolidate its foreign policy emphasis on wide 
international relations and to gain additional and much needed trade and 
investment. Vietnam's membership offers ASEAN a way of broadening its 
coverage in Southeast Asia and bolstering its credibility as it seeks to reaffirm 
and expand its role in the post Cold War era. Vietnam's membership, however, 
also poses some interesting and significant questions about how the seven 
countries will cooperate to overcome the historical legacies of suspicion 
among them and of how ASEAN itself will be affected by what is undoubtedly 
the most significant development for the Association since its inception in 
1967. 1 
General background 
After the Cold War era and the end of ideological confrontation, there have been 
rapid changes in the international political arena throughout the world and in Southeast 
Asia. At present, each country's economic strength becomes an important factor in the 
building up of the country's security; and for closer cooperation. ASEAN-Vietnamese 
relations have passed through various periods changing between political confrontation 
and diplomatic conciliation. When Vietnam triumphed in Cambodia in 1978, ASEAN 
(along with UN) launched the policy for anti-Vietnam political strategy. Until 1988, the 
ASEAN countries and Vietnam discussed the way to find a political solution to the 
conflict.2 
Vietnam and other countries in the region have a common interest in further 
strengthening their friendship and cooperation in order to cope with new challenges and 
1 Frank Frost, Vietnam's Membership of ASEAN: Issues and Implications (Canberra: The Department of 
the Parliamentary Library, 1995), p.l. 
2 For more information on ASEAN-Vietnam rapprochement, see Carlyle Thayer, "ASEAN and Indochina: 
The dialogue", in Alison Broinowski (ed.), ASEAN into the 1990s (London: The Macmillan Press, 1990), 
pp.138-159. 
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opportunities.3 The collapse of the Soviet Union removed its military and economic aid 
to Vietnam. Vietnam lost a political, military and economic ally. The emergence of new 
Russia which cooperated with the United States to create a "new world order" meant 
that the old relationship with the Soviet Union was no longer operable. 
Importantly, there were many internal factors encouraging economic and 
political reform in Vietnam. During 1979-1989, Vietnam faced economic problems. 
Thus, at the 1986 Sixth Party Congress, the Vietnamese Communist Party stressed the 
need for economic reform ( doi moi) to attract foreign trade and investment. 
With external factors and internal political economic difficulties, Vietnam had to 
adjust its foreign policy. This led to Vietnam's decision in 1987 to withdraw its troops 
from Cambodia.4 This was accomplished in September 1989. Thakur and Thayer have 
concluded that the 1989 Sino-Soviet normalisation, Gorbachev' s new political thinking 
of glasnost and perestroika and the end of the Cambodian conflict pushed Vietnam to 
reform its economy and foreign policy.5 Vietnam has also altered its foreign outlook 
towards the development of relations with China, Japan and ASEAN countries. While 
continuing its friendly relations with Russia, Vietnam expressed its hope for Vietnam-
U.S. reconciliation in 1991. The remarkable event which indicated that Vietnam-U.S. 
relations improved greatly was that the U.S. lifted an embargo on trade with Vietnam in 
1994. In 1995, Vietnam and the U.S. normalised diplomatic relations.6 
Stimulated by ASEAN' s success, Vietnam has shown its interest in joining the 
Association. It is evident that ASEAN no longer views a Soviet-backed Indochinese 
3 Vietnam Courier, March 1992, No. 29, p.1. 
4 In fact, Vietnam initiated to withdraw its troops from Cambodia in 1982. Until 1989, the process of the 
withdrawal was progressively and publicly accomplished. 
5 Ramesh C. Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer, Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam (London: Macmillan 
Academic and Professional LTD, 1992), pp.77-80. 
6 Allan E. Goodman, "The political consequences of normalisation of U.S.-Vietnam relations", 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.17, No.4, March 1996, pp.420-29. 
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bloc as a direct threat to its security. This makes possible new forms of cooperation 
between ASEAN and Indochina.7 
There has been remarkable improvement in the relations of the ASEAN states 
with Vietnam. The economic interactions, the exchange of officials, two-way trade 
flows, educational and cultural exchanges and tourism have increased greatly. The 
Indochinese countries have been increasingly accepted by ASEAN. The past 
antagonisms between both sides seemed to have disappeared when Vietnam and Laos 
signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 1992 and were later accorded observer 
status in the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM). 
The rapprochement between Indochina, in particular Vietnam, proceeded 
smoothly through the 27th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Bangkok in 1994 when 
Vietnam was admitted to join ASEAN as a new member. Accordingly, Vietnam 
formally became a new member in July 1995. This was the first step to expand ASEAN 
up to 10 members, including Laos, Cambodia and Burma, which would make ASEAN a 
truly regional association. 
Nevertheless, there are a number of problems and issues both actual and 
potential, which may act as constraints of varying severity upon the process of 
expanding ASEAN membership from six to ten. 8 In fact, there are some disputes 
between Vietnam and some ASEAN states which remain unresolved. These include 
territorial disputes. Most significantly, the South China Sea dispute which involves 
Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, China and Taiwan, may erupt a 
7 In fact, the term "Indochina" signifies the convergence of Indian and Chinese cultural influences in 
mainland Southeast Asia; therefore, Indochina may include Burma (or Myanmar), Malaysia, Singapore, 
Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. Importantly, the term does not represent Vietnam, Laos and 
Cambodia in any unified sense because the subregion contains three distinct countries with different 
language, ethnic groups, cultures and a long history of mutual antagonism. For more information, see 
Frederich Z. Brown, Second Chance: The United States and Indochina in the 1990s (New York: Council 
on Foreign Relations Press, 1989), pp.14-5. 
8 Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "From ASEAN Six to ASEAN Ten: Issues and prospects", Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, Vol.16, No.3, December 1994, pp.243-258. 
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conflagration in the region. However, both ASEAN states and Vietnam have to cope 
with common security challenges brought about by changes in the international and 
regional environment. ASEAN can see Vietnam as a partner in their efforts to build a 
new regional order. 
Purpose of the study 
This study aims to provide an analysis of the process of Vietnam's entry into 
ASEAN and the results and problems which may occur after Vietnam has joined. The 
problem is whether ASEAN and Vietnam will be able to adjust to develop a new 
relationship in order to help promote peace and economic development among ASEAN 
members in the future. 
The study focuses on Vietnam's political and economic renovation and foreign 
policies during 1990-1995 because there were several important events that occurred in 
this period that affected the international political arena, in particular the Southeast 
Asian region. For much of the period, in 1990, it was the post Cambodian settlement 
when Vietnam had withdrawn its troops from Cambodia. Accordingly, Vietnam and 
China normalised their relations in 1991. In 1994, the U.S. lifted its trade embargo on 
Vietnam. Importantly, in 1995, Vietnam made rapprochement of diplomatic relations 
with the United States and it became a full new member of ASEAN. 
As a result, Vietnam has been taking a greater role in cooperation with other 
countries in the region. However, throughout the period, some territorial disputes 
between Vietnam and its neighbours, in particular the South China Sea dispute, have 
remained unresolved. These conflicts make ASEAN' s foreign outlook more 
complicated. 
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The central argument of the thesis is that Vietnam's entry into ASEAN will not 
produce many problems to the other members because both ASEAN countries and 
Vietnam need to develop their economies. This type of cooperation will facilitate 
harmonisation. Although the unresolved disputes between Vietnam and China, in 
particular the South China Sea dispute, may affect ASEAN' s foreign policy towards 
China, it is unlikely that the conflagration between China and ASEAN including 
Vietnam would easily occur as the dispute, indeed, is a focus for many countries who 
need to see the dispute resolved peacefully. 
In particular, this study focuses on the fallowing lines of enquiries: 
- What are factors that have stimulated Vietnam to reform its economy? 
- Will the integration of Vietnam with ASEAN encourage greater regional 
security, fragment it or create another regional grouping including Thailand, 
Vietnam, Cambodia and Burma? 
- What are benefits that both Vietnam and ASEAN states may gain from 
Vietnam's membership? And what are troubles which seem to be 
problematic such as ASEAN Free Trade Area and ASEAN Regional Forum? 
- What are changes in Sino-Vietnamese relations since the 1991 normalisation 
of relations of both sides? 
Outline of the present study 
Chapter 1 briefly provides the general introduction, purposes of the study and the 
study outline. 
Chapter 2 examines the internal and external forces of the re-emergence of 
Vietnam during the 1990s. Some causes of change in Vietnam have been reviewed also 
from the 1970s and 1980s which help to explain the present situation. The problems of 
8 
I 
rin! 
I 
, .. I 
•Ii 
!\ 
I 
Vietnam's reform are discussed. The chapter also focuses on Vietnam's relations with 
major powers such as the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan. 
Chapter 3 investigates the process of Vietnam's admission into ASEAN starting 
from the mid 1980s. The chapter looks at the benefits and problems which will affect 
both ASEAN and Vietnam due to Vietnam's membership, in particular the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area and ASEAN Regional Forum. The problems of relations between 
ASEAN (including Vietnam) and the major powers will be discussed. 
Chapter 4 discusses the relations between Vietnam and China before and after 
the settlement of the Cambodian conflict. The study focuses on the normalisation of 
their relations in 1991. Some present potential conflicts between Vietnam and China, 
particularly the South China Sea dispute, will be discussed. The chapter also 
investigates attempts of both sides and of other non-concerned parties to find ways and 
means to solve these problems. 
Chapter 5 includes a discussion of prospects and conclusions. 
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Chapter 2 
Driving Forces behind the Re-emergence of Vietnam 
Introduction 
Since the mid-l 980s Vietnam's economy has been undergoing a major process 
of change under the policies of doi moi (renovation) ... stimulated by the 
example of market-oriented economic reforms in other socialist countries 
(including China and Eastern European states) and by a realisation that 
Vietnam has since 1975 lagged behind many of its neighbours in economic 
performance, have added further pressures and incentives for the pursuit of 
broader foreign relations. The policies of economic "renovation" have sought 
to decontrol major areas of the economy, create a substantial role for private 
economic activity, revitalise the state sector and encourage foreign investment. 
These policies have had considerable success ... in helping Vietnam to survive 
the rapid cut-back in assistance from the former Soviet Union and states of 
Eastern Europe after 1989. 9 
To examine the re-emergence of Vietnam, it is necessary to look back to the past 
in order to understand the driving forces behind the Vietnamese reform policy. Political 
and economic factors were the primary causes of Vietnamese reforms during the mid-
1980s. These include internal and external factors. The reforms represent a change in 
Vietnam's political strategy to a less ideological outlook since Vietnam wasted its 
resources 1n Cambodia while most ASEAN states and China had prospered. 
Significantly, re-legitimation of the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) role is also 
necessary. The economic problems and the Soviet military withdrawal from the region 
pushed Vietnam to withdraw its troops from Cambodia in 1989. 10 
Vietnam has been affected by the changes in the global balance of power. Fforde 
has pointed out that the outbreak of the Third Indochina War in the late 1970s and the 
failure of the socialist economic system in Vietnam resulted in bottom-up pressures on 
9 Frank, Frost, Vietnam's Foreign Relations: Dynamics of Change (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 1993), p.3. 
10 Soviet disengagement came with Gorbachev's new political thinking. See Leszek Buszynski, 
Gorbachev and Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 1992), pp.1-53. 
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reform. to its economy, because the government failed to impose sufficient control on 
the economy, particularly in the Mekong Delta, with its large economic potential. 11 
Political reform. was first mentioned in 1981 prior to the Fifth and the Sixth National 
Congress. The changes of Vietnam.' s development were marked to repair the dam.age 
and decay of the last decade by concepts regarding economic renewal drawn up in the 
1986 Sixth National Congress. 12 
In 1986, a concept Doi Mai (renovation) was devised by Vietnamese leaders. 13 It 
was used as a slogan involving developments in a wide-range of areas including finance, 
state enterprises, foreign investment, trade, housing, education, health and family 
planning and the mass media. Forbes states that transformations in the economy must 
eventually bring transformation in the political system., but Vietnamese leaders wish to 
control the pace and direction of that change.14 From. the 1990s, Vietnam.' s national 
focus will be almost exclusively economic renovation and integration with the world 
economy. 
This chapter examines the internal and external forces, the process of econormc 
and political reform. in Vietnam. since the mid-1980s, and the results and problems 
caused by the economic and political reforms. The Seventh Vietnam. Party Congress will 
also be discussed. In addition, this chapter discusses the effect and problems of 
renovation policy, also investigates the way the government has attempted to solve these 
problems. 
11 For more information of the bottom-up pressure in Vietnam in the late 1970s, see Adam Fforde, "The 
political economy of "Reform" in Vietnam-some reflections", in Borje Ljunggren (ed .. ), The Challenge of 
Reform in Indochina (USA: Harvard Institute for International Development, 1993), pp.293-326: 230. 
12 Gary, Klintworth, "Forces of Change in Vietnam", in D. K. Forbes, T. H. Hull, D. G. Marr and 
B. Brogan (eds.), Doi Mai; Vietnam's Renovation Policy and Peiformance (Canberra: Australian 
National University, 1991), pp.215-233, 215. 
13 Doi Mai was originated in the early 1980s when contract production in agriculture and an increased 
tolerance towards the private sector were phased in. For more details of Doi Mai, see Dean K. Forbes, in 
Dean K. Forbes, et.al (eds), Doi Mai; Vietnam's Renovation Policy and Peiformance, op.cit., pp.vii-ix. 
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This chapter also looks at the role of external factors pushing Vietnam to reform 
itself, and in particular the four major powers, China, the Soviet Union, the United 
States and Japan including the financial international organisations such as the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank, in the 
building up of the country's economic strength and political reform. These have greatly 
affected Vietnam's foreign policy since 1986 and the settlement of the Cambodian 
conflict. Vietnam saw the need for and importance of its gradual economic and political 
reform. 
2.1. Economic reform in Vietnam during the 1980s15 
Since the late 1970s, there have been many internal factors forcing reform on 
Vietnam. As a result of the turmoil in Vietnam in the late 1970s, thousands of 
Vietnamese fled as refugees and economic migrants to other countries in Southeast 
Asia, severely affecting the labour force. (For a discussion of refugees, see Chapter 4) 
Significantly, in 1978 Vietnam became a full member of the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA) and signed a 25 year Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation with the Soviet Union. Vietnam invaded and occupied Cambodia with the 
protection of this treaty. 16 Consequently, Western and Chinese aid was cut hitting the 
state sector .17 
14 Ibid. 
15 Vu Tuan Anh mentions that the process of economic reform in Vietnam may be divided into three 
stages. First, from 1976-1979, there was a process of unifying the economy into an integrated whole in 
accordance with the central planning principles. Second, from 1980-1986, there were experiments on 
readjustment of economic policies oriented toward trade liberalisation. Third, from 1986 to 1994, the 
basic orientation for renewal of economic policies was affirmed. For more information, see Vu Tuan Anh, 
"Process of Economic Policy Reform", Vietnam's Economic Reform: Results and Problems (Hanoi: 
Social Science Publishing House, 1994), p.15. 
16 Since the signing of the Friendship Treaty the top leaders of both countries met frequently. For details 
of the treaty and example of leader visits of both sides, see Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle Thayer, Soviet 
Relations with India and Vietnam (London: Macmillan, 1992), pp.60-61. 
17 The failure of the Mekong collectivisation pushed up free-market rice prices and inability to force the 
needed rice out of the Mekong in 1978-1979 showed that the Stalinist model must be softened. See Adam 
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After reunification, Vietnam faced severe economic problems. These problems 
included the natural disasters and poor weather in 1977 and 1978, which caused the low 
level of agricultural production affecting Vietnam's economy. 18 Between the 1979-
1989, Vietnam wasted a lot of money maintaining its occupation force in Cambodia. 
Due to the deterioration of relations with China, Vietnam lost assistance and investment 
from China and the West and became reliant on Soviet aid alone. 19 However, the 
Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) hoped to gain economic assistance from the Soviet 
bloc, China, and Western countries to promote reconstruction. By the mid-1980s, there 
was an increased realisation that Vietnam was still poor while neighbouring economies 
were prospering. Thus, in 1986 the VCP emphasised the need for economic reform and 
a series of measures were taken to attract foreign trade and investments.2° Frank Frost 
has noted: 21 
A new code on foreign investment was introduced in January 1988 in an 
attempt to attract investment from Western and non-communist Asian 
countries; the private sector was encouraged and the autonomy and 
accountability of state enterprises was increased; price controls and subsidies 
were reduced; interest rates were raised; credit facilities were tightened; and 
the currency was devalued almost to its black market rate 
In 1987, Vietnamese writers, artists and workers were increasingly critical that 
Vietnam could not solve economic problems. Vietnam had to adopt a remarkable new 
national-security doctrine embodied in Politburo Resolution 2 which overturned the 
security orientation of the previous decade.22 In 1988, it was remarked that Vietnam was 
Fforde, "The political economy of "Reform" in Vietnam-some reflections", The Challenge of Reform in 
Indochina, op.cit., p.300. 
18 However, agricultural production recovered in 1979 because of the favourable climatic conditions. For 
more details, see Vo Nhan Tri, "Reunification and "socialist transformation", 197 5-80", Vietnam's 
Economic Policy since 1975 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990), p.83. 
19 Frost, op.cit., pp.4-5. 
20 David, G. Marr, "Where is Vietnam Coming From?", in Dean K. Forbes, et.al (eds), Doi Moi: 
Vietnam's Renovation Policy and Peiformance, op.cit., pp.16-18. 
21 F . 5 rost, op.cit., p. 
22 Resolution 2 is defined 'On strengthening National Defence in the New Revolutionary Stage'. It was 
elaborated on in a series of confidential directives issued by the VCP's Military Commission, the Ministry 
13 
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far behind Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Thailand in economic 
performance. 23 Premier Do Muoi warned that, "If we left the economic situation to 
continue as it did in recent years, we will encounter a more difficult situation and will 
lag even further behind neighbouring countries with regard to growth rate, national 
income and people's average standard of living".24 He also stressed that the economic 
management had been sluggish, inconsistent, perfunctory and still marked by the old 
way of thinking in many different aspects.25 
Most importantly, in 1989-1991 the collapse of East Europe and the Soviet 
Union caused the decline of Soviet aid to Vietnam which led to the rupture of the 
Soviet-Vietnamese alliance. Thakur and Thayer concluded that there are at least four 
main problems affecting Vietnam's economy.26 First, the Sino-Soviet normalisation 
process culminated in a summit in May 1989, second, Gorbachev's new political 
thinking of glasnost and perestroika brought about dramatic shifts in its foreign policy, 
third, the Soviet Union expressed its dissatisfaction over Vietnamese misuse of Soviet 
aid in the mid 1980s and cut its assistance to Vietnam for the 1991-1995 five-year plan, 
and fourth, as a result of the above problems, the resolution of the Cambodian conflict 
came to an end. Vietnam withdrew its troops in 1989 (the external factors will be 
discussed later), hence Vietnam has established trade and commercial ties with many 
different countries. It has forged economic relations with many countries in Southeast 
and Northeast Asia, Australia, Europe and North America. 
of National Defence and the VPA General Staffs General Political Directorate. For more details, see 
Carlyle Thayer, Beyond Indochina (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.23-4. 
23 Vo Nhan Tri, Vietnam's Economic Policy since 1975 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
1990), p.229. 
24 Ibid, p.231. 
25 Ibid, p. 249. 
26 See more explanation in Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle Thayer, Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam, 
op.cit., pp.77-80. 
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2.2. The results of economic renovation 
Since the doi moi policy was officially endorsed in 1986, Vietnam has 
undergone immense changes in its economic development. Foreign investment has 
begun to flow into Vietnam. The 1986-1990 five-year plan27 brought about some 
successes. The initial achievement in the economic field was shown by advances in the 
attainment of the objectives in the three economic programs (raw foodstuffs, consumer 
goods and export goods). 28 In this plan, investment in the three economic programs 
made up more than 60 per cent of capital investment from the central state budget, and 
7 5-80% of local capital investment. 29 During this period external economic relations 
developed fast. Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore invested in a large amount of 
projects in Vietnam (see Table 5). 
Importantly, the Vietnamese government has been successful in decreasing 
inflation-from the high level of 67% in 1991 to 17% in 1992 and to 5% in 1993 (see 
Table in Appendix A). However, economic growth and looser monetary policy toward 
the end of 1993 led to an annual inflation rate of 14.4%, which remains comparatively 
lower than the figure in the past. 30 
Industry, foreign investment and trade 
Vietnam's industrial growth since the mid-1980s has averaged 13.2% over the 
past three years. Exports are growing, particularly of crude oil, textiles, seafood and rice. 
The government has emphasised that trade, especially export development, is vital to 
increase economic growth. (see Table 1) Vietnam exported crude oil worth US$ 1.04 
27 This plan stressed the industrial development and the U.S. aid was also expected to assist Vietnam's 
economy. 
28 Vietnam Communist Party: Documents of the Seventh Party Congress, Truth Publishing House, Hanoi, 
1991, p. 17. Quoted in Vo Dai Luoc, Akie Ishida, et.al., Vietnam 's Economic Renovation and Foreign 
Economic Policies (Hanoi: Social Science Publishing House, 1995), p.60. 
29 Ibid., pp.61-2 
30 "Vietnam December 1995", Country Economic Brief (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, 1995), p.14 
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billion in 1995.31 Exports of rice and maritime products have also increased. Two-way 
foreign trade has gone up by approximately 20% annually. 
Table 2 shows that the strongest industrial sectors were electricity, coal, and 
crude oil. Cement, fertiliser and essential consumer goods also boosted growth. Private 
sector industry grew by 14% and the state sector expanded by 13%.32 
Table 1: Major export products (to convertible area - US$ millions) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Crude oil 390 581 756 844 866 
Textiles 20 224 156 500 770 
Seafood 220 285 302 427 489 
Rice 272 225 300 363 429 
Coffee 25 74 86 110 234 
Rubber 16 50 54 74 95 
Coal 38 48 47 70 71 
Source: Ministry of Trade 
Table 2: Industrial production - major items 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
electricity (trillion kwh) 8790 9307 9818 10851 12473 
coal ( thousand tonnes) 4627 4728 5019 5899 5914 
crude oil ( thousand tonnes) 2700 4000 5500 6312 6938 
cement ( thousand tonnes) 2534 3127 3926 4849 5161 
fertiliser ( thousand tonnes) 358 462 554 714 790 
Source:Country Economic Brief, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia, 1995 
31 "Vietnam: Booming Viet oil industry's exports top US$ 1 billion", Business Times (Singapore), 25 
January 1996. 
32 Harish Mehta, "Vietnam: Viet industrial growth to hit 15%", Business Times, 18 December 1995. 
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Despite the success of the reform policy and growth rates, industrial 
development is hampered by a capital shortage. Vo Hong Phuc claimed that, 'Total 
investment capital needed from 1996-2000 will be about $41-42 billion, 50% of which 
will come from domestic sources and the remaining 50% from foreign sources'. 33 
Vietnam's Law on Foreign Investment also causes problems in project and capital 
approvals. By the end of 1993, realised investment capital amounted to US$ 2,084 
million, of which US$ 1,672 million was from foreign investors. (See Table 3) 
Table 3: Actual execution of projects (million US$) 
Year Total investment 
capital of licensed 
projects 
1988 366.0 
1989 539.0 
1990 596.0 
1991 1,288.0 
1992 1,939.0 
1993 2,728.4 
Total 7,456.4 
34 Source: SCCI 
Total investment 
capital of projects 
whose licences had 
been withdrawn 
132.0 
208.5 
114.0 
129.0 
17.4 
11.9 
612.8 
Remaining Capital 
capital to be already 
realised realised by 
Dec. 25, 1993 
234.0 239.0 
330.5 366.0 
482.0 349.0 
1,159.0 513.0 
1,921.6 471.0 
2,716.5 146.0 
6,843.8 2,084.0 
It is expected that "the GDP will rise up to 2-2.5 times as high as that of 1990, 
with an annual average rate of 8-10%, attain a growth rate of industry which is 1.5 times 
as high as that of GDP (about 13-15o/o ); raise the proportion of industry in GDP to 
nearly 30% in 2000, and to achieve a total domestic accumulation of 16-20%, a total 
investment of about 30% GDP, like China at present".35 Vietnam had 401 foreign direct 
33 Vo Hong Phuong is the Vice-Minister of Ministry of Planning and Investment of Vietnam. "Vietnam 
seeks $42 billion in investment capital", Reuter News Service, 30 November 1995. 
34 The realised capital in 1988 and 1989 was bigger than the invested capital because a number of projects 
were further expanded. 
35 Ibid., pp.71-2. 
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investment projects licensed in 1995 with a total prescribed capital of 6.61 billion US$, 
and 1.312 billion more added to operating projects.36 
The increased influx of foreign investment in Vietnam has so far created almost 
30,000 jobs in the industrial sector, especially in the electronics and machine sector. 
Despite increasing jobs in the industrial sector, unemployment in Vietnam remains a 
severe problem. The ADB estimated that unemployment in 1991 was about 7 million 
people or 20% of the labour force. 37 Since the Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia 
in 1989, military expenditure has been cut back, greatly affecting jobs and 
accommodation for the military. In addition, economic changes and reduction of 
demand for Vietnamese workers in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, has forced 
thousands of Vietnamese guestworkers to return.38 Unemployment has climbed because 
of this large influx of returning workers into the workforce. 
The problems continue to confront Vietnam's economy. While the amount of 
capital is increasing, foreign investors' complaints continue to grow. To address these 
troubles, Vietnam has launched a campaign to cut red tape. The government created the 
Ministry of Planning and Investment in October 1995 to be a one-stop agency for 
investors, who will no longer have to run around Hanoi for permits.39 The foreign 
investment law has been changed to speed up the approval process. 
36 Most foreign investment went to Ho Chi Minh City, Dong Nai and Hanoi. 50% are in the industrial 
sector, with disbursed capital reaching about 6 billion. See "Vietnam: New investment", Bangkok Post, 9 
January 1996 and "Vietnam: Foreign direct investment in 1995 detailed", BBC Monitoring Service, 10 
January 1996. 
37 Asian Development Bank, "Asian Development Bank Report 1992", p. 149. 
38 Frost, Vietnam's Foreign Relations, op.cit., pp.9-10. 
39 Harish Mehta, "Vietnam: Enticing investors into industrial sector", Business Times (Singapore), 26 
December 1995. 
18 
''"i 
' 
·•j 
'I 
I 
lll 
Agriculture 
In 1988, Vietnam decollectivised agriculture which resulted in a rapid increase 
1n agriculture production.40 Rice remains the most important crop in Vietnam and 
production has increased from 13 million tonnes in 197 6 to around 23 .5 million tonnes 
in 1994. It has resulted in Vietnam changing from being an importer to an exporter of 
rice.41 Vietnam, at present, exports 1.5 million to 2 million tons of rice a year, which 
makes it the world's third largest exporter (after the U.S. and Thailand). In 1996, 
Vietnam signed contracts to export rice. The Philippines will take 350,000 tonnes, 
Indonesia, 100,000 tonnes, Cuba, 100,000 tonnes and Iraq, an unspecified amount.42 
The fertile Mekong Delta in the south produces the largest portion ( about 65 % ) 
of rice output. Vietnam produced 200,000 tonnes of coffee in 1995 (170,000 in 1994 ), 
50,000 tonnes of tea, 250,000 tonnes of peanuts, and cashew nuts, 80,000 tonnes.43 
Food production output for 1995 was 27 .5 million tonnes. Maritime products output in 
1995 was 1.4 million tonnes. These figures illustrate further growth as more 
development assistance programmes get underway. A number of major projects have 
been started by international donor agencies.44 
The government realises that some 80% of the Vietnamese population still 
depend on agriculture for a livelihood and has been promoting more foreign investment 
into this sector. The government is considering new regulations concerning land rental, 
40 Until the late 1980s, the enforced collectivisation of land in Vietnam and the continuing poor harvests 
had a crucial detrimental effect on agricultural output. Recently, security of tenure was improved by a land 
law passed by the National Assembly in 1993 which allowed small farmers 20-50 year renewable tenure 
holding and enabled them to transfer, exchange, lease and pass on land to relatives. See "Vietnam 
December 1995", Country Economic Brief (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1995), 
p.43. 
41 Smarn Sudto, "Vietnam: Rice export giants urged to be allies", Bangkok Post, 6 December 1995. 
42 "Vietnam: Vietnam to export 680,000 tonnes of rice-report", Reuter News Service, 12 February 1996. 
43 "Vietnam: Food production in 1995", BBC Monitoring Service, 17 January 1996. 
44 For example, in 1993, the WB announced a US$ 100 million loan for the restructuring of Vietnam's 
agricultural sector. An aid coordination meeting on a Vietnam's agricultural sector was held in June 1995. 
The more important non-rice crops include fruit and vegetables, rubber, sugarcane, coconut and cotton. 
See "Vietnam December 1995", Country Economic Brief, op.cit., p.45. 
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profit tax and other incentives. The 1996-2000 five-year plan gave special attention to 
agricultural development in order to stabilise the socioeconomic situation. New 
agricultural policies in the localities have been improved and produced higher living 
standards, better health care and education 45 . 
Infrastructure 
While Vietnam has been developing by attracting foreign aid and investment, 
there are some problems concerning the inefficient and insufficient infrastructure. 
Vietnam has moved slowly down the road to privatisation and lacks the large amount of 
investment capital needed to improve its eroded infrastructure.46 
However, the VCP has planned to improve the eroded infrastructure by 
developing a more extensive transport system, improving the system of communication, 
and distributing the supply of power to urban areas and to electrify important parts of 
rural areas.47 Its ports, railways and bridges are being built up. Significantly, in 1996, the 
WB and the ADB committed a further $550 million for other stretches of the 2,288-
kilometre Highway One, the key road for Vietnam.48 
2.3. Vietnam's present economic situation 
The Seventh Congress adopted a socio-economic development plan up to the 
year 2000. In general terms, Vietnam will continue with its programme of 
economic renewal or doi moi. Domestically this will mean the continued 
encouragement of a multi-sectoral economy, including private enterprise. This 
is not an endorsement of unfettered market capitalism. The Seventh Congress 
made clear that key industries would remain under central control and that the 
· if · d l · l . 49 aim o economic eve opment was socia ism. 
45 "Vietnam: Do Muoi urges industrialisation of agriculture", BBC Monitoring Service, 29 December 
1995. 
46 Thayer, Beyond Indochina ,op.cit., p.10. 
47 Some development scenarios have been determined until 2010. For more information, see, Vo Dai 
Luoc, Akie Ishida, et.al, op.cit., pp.74-94. 
48 "Vietnam: Red tape and new trade add to burdens of Vietnam' s creaking infrastructure", South China 
Morning Post, 11 January 1996. 
49 Carlyle Thayer, Political Developments in Vietnam: From the Sixth to Seventh National Party 
Congress (Canberra: Australian National University, 25 October 1991), Paper No.5. presented to 
'Vietnam 1991: An Update', p.20. 
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The long-term development of the multi-sector economy and the role of the 
market were reconfirmed by eliminating discrimination against the private economy. 
The economic structure would be reformed by developing agriculture and goods 
production, increasing exports and expanding external economic relations while 
reducing the inflation rate, budgetary deficits and excess cash expenditure, in order to 
increase the general living standard and the stability of socioeconomic environment. The 
open-door policy was emphasised in relations with foreign partners.50 
Most importantly, the peace settlement in Cambodia in October 1991 was a very 
important turning point in the economic development of Vietnam. Many Western states 
relaxed their long-standing embargos on trade, aid and investment. Thayer has 
emphasised that: 51 
In July 1993, the United States relaxed its policy of blocking loans to Vietnam 
by international lending agencies such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank. The United States 
Law, however, prohibited foreign assistance to communist Laos and Vietnam. 
In February 1994, the United States lifted its 30-year embargo, although 
Vietnam is still denied access to trade and investment benefits accorded under 
most favoured nation (MFN) status, Generalised System of Preference 
privileges and credits from the Export-Import (Exim) Bank of the United States 
Since the termination of Soviet Union and East European aid, Vietnam began to 
benefit from the aid offered by world financial organisations, Western countries, and 
Japan, which is the biggest donor to Vietnam: 380 million US$ in 1992, and 476 million 
US$ in 1993. Grants from the Japanese Government have also rapidly increased: 15 
million US$ in 1992, 58 million US$ in 1993 and 77 million US$ expected for 1994. 52 
In 1992, Vietnam received over US$ 560 million in ODA, including US$ 71 and 
US$ 73 million from the United Nations. Reasons for the rapid increase in ODA inflow 
into Vietnam include the normalisation of relations between Vietnam and the IMF, the 
50 Vu Tuan Anh, op.cit., pp.21-23 
51 Thayer, Beyond Indochina, op.cit., p.12 
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WB and the ADB as well as the U.S., which dropped opposition to the development 
assistance to Vietnam by international financial agencies in 1993.53 Vietnam entered a 
new phase in the development of its industry. 
During 1991-1995, Vietnam achieved the objectives set in the strategy for 
socioeconomic development - the period of fast economic growth and advancement to 
industrialisation and modernisation. It is clear that Vietnam is no longer taking financial 
assistance from COMECON but from the IMF, WB and ADB. 
The IMF and the WB informed Vietnam that credits would be provided in 1994 
for the carrying out of four crucial projects.54 The ADB pledged assistance to Vietnam 
in the execution of a number of projects involving US$ 1.5 billion during the 1993-
1996, including upgrading the highway from Ho Chi Minh City to Nha Trang, US$ 120 
million, rehabilitating the irrigation and flood control system, US$ 7 6 million, and the 
water supply to Ho Chi Minh, US$ 65 million. 55 
Vietnam has opened up its economy and has been integrated into the world 
economy. Over recent years, the countries in the Asia-Pacific region have become 
Vietnam's main markets. Table 4 indicates Vietnam's major trade partners. It shows that 
85.12% of Vietnam's trade is conducted with 9 main trading partners. 
Six of them are in the Asia-Pacific region (the former USSR and its Far Eastern 
region are also included in this region). Significantly, Singapore, Japan, Hong Kong, 
52 Vo Dai Luoc, Akie Ishida, op.cit., pp.74-94. 
53 Thayer, Beyond Indochina, op.cit., p.59. 
54 Four of them are the 170 million power-development, the 100 million irrigation project, the 150 million 
structural-change project and the 40 million improvement-of-banking-technology project. See Vo Dai 
Luoc, Akie Ishida, et.al, op.cit., pp.142-3. 
55 Ho Chi Minh City has achieved the highest growth rate in Vietnam at 14.5%, over the national average 
of 8.8% in 1994. The GDP per capita in the city is US$ 810, or 2.8 higher than the national average. For 
details, see "Economic news", Vietnam Business Opportunities, Vol.4, No.9 (28) January 1995, p.3 and 
Vo Dai Luoc, Akie Ishida, et.al, Ibid., p.143. 
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Republic of Korea, Taiwan and Thailand account for 70% of Vietnam's total foreign 
trade, 68.5% of its exports and 71 % of its imports.56 
Table 4: Vietnam's major trade partner, 1993 (% of total) 
Country Exports Imports Export+ Imports 
Singapore 26.76 33.93 30.14 
Japan 20.85 9.82 15.65 
Hong Kong 11.74 11.82 11.78 
Former USSR 8.57 4.88 6.83 
France 4.23 5.78 4.96 
South Korea 1.54 8.74 4.94 
Taiwan 3.17 4.35 3.73 
Thailand 4.70 2.29 3.56 
PRC 4.90 2.00 3.53 
Total 86.46 83.61 85.12 
Source: Ministry of Trade of Vietnam 
Foreign investments are increasing. Total licensed foreign investment in 
Vietnam is more than US$ 16 billion although abandoned projects and cancelled 
licences account for about 6o/o of this amount. Table 5 indicates that the newly 
industrialised capital-exporting countries of Asia have taken the lead - Taiwan (US$ 3.2 
billion), Singapore (US$ 1.5 billion), South Korea (US$ 1.4 billion).57 
Table 5: Licensed Foreign Investment-Total by country of origin (to September 1995) 
Country Number of Projects Capital (US$ million) 
1. Taiwan 219 3200 
2. Hong Kong 178 2200 
3.Japan 110 1680 
4. Singapore 109 1470 
5. South Korea 127 1410 
6. United States 43 994 
7. Malaysia 41 826 
8. Australia 48 715 
9. France 68 627 
10. British Virgin Islands 37 556 
Total 1262 16960 
Source: SCCI 
56 Ibid., p.218. 
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Foreign investment in Vietnam is spread over the spectrum of economic sectors. 
In value terms, industry (US$ 7 .2 billion) accounts for almost half of all approved 
investment licences, hotels/tourism (US$ 4.0 billion), services (US$ 1.9 billion), oil and 
gas ( US$ 1.1 billion) and transportation and communications (US$ 1.1 billion) (See 
Table 6). 
Table 6: Licensed foreign investment-by sector ( to September 1995) 
Sector Number of projects Capital (US$ million) 
Industry 731 7220 
Hotels, tourism 141 4070 
Services 143 1900 
Oil and gas 21 1130 
Transport/Communications 44 1060 
Industrial zones 8 485 
Agriculture 33 320 
Banking, finance 18 250 
Export processing zones 54 183 
Housing 23 69 
Fisheries 23 61 
Other 23 206 
Total 1262 16960 
Source: SCCI 
In 1995, it is likely to be the fourth year in succession in which the economy will 
have grown by over 8%. The target for industrial production growth has been set at 14-
14.5%, and the inflation ceiling at 14% which is high but is decreasing. Foreign 
investors may be disgruntled, but they continue to show interest. Domestic savings are 
rising. 58 The dream of catching up with its prosperous neighbours no longer seems 
57 "Vietnam December 1995", Country Economic Brief, op.cit., p.37. 
58 "Living with contradiction", Economist, 2 December 1995. 
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impossible. The Eighth VCP was held during 28 June-I July 1996.59 It was an important 
event since it was a reassessment of ten years of Doi Moi whether the reform policy is 
successful. Vo Van Kiet has suggested in 1996 that: 60 
Along with developing centralised industrial zones, there needs to be 
encouragement of all businesses to build infrastructure facilities and form new 
residential quarters to help accelerate rural urbanisation. The change of 
economic structure in rural areas must start in the households. 
Although Vietnam has reformed its country in many areas, it faces several major 
problems. Several restraints are seen with regard to quality and economic efficiency. 
Significantly, Vietnam has not managed to form a national financial system which is 
compatible with an open economy operating on a market mechanism.61 Other major 
problems include the large number of inefficient state-owned enterprises that are being 
kept afloat by indirect state subsidies. Frost has added that the end of aid, decline of 
international trade and inefficient public sector add to Vietnam's difficulties.62 
The underdeveloped financial system and unskilled labour are sources of 
difficulties. Corruption, bureaucratic red tape, customs procedures and inadequate 
infrastructure such as the transport system often remain important obstacles. 63 Many 
foreign businessmen complain about Vietnam's legal system as it is very complicated. 
Recent legal reform of commercial law in Vietnam is less developed. Commercial laws, 
which are the most fundamental for economic transactions, have not yet been 
59 After the Congress, VCP agreed that economic reform would continue to reform but at a more cautious 
pace. Due to the 1990-1995 (the period under study), the 1996 Eighth Congress will not be much 
discussed. However, for more information on the Eight Congress, see Adam Schwarz, "Safety first", 
FEER, 11 July 1996, pp.14-6. 
60 "Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet discussed measures to achieve 1996 target", BBC Monitoring Service , 9 
January 1996. 
61 Vo Dai Luoc, Akie Ishida, et.al, op.cit., pp.63-71. 
62 As a result of the decline of trade and aid with the Soviet Union, particularly after 1991, Vietnam has 
reoriented its trade to the market economies, especially in East and Southeast Asia with Singapore, Japan, 
Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
63 Murray Hiebert, "The rise of Saigon", FEER, 5 September 1991, pp.62-4 and Murray Hiebert, 
"Obstacle course", FEER, 5 September 1991, pp.64-5. 
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established.64 Despite assistance with Vietnam's legal reform by international 
organisations such as UNDP/WB for the bankruptcy Law and SIDA (Sweden) and 
French government help for commercial law, Vietnam has to coordinate the different 
systems in order to integrate them into a new legal system. 65 
In addition, there are pressures due to Vietnam's population growth rate. While 
more rice is available, Hiebert has stressed in 1991 that the lack of adequate nutrition 
continues to plague a large number of people and half of Vietnam's children are under-
nourished, with over 14% suffering from severe malnutrition.66 Furthermore, although 
the economic renovation policies have had some success, Vietnam's exports are not yet 
sufficient to meet the requirements for imports and not competitive enough to secure 
foreign market places.67 
However, the VCP has regularised processes of asset transfers, a more efficient 
labour market and improved business communication and banking system, and a system 
of business laws to protect both domestic and foreign investment by modifying the 
foreign investment law and by giving priority to commercial legislation to ensure 
foreign investment.68 Vietnam amended its foreign investment law to be more liberal 
and more attractive to foreign businesses and invited capital investment from non-
socialist economies. 69 Infrastructure development has been emphasised. 
Economic factors have great importance in building up Vietnam's security. 
Vietnam has moved to open its door for trade to all new comers both communist and 
64 To develop a competitive environment in market, it is necessary to establish anti-monopoly law, law on 
fair trade and law on consumer protection. For more details, see Vo Dai Luoc, Akie Ishida, et.al, op. cit., 
pp.246-51. 
65 Vo Dai Luoc, Akie Ishida, et.al, Ibid., p.260. 
66 Murry Hiebert, "The cost of care", FEER, 10 January 1991, pp16-7. 
67 Barry Wain, "Vietnam weathers economic transition", Asian Wall Street Journal, 3 August 1992. 
68 See Le Dang Doanh, "Economic renovation in Vietnam: Achievements and prospects", in D. K. Forbes, 
T. H. Hull, D. G. Marr and B. Brogan (eds.), Doi Moi: Vietnam's Renovation Policy and Performance, 
op.cit., pp.79-94 and Thayer, Beyond Indochina, op.cit., p.12. 
69 For the details of Vietnam's foreign investment amendme~t, see Vo Dai Luoc, Akie Ishida, et.al., op.cit, 
pp.164-75. 
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non-communist such as South Korea, Taiwan and Israel. For example, Israel's Finance 
Minister visited Vietnam and signed an agreement on customs procedures with 
Vietnam.70 Although initial reform efforts took several years because of the opposition 
of party conservatives, economic benefits have influenced party members to accept the 
reforms accompanied by efforts towards political liberalisation.71 
2.4. Vietnam's political reform 
After gaining power in North Vietnam in 1954, the VCP has played a decisive 
role in foreign policy. It has embraced the precepts of 'Marxism-Leninism' and later 
applied these to the whole country after the 1975 re-unification.72 This model is a one-
party political system. Land and all major means of production were collectivised and 
subject to central state planning.73 Because of internal problems such as continuous 
economic difficulties and increased Vietnamese criticism of the government policy, and 
external powers that pushed Vietnam to reform, the VCP decided to end the chaotic 
overlap between party and state institutions in 1982.74 
70 The first Israeli minister to visit to Vietnam since both sides established diplomatic ties in July 1993. In 
fact, relations between Hanoi and the Palestine Liberation Organisation date back to the 1960s. The first 
PLO office was opened in Hanoi in 1976. In January 1996, Arafat visited Vietnam which is the sixth visit 
to Vietnam since 1970. For more details, see "Yasser Arafat feted on arrival in Vietnam", Reuter News 
Service, 19 January 1996 and "Israeli Minister visits Vietnam to strengthen ties", Reuter News Service, 23 
January 1996. 
71 For general view of the political reform process, see Carlyle Thayer, "Political reform in Vietnam: Doi 
Moi and the emergence of civil society in communist system", in Robert F. Miller (ed .. ), The 
Development of Civil Society in Communist Systems (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1992), pp.110-29. 
72 The political system in Vietnam, Marxism-Leninism, has gradually been changed to be 'Market-
Leninism'. For more explanation of 'Market-Leninism', see Nicholas D. Kristof, "China gropes toward 
market Leninism", International Herald Tribune, 7 September 1993. pp.1, 4. 
73 Vietnam's political system during at that time can be called 'mono-organisational socialism' which 
describes the party's attempt to monopolise political power. For more details, see Carlyle Thayer, "Mono-
organisational socialism and the state", in Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet and Doug J. Porter (eds.), Vietnam's 
Rural Transformation (Corlorado: Westview Press, 1995), pp.39-64. 
74 Carlyle Thayer, "Renovation and Vietnamese society; the changing roles of government and 
administration", in D.K. Forbes, T.H. Hull, D.G. Marr and B. Brogan (eds.), Doi Mai: Vietnam's 
Economic Renovation: Policy and Performance, op.cit., pp.21-33. 
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Changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, particularly in the 1980s 
affected Vietnam's political reform. The need for political reform of Vietnamese 
political institutions was identified as early as 1981 when Nguyen Khac Vien, a leading 
intellectual, addressed an open letter to the National Assembly pointing out deficiencies 
in the political system and calling for democratic reform.75 An important turning point 
for Vietnam's political renewal was the Sixth National Congress in 1986. 
2.4.1. The political reform at the Sixth National Party Congress 
As a result of this Congress, Vietnam has changed from a centrally planned to a 
market-oriented economy. Frost has pointed out that:76 
The VCP has maintained a dominant position politically but has faced 
difficulties in providing effective leadership and administration. The Party 
itself has acknowledged the need for some change, by promoting reforms in the 
political sphere under the banner of doi moi (renovation) after 1986. 
Several areas have been increasingly recognised as important factors for the 
process of renovation. As Vietnam has created a multi-sectoral commodity economy by 
taking apart the 'bureaucratic centralised system', the role of the private sector has 
increased.77 Vietnam's doi moi programme also stressed other important areas such as 
management, administration and commercial law.78 
Criticism of the Party and its policies, emerging in the local congresses, has been 
widespread. Hence, the VCP decided to renovate the party organisation and the state 
apparatus (including the National Assembly); by loosening controls over the press and 
media; and by implementing a regime of socialist legality (rule of law).79 
75 Thayer, "Mono-organisational socialism and the state", op.cit., p.48. 
76 Frost, Vietnam's Foreign Relations, op.cit., p.12. 
77 When the public sector was unsuccessful and inefficient, the private enterprises were considered that 
they could be beneficial to the national economy. For more information, see Do Due Dinh, "The public 
sector of Vietnam", in D.K. Forbes, T.H. Hull, D.G. Marr and B. Brogan (eds.), Doi Moi: Vietnam's 
Economic Renovation: Policy and Performance, op.cit, pp.54-67, 59-60. 
78 Thayer, Beyond Indochina, op.cit, p.10. 
79 Carlyle Thayer, Political Developments in Vietnam: From the Sixth to Seventh National Party 
Congress, op.cit, p.4. 
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Changes in the relocation of control of writers, poets, publishing houses, the 
press and media (including video cassette and film industry) 
Several of Vietnam's writers began to explore the limits of freedom under doi 
moi. Artists, writers, and film makers were allowed to have more latitude in contributing 
to criticism. Thayer has noted that: 80 
Greater freedom was given to writers and artists. Party control over the 
selection process of deputies to the National Assembly was loosened, and 
elected members were given greater scope to express critical views. The 
combined effects of economic and political reform led to a wide variety of 
activity conducted independently of party control, most notably among the 
press, the video and publishing media, war veterans, private entrepreneurs and 
to a lesser extent among students and other groups. 
The expansion of the role of legislature, mass organisations and the press were 
stressed.81 The Party faced criticism from well known Vietnamese writers and Party 
members such as Bui Tin, the former deputy editor of Nhan Dan (VCP' s daily 
newspaper). In 1990, he criticised the repressive policies pursued after 1975 under 
which his broadcast was banned in Vietnam. He stated that, 'Now, we have corruption, 
fraud and conservation. We must change the concept and content of communism .. . We 
need democracy or there will be chaos' . 82 
In 1987, Nguyen Van Linh, the VCP secretary-general, also wrote an article 
about the responsibility of government officials towards corruption. 83 According to Ha 
Dang, editor of Nhan Dan, 'the Sixth Congress of our party stressed that the press 
should be not only the mouth piece of the party and leading bodies, but also a rostrum 
for the voices of the broad masses of the people'. 84 
80 Ibid, p.5. 
81 Gareth Porter, "The politics of renovation in Vietnam", Problems of Communism 39, no. 3 (May-June 
1990), pp.72-88, 80-81. 
82 Bui Tin, "The road away from disaster", Vietnam Commentary, No.20 (March-April) 1991, 
pp.11-5. Quoted in Frank Frost, Vietnam's Foreign Relations, op.cit, p.14. 
83 Thayer, Political Developments in Vietnam, op.cit., p. 6. 
84 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 August 1987. Quoted in Carlyle Thayer, Ibid. 
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The role of mass organisations such as those representing youth, peasants, and 
women has been increasingly emphasised. 85 The loosening of political controls on 
literary expression and the press, led to the rapid expansion of the printing and 
publishing industry. The loosening of economic controls has meant an increase in the 
quantity of radio-cassette players, video recorders, and television sets. This has been 
accompanied by the increased availability in Vietnam of foreign films on video. 86 
National Assembly deputies 
A major focus of the policies was changing the role of the National Assembly 
deputy towards being a more active legislative and representative body. This is a result 
of the loosening of the party's control over the selection process. Frost has suggested 
that Assembly deputies adopt a more active role in questioning ministers and criticising 
policy. The election of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Vietnam's Premier) 
assumed a more competitive style. In 1988, at least two candidates were to be allowed to 
run for elections. 
In June 1989, the National Assembly amended and supplemented seven minor 
articles and set up the Committee to amend the Constitution to consider fundamental 
constitutional reform. 87By 1989, many Assembly meetings were broadcast on radio and 
television. In July 1992, 395 deputies to the ninth legislature of the National Assembly 
were elected for a five-year term that commenced in September 1992. It has begun 
reforming Vietnam's administrative structure under the newly amended state 
constitution and developing the foundations for a political system governed by law. 88 
85 Frost, Vietnam's Foreign Relations, op.cit., pp.12-13 
86 The VCP has been concerned about the expanded foreign mass communications and ideas as they 
would bring about different perspectives. These may cause problems to control Vietnamese people that 
has happened in the early 1996. Campaign against social evils has occurred in Vietnam. 
87 This committee is under the chairmanship of the head of the State Council to consider fundamental 
constitutional reform. For more information, see Carlyle Thayer, "Recent political developments: 
constitutional change and the 1992 elections", in Carlyle Thayer and David Marr (eds.), Vietnam and the 
Rule of Law (Canberra: Australian National University, 1993), pp.50-80. 
88 Ibid., pp.55-6. 
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However, it remains clear that the VCP will continue to exercise ultimate control 
on selection of candidates for the Assembly, who need approval from the Party-aligned 
Vietnam Fatherland Front to stand. 89 It is likely that the most crucial aspect of the Sixth 
Congress was its formal commitment to political renovation and democratisation of 
V . 1·. 90 1etnamese po 1t1cs. 
The increasing role of other groups: war veterans, peasant farmers, private 
entrepreneurs and students 
In 1986, during the period of mounting socio-economic difficulties, the former 
Vietnamese veterans set up the Club of Former Resistance Fighters. The club published 
a Newspaper called 'Tradition of Resistance: Voice of the Resistance Fighters' which 
condemned the current party leadership for their alleged incompetence, corruption; and 
called for openness, intra-party democracy, personnel changes and the serious 
implementation of doi moi.91 In 1988, collectivised farming and cooperatives, land 
arrangements, and behaviour of authorities were among the primary issues in rural 
Vietnam. Land had been redistributed to farming households, and agricultural 
cooperatives were being transformed. A major concern among villagers was the abusive 
and corrupt local authorities they experienced.92 The peasants of the Mekong delta area 
attempted to reclaim land lost during the collectivisation process.93 
Doi moi has led to the economic reform and a marked increase in free market 
practices by private entrepreneurs in Vietnam. A decrease in party control has meant 
89 For more details of change of electoral system in Vietnam, See Carlyle Thayer, Political Developments 
in Vietnam: From the Sixth to Seventh National Party Congress, op.cit. 
90 Huynh Kim Khanh, "Vietnam's reforms: 'Renewal or death", Indochina Issues, No.84 (September, 
1988), p.1-5: 2. 
91 Nayan Chanda, "Party reformists attack the conservative leadership", FEER, 5 October 1989, p.24. 
92 For more information, see Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet, "Rural society and state relations", Vietnam's 
Rural Transformation, op.cit., pp.65-96. 
93 The peasant's demonstration were motivated by economic considerations in doi moi policy which 
recognised individual and private production, and rejected collectivised agriculture in favour of family-
based production. See Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet, "Rural society and state relations", Vietnam's Rural 
Transformation, Ibid., and Murry Hiebert, FEER, 19 January 1989. 
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that private entrepreneurs have been given the freedom to meet foreign business 
representatives without government interference.94 In addition, students and academics 
are also given more freedom. However, this freedom is indeed limited. They are not 
permitted to challenge the party's leading role in society nor advocate political pluralism 
or multi-party democracy. These, Thayer suggests, might be termed 'the three nos' .95 
2.4.2. The Seventh National Party Congress 
The Seventh National Party Congress from 24-27 June 1991 was attended by 
1,176 delegates grouped into 54 delegations representing Vietnam's provinces, cities, 
and functional groups, such as the military and central-level ministry blocs. The market-
oriented reform and gradual political change were reiterated. This marks an important 
step in what Thayer has termed "the regularisation of politics".96 
The party stressed the importance of democracy in political life; however, they 
still rejected pluralism and multi-party democracy and so assured their rights to retain a 
monopoly on power.97 The aim of reform was actually to increase the efficiency and 
administrative capacity of the existing system. Thayer has written that: 98 
Emphasis was placed on more clearly demarcated roles of the party and the 
state. The party was to set broad policy goals while the state was to engage in 
day-to-day administration and policy application. The state bureaucracy was 
to be streamlined. 
Between 1989 and 1992, Vietnam wrestled with constitutional reform.99 A major 
effort was made to increase the effectiveness of the National Assembly as a legislative 
94 Carlyle Thayer, Political Developments in Vietnam: From the Sixth to Seventh National Party 
Congress, op.cit., pp.15-6. 
95 In other words, no challenge to the party's leading role in society, no advocacy of political pluralism 
and no multi-party democracy. See Carlyle Thayer, "Stability depends on economic reform", The 
Australian, 26 June 1992. 
96 For the explanation of 'the regularisation of politics', see Carlyle Thayer, Political Developments in 
Vietnam: From the Sixth to Seventh National Party Congress, op.cit., pp.1-4. 
97 Carlyle Thayer, "The challenges facing Vietnamese communism", in Daljit Singh (ed.), South-east 
Asian Affairs 1992 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992), pp.68-73, 359-64. 
98 Thayer, Beyond Indochina, op.cit., p.15 
99 The new Constitution recognises five economic-sectors, including the private sector, human rights, and 
other freedoms. Collective leadership has been superseded by a system of ministerial responsibility, the 
Council of Ministers has been replaced by a cabinet government led by a prime minister, while the 
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body. The electoral law was amended in 1992, requiring every National Assembly seat 
to be contested. 
Voting procedures for the election of office-bearers were altered. The secret 
ballot replaced the traditional public show of hands. However, the July 1992 national 
elections disappointed those who sought to reform the system. The majority of 
independent candidates were disqualified and the two who remained were defeated. 100 
In sum, the congress reaffirmed the principles of economic renewal, but was 
short on specifics and left it to the new Central Committee to amend and 'perfect' the 
major policy documents which had been adopted. Vietnam's new leaders will be judged 
on how effectively they can manage economic reform and bring the benefits of 
d 1 V. . 1 101 eve opment to 1etnamese society at arge. 
2.4.3. Post-congress developments 
The VCP has continued its emphasis on limited political renovation within the 
guidelines laid down by the Congress. The new constitution, which replaced the 1980 
Soviet-inspired constitution, was adopted on 15 April 1992 by the National Assembly. 
The former collective leadership was abolished and replaced by a president and prime 
minister who would both be chosen by the National Assembly. 102 Marr pointed out the 
future political system in Vietnam that: 103 
Council of State has been replaced by a state president. For more details, see Carlyle Thayer, Beyond 
Indochina , Ibid. , p.15. 
100 It is clear, however, that the new National Assembly deputies are younger and better educated than the 
predecessors. Women comprise 8.2 % of the total while the figure for ethnic minorities is 8.9 %. For 
more details of the event in 1992 Elections, see Carlyle Thayer, "Recent political developments: 
constitutional change and the 1992 elections", in Carlyle Thayer and David Marr (eds), Vietnam and the 
Rule of Law, op.cit., pp.50-80, and Carlyle Thayer, Beyond Indochina, Ibid, p.15-7. 
101 Thayer, Political Developments, op.cit, p.21. 
102 The National Assembly accepted the retirement of three vice-premier: Vo Nguyen Giap, Dong Sy 
Nguyen and Nguyen Co Thach. The assembly elected Le Due Anh as President, Vo Van Kiet was re-
appointed as Prime Minister. Nong Due Manh was appointed as the Chairman of National Standing 
Committee. Phan Van Khai, Nguyen Khanh and Tran Due Luong were chosen to be vice-premiers. For 
more information, see, Carlyle Thayer, Political Development in Vietnam, op.cit, p.20-22. 
103 David Marr, "The Vietnam Communist Party and civil society", Paper to Vietnam Update 1994 
(Canberra: Australian National University, 1994), p.14. 
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... if the Party decides to reassert proletarian dictatorship on these 
organisations, many are likely to continue operating from the shadows, since 
1994 is not 1978 or 1957. If the Party allows groups to proliferate and link up 
with each other, thus infiltrating the state more effectively, the political system 
will become more vulnerable to schism and protracted instability. The third 
alternatives to legalise a public sphere independent of either state or private 
sectors. Only then might one be able to talk about a 'nascent civil society' 
The objective of current reform is to strengthen the legitimacy of the system, by 
separating state and party, reforming the electoral system, and revitalising the National 
Assembly by a process of creeping pluralism or by a soft authoritarian system, 
following the pattern of South Korea and Taiwan. 104 
The adoption of the new constitution is the most important step of Vietnam's 
political reform in all aspects of daily life. The constitution attempts to install the 
fundamental legal structure in which doi moi operates. 105 Political reform is also linked 
with opening up and a change in the direction of Vietnam's foreign policy, aimed at 
helping the country out of international isolation. The constitution refers to international 
relations and global co-operation irrespective of their political and social system. The 
principles underlying the investment law have now been included in the 1992 
constitution to promote investment in Vietnam. 106 
These changes cause the development of Vietnam's foreign relations with other 
countries which link to Vietnam's opening up. At least, the reform would attract more 
foreign trade and investment in Vietnam because the reform would cause the expansion 
of economic cooperation and contribute to peace and stability in the region. 
Nonetheless, there are deep divisions in some key areas of policy such as budget 
management, the state enterprises, the industrial and rural development, the foreign 
104 Gareth Porter, "The politics of renovation in Vietnam", Problems of Communism, Vol.39, No. 3, May-
June 1990, pp.77-88 and Borje Ljunggren, "Beyond reform: On the dynamics between economic and 
political change in Vietnam", Paper to Vietnam Update 1994, op.cit, p.52-3. 
105 Levien Do, "Vietnam's revised constitution: Impact on foreign investment", in Carlyle Thayer and 
David Marr (eds.), Vietnam and the Rule of Law, op.cit., p.116. 
106 Ibid., pp.122-3. 
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investment approval process and the urgency of pruning the bureaucracy. These 
differences are likely to slow the renovation process. 107 External factors also have 
greatly affected Vietnam's reform. 
2.5. Vietnam and major powers 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and its withdrawal from Cam Ranh Bay, the 
United States' withdrawal from the Philippines and some small Southeast Asian powers 
such as Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand have greatly affected Vietnam. 108 Vietnam 
could no longer depend on the Soviet Union for military aid and trade. 109 It had to alter 
its outlook towards the region, to end its occupation of Cambodia and to develop closer 
ties with all countries (including Scandinavia, France and Australia). A new feature of 
the security environment in the region is the greatly diminished military presence of the 
former superpowers. The growing role of the Asian powers, especially China and Japan, 
has also raised future security problems. Moreover, ASEAN has taken a greater role in 
regional politics and economics. 
Vietnam is inevitably affected by the changes in the global strategic balance of 
power and by developments in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. Major 
powers; China, the former Soviet Union, the U.S. and Japan, and regional organisations, 
particularly ASEAN have played crucial roles in encouraging Vietnam's reform. Hence, 
Vietnam needs to adjust its foreign policy outlook to be more practical and compatible 
with the present world. 
107 "Vietnam: Country forecast summary", Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), 30 November 1995. 
108 The Russian navy presences in the Cam Ranh Bay under an agreement between the former USSR and 
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The agreement runs out in 2001. The number of Russian personnel at 
the supply base is now about a quarter of what it was in 1980. See "Russia: Pacific fleet commander visits 
Cam Ranh naval base in Vietnam", BBC Monitoring Service , 7 February 1996. 
109 In the past, Vietnam had to distribute immense resources for military purpose. For instance, in 1982 the 
defence expenditure was 50% of the national budget with Soviet military aid included. See Khien 
Theeravit, "Indochina and security in Southeast Asia", in Robert A. Scalapino, et.al (eds), Internal and 
External Security in Asia (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1986), 
35 
1'' 
I 
l 
I 
I 
,11 
I 
I• 
.1 
I 
I 
1ll l 
1;: 
Il l 
2.5.1. The United States 
After the late 1970s, the U.S. did not have an official relationship with Vietnam. 
The Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia was an important event which encouraged the 
U.S. to keep Vietnam isolated. The Vietnamese invasion represented a threat to the 
U.S., China and other Asian countries. Hence, the U.S. joined ASEAN and China in 
opposing Vietnam's presence in Cambodia and provided some assistance to non-
Communist Khmer resistance. The U.S. also acted to deny Vietnam access to loans from 
the IMF, the WB and the ADB. The embargo prevented U.S. citizens from doing 
business with Vietnam. 
However, since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European 
states, the end of Soviet aid to Vietnam, the U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Sino normalisation 
and the U.S. internal economic problems produced a change in the U.S.-Vietnam policy. 
Frost has pointed out that criticism from some U.S. business interests towards the 
embargo was increasing during that period. 110 
In 1991, Vietnam expressed the hope for Vietnam-U .S. normalisation. 111 In the 
same year, the United States also made a detailed proposal on the issue of normalisation, 
which was linked to progress on a Cambodian settlement, in a step-by-step manner. 112 
The significant turning point of normalisation was the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops 
p.227. 
110 The U.S. companies were frustrated at the increased Japanese and European businesses in Vietnam. 
They started to try to remove the U.S. embargo towards Vietnam. See, Frank Frost, Vietnam's Foreign 
Policy, op.cit., p.42-3. 
111 Kieu Nguyen, "Vietnam-US relations", Vietnam Courier, No. 20 (June 1991), p.4. 
112 Frost concluded the outline of a four-phase Vietnam-U.S. normalisation which was proposed by 
Richard Solomon. The first phase, after Vietnam and the State of Cambodia signed a peace accord on 
Cambodia, the United States would allow U.S. business and veterans groups to travel to Vietnam. The 
second phase, when UN officials arrived in Cambodia and arranged a cease-fire, the United States would 
end trade embargo with Vietnam. In the third phase, after the peace accord had been in effect and after all 
Vietnamese troops had left Cambodia, the United States would begin withdrawing U.S. opposition to 
loans by international financial institutions to Vietnam. In the fourth phase, after free elections and the 
establishment of a new National Assembly in Cambodia, the United States would normalise diplomatic 
and economic relations with Vietnam. See Robert G. Sutter, "Vietnam-US relations: The debate over 
normalisation", CRS Issue Brief (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 12 May 1992). Quoted in 
Frank Frost, Vietnam's Foreign Relations, op.cit., p.43. 
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from Cambodia in 1989 which brought about the end of the Vietnamese threat. The 
1991 Cambodian peace settlement made the U.S.-Vietnam rapprochement easier. Once 
the agreement was signed, regional states dropped their long-standing embargo on trade, 
aid and investment. 113 (The lifting of the trade embargo on Vietnam has previously been 
discussed) 
The end of the embargo greatly benefited Vietnam' s economic development. 
The restoration of telecommunications links was permitted, commercial sales were 
allowed where the items involved meeting basic humanitarian needs, and restrictions 
were lifted on projects undertaken by non-profit and non-governmental organisations. 
Many U.S. companies have been exploring potential opportunities in Vietnam for 
example, airlines and aircraft manufacturers have been developing contacts in 
. . . f fu b . 114 ant1c1pat1on o ture us1ness. 
Thayer has suggested that these developments have several notable 
implications. 115 First, Vietnam has reoriented its foreign economic relations towards 
free-market economies. It also has established diplomatic ties with many countries 
including South Korea, Israel and Taiwan. Second, economic factors are significant in 
the building up of Vietnam's security. In the 1991 Seventh Congress, the VCP stated 
that a stable peaceful external environment is necessary for economic development. 
Vietnamese leaders have responded by modifying foreign investment laws and 
regulations and by giving priority to commercial legislation to attract foreign investment 
trade and aid. Third, the political economy of Vietnam is being rapidly reshaped as aid 
113 Thayer, Beyond Indochina, op.cit., p.12. 
114 F v· ' F . R l . . 44 rost, zetnam s orezgn e atwns, op.cit., p. . 
115 Thayer, Beyond Indochina, op.cit., p.12-4. 
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donors, foreign investors and international financial institutions make their presence 
felt.116 
The lifting of the trade embargo unconditionally on 3 February 1994 has boosted 
the Vietnamese economy since the VCP launched its free-market reform in 1986.117 The 
lifting of the embargo caused a remarkable increase in the activity of U.S. companies 
wishing to do business in Vietnam, many of whom already had representatives in Hanoi. 
The U.S. ranks fifteenth on the foreign investment ladder with a total of US$ 159 
million invested in 16 projects in 1994. 118 Most significantly, the U.S. and Vietnam 
normalised diplomatic relations in July 1995. The U.S. is looking at Vietnam, with its 
fast-growing population of 73.5 million, as a potentially important market for 
agricultural products. 119 In 1995, President Clinton announced in relations to his 
decision to extend diplomatic recognition to the government in Hanoi that: 120 
I believe normalization and increased contact between Americans and 
Vietnamese will advance the cause of freedom in Vietnam, just as it did in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
The U.S.-Vietnam relationship improved greatly as Vietnamese officials 
released a number of photographs and more information of the fate on American 
servicemen listed as missing in action (MIA) to private American researchers. MIAs are 
a maJor point in negotiations to establish full trade and economic relations with 
Vietnam, whose forces defeated U.S.-backed South Vietnam in April 1975. Washington 
said in November 1995 that of 2,202 Americans still missing from the Vietnam War, 
116 In particular, Southern Vietnam, HCMC, is becoming a powerful commercial counterbalance to the 
political centre in Hanoi. Other regional centres, such as Hai Phong and Da Nang, are emerging. 
117 "Asia 1994", Far Eastern Economic Yearbook, 1994, pp.223-4, and Michael Mecham and Paul Mann, 
"Clinton Lifts Vietnam Embargo", Aviation Week and Space Technology, 7 February 1994, 
pp. 20-1. 
118 Thayer, Beyond Indochina , op.cit., p.59. 
119 Nancy Waitz, "U.S. eyes Vietnam's as agricultural market", Reuter News Service , 30 November 
1995. 
120 Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, "Remarks by the President in announcement on 
normalisation of diplomatic relations with Vietnam", Washington D.C., 11 July 1995, p.3. Quoted in 
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1,476 cases required further action and 567 had virtually no chance of ever being 
resolved. 121 The U.S. President Clinton signed an order on 14 May 1996 to end the 
classification of Vietnam as a combat zone 21 years after the U.S. troop withdrawal 
from Vietnam. 122 The U.S. was pleased with the cooperation but still wanted more 
progress as the MIAs remain America's highest priority. It was officially announced that 
Vietnam would provide further extensive data to the U.S. 
The achievement of the U.S.-Vietnam normalisation would involve some 
significant challenges for Vietnam. It would, for instance, bring an increase in business 
activity that would highlight the inadequacies of Vietnam's infrastructure. A rapid 
increase of activity would place added strain on the banking and finance sector, and 
highlight the limited availability of office space and suitably skilled and trained people 
to accommodate business and investment operations. One of the conditions which needs 
to be met for Vietnam is to earn the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) trading status. MFN, 
which guarantees non-discriminatory tariff rates on exports, would help Vietnam's 
textiles and other goods compete in the U.S. market. Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary 
of State, said that both governments were working to answer certain questions to reach a 
trade agreement. 123 
2.5.2. The Soviet Union 
The Soviet Union used to be the main supporter, providing immense aid to 
Vietnam. Table 7 shows that Soviet aid to Vietnam doubled in each five-year planning 
Allan E. Goodman, "Political consequences of normalisation of U.S.-Vietnam relations", Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, Vol.17, No.4, March 1996, pp.420-429: 421. 
121 John Chalmers, "U.S. puts MIAs at top of broadening Vietnam agenda", Reuter News Service, 19 
January 1996. 
122 This order allows the Washington administration to stop providing fixed allowances to the families of 
those American soldiers missing in action (MIAs) in Vietnam and to those people searching for the 
remains of their relatives killed in action. This announcement by President Clinton is a very important 
turning point. It was made public nearly a year after the U.S. decision to normalise relations with Vietnam. 
See "Vietnam reports U.S. acknowledgment of death of reported MIAs", BBC Monitoring Service, 23 
May 1996. 
123 John Chalmers, "U.S. puts MIAs at top of broadening Vietnam agenda", op.cit. 
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period from 1976-1990. Hom has noted, the Soviet Union gave about US$ 13 billion to 
Vietnam to support the 1986-1990 five year Plan. 124 
Table 7: Soviet Economic Aid to Vietnam, 1955-1990 (million roubles) 
1955-60 1961-65 1966-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 
- 1st FYP - 2ndFYP 3rd FYP 4th FYP 
Grants 400 20 253 ** 223 *** 
Loan 
-with interest - 430 - 700 2500 *** 
-interest free * - 1247 800 600 *** 
Total 400 450 1500 1500 3323 8700 
Average a year 67 90 150 300 665 1740 
. - -
Source: Nong Nghiep (Hanoi), No.5, November 1987, pp.I, 7. 125 
The Soviet Union developed an extensive presence at Cam Ranh Bay. Soviet 
military aid in 1980s, amounting to US$ 1 billion annually was a vital support for 
Vietnam's presence in Cambodia. 126 Nonetheless, in 1989 the Soviet Union indicated 
that it would cut its military assistance to Vietnam by one-third and that Vietnam would 
124 Robert C. Horn, "Soviet policy in Southeast Asia in the Gorbachev era: Change or continuity", in 
Thambipillai and Matuszewski (eds), The Soviet Union and the Asia-Pacific Region (New York: Praeger, 
1989), pp.60-75. 
125 Refers to Table 7, *Does not include a grant of 200m roubles in commodity aid. **no details are 
provided. ***Not specified. See Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle Thayer, "Economic relations", Soviet 
Relations with India and Vietnam (London: Macmillan, 1992), p.189. 
126 Carlyle Thayer, "Vietnam and the Soviet Union", in Thambipillai and Matuszewski (eds), The Soviet 
Union and the Asia-Pacific Region, op.cit., p.137. 
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now be expected to pay for military equipment. 127 The Soviet cut-back caused some 
troubles to Vietnam. Frost has stated that: 128 
the progress of normalisation of relations with China after President 
Gorbachev went to Beijing in May 1989 and the Soviet Union's intense focus 
on its internal economic priorities and problems changed the context in which 
the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship developed in the late 1980s ... The Soviets 
subsequently moved to scale down their usage and deployment in the facilities 
and ... intended ultimately to withdraw all its military forces from Vietnam. 
The changing relations between Vietnam and the Soviet Union in the late 1980s 
was illustrated by the Soviet Foreign Ministry in 1989 that: 'all countries are expected to 
learn to cooperate, to respect each other regardless of distinctions in ideology and to 
search for common ground in the ideological principles of a large or small section of 
humanity, principles that are often antithetical in content'. 129 In 1992, on the eve of the 
most senior state visit to Vietnam by a Russian official, a spokesman declared that 
Soviet and Vietnam relations were still friendly but they had been depoliticised and de-
.d 1 . d 130 1 eo og1se . 
In reaction to Chinese pressure and several internal Soviet problems, the Soviet 
Union had to adjust its policy towards Vietnam. The Soviet Union reduced its security 
guarantee, aid and all other financial support to Vietnam. In 1992, the Vietnam-Soviet 
ties and defence co-operation remained uncertain. It partly depended on the outcome of 
efforts to stabilise and revitalise Russia's economy. Vietnam commenced new economic 
127 Carlyle Thayer, "The Soviet Union and Indochina", Paper for 4th World Congress for Soviet and East 
Europe Studies (Great Britain: Harrogate, July 1990), p.4. Although the Soviet Union retained a military 
presence in Vietnam, it was clear that it no longer played a crucial role in the region. Even if the Soviet 
Union continues to be a source of arms for Vietnam, it is also actively interested in supplying weapons to 
China. 
128 F v· ' F . R l . . 26 rost, zetnam s oreign e atwns, op.cit., p. . 
129 Thayer, "The Soviet Union and Indochina", op.cit., p.4. 
13° Carlye Thayer, "Indochina" in Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle Thayer (eds.), Reshaping Regional 
Relations: Asia-Pacific and the Former Soviet Union (Oxford: Westview Press, 1993), p.205. 
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relationships because trade between them had declined considerably. Vietnam reoriented 
its trade to Western industrial countries, Japan and the developing Asian countries. 131 
However, Vietnam and the Soviet Union during 1994-1996 have improved 
political and economic ties by frequent official-visit exchanges. In April 1994, Russian 
Deputy Premier Yuriy Yarov met Vo Van Kiet in Hanoi, and in June 1994, Vo Van Kiet 
visited to Russia. The two sides agreed to establish a new relationship to replace close 
communist links shattered when the Soviet Union collapsed.132 The important 
achievement of Kiet' s visit to Moscow was the signing of a new friendship treaty to 
replace the 'comer-stone' agreement of 1978.133 
In July 1995, the Russian Foreign Ministry hailed the re-establishment of full 
U.S.-Vietnamese relations. 134 Russia stressed that Vietnam's entry into ASEAN was 
also an additional link between ASEAN and Russia. 135 Nguyen Manh Cam, the 
Vietnamese Foreign Minister, met Panov, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, in 
1996. They agreed that Vietnam and Russia had such a long record of cooperation that 
both states should strengthen their relations, and that any problems can be resolved 
through the development of relations. 136 
2.5.3. China 
Since the 1975 re-unification of Vietnam, China has felt the need to prevent 
Vietnamese regional hegemon, as Vietnam with an outside power can pose a threat to 
131 Thayer, Beyond Indochina, op.cit., p.12. 
132 The agreement included economic, scientific, and fisheries cooperation. It was affirmed that Russia 
would not lose its position in Vietnam and seek for new cooperation fields because Vietnam has moved 
away from its former mentor and built close ties with non-communist Asia and the West. See "Russia, 
Vietnam aim to improve relations", Reuter News Service, 16 June 1994 and "Russian delegation in 
Vietnam to seek continued cooperation", BBC Monitoring Service, 15 April 1996. 
133 Thayer, Beyond Indochina, op.cit., p.60. 
134 "Foreign Ministry welcomes restoration of full U.S.-Vietnamese relations", BBC Monitoring Service, 
28 July 1995. 
135 Russia wanted to support a good mechanism to develop regional stability. See Sanjay Perera, 
"ASEAN: Ways sought to improve relations", Straits Times, 31 July 1995. 
136 "Russia: Deputy Foreign Minister Panov promises closer links with Vietnam", and "Vietnamese and 
Russian communist parties to strengthen ties", BBC Monitoring Service, 5 February 1996. 
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China. However, the Sino-Soviet normalisation in 1989 and Vietnam's domestic 
economic problems created a new climate for Vietnam's foreign policy when Vietnam 
withdrew from Cambodia in 1989 .137 Vietnam expected the international community to 
suspend the embargo and view it with less distrust and suspicion. 
At the Sixth Congress, all hostile references to China were dropped. 138 Tension 
on the Sino-Vietnamese border was gradually reduced. Vietnam realised that if Sino-
Vietnamese antagonism remained high, its economic development would suffer. 139 The 
1991 Seventh Congress in Vietnam made crucial steps to promote the rapprochement 
with China. The Sino-Vietnam relations were normalised on a party-to-party basis in 
November 1991 that caused two-way trade in 1995 to double to almost 1 billion dollars, 
up from 534 million dollars in 1994. (For a discussion, see Chapter 4) 
Despite the improvement of relations, some problems such as the Vietnamese 
refugees, the smuggling of cheap Chinese goods into Vietnam and the territorial 
disputes over the land and sea border such as the Gulf of Tonkin and the Spratly Islands 
remain unresolved. (For a discussion of the territorial disputes, see Chapter 4) 
However, in 1995 both sides agreed that those can be settled through peaceful 
negotiations. They reopened two railways between China and Vietnam in 1996 that 
prompted a trade boom worth an estimated US$900 million. 140 The Sino-Vietnamese 
normalisation is not only in the world's economic interest but in the interest of peace 
that they were integrated into the global arena. 
137 There was the failure that no internationally-sanctioned observers kept an eye on the withdrawal. For 
more information, see Roland J. Cima, "Vietnam in 1989: Initiating the post-Cambodia period", Asian 
Survey 30, no. 1 (January 1990), pp.88-95, 88-90 and Gary Klintworth, "Forces of change in Vietnam", 
op.cit., p219. 
138 Carlyle Thayer, "China's domestic crisis and Vietnamese responses, April-July 1989", in Gary 
Klintworth (ed.), China's Crisis: The International Implications (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies 
Centre, The Australian National University, 1989), p.81-97, 90-2. 
139 Gary Klintworh, "Forces of change in Vietnam", op.cit, p.220. 
140 James Pringle, "Vietnam and China reopen raillines to extend trade links", The Times, 15 February 
1996. 
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2.5.4. Japan and International financial agencies 
During the initial period, Japan was motivated by both the desire of using 
economic relations to soften Vietnam's political viewpoints to regional problems and 
security, and also by the fact that Vietnam was a source of raw materials and a potential 
market in the region for the sales of Japanese goods. In 1975, a Japanese embassy was 
d . H . 141 opene 1n ano1. 
Because of the Cambodian problem and the unsatisfactory political atmosphere 
in East Asia, Vietnam-Japan trade dropped from US$ 267 million in 1978 to US$ 128 
million in 1982. Until 1989, the total amount of two-way trade was still small. Vietnam 
imported from Japan more than it could export to Japan. 142 Nonetheless, at the Sixth and 
Seventh Congress, Japan was mentioned as one of five target countries for an expansion 
of friendly relations. 143 
Since 1989, Vietnam-I apan trade has entered a new period. Japanese 
businessmen have explored the Vietnamese markets. Major Japanese business groups 
have set up representative offices in Vietnam: Mitsubishi, Susu Mitsui, Tokyo Bank and 
other Japanese banks. Two-way trade has been increasing. Vietnam's exports to Japan 
increased to US$ 950 million in 1993 (US$ 340 million in 1990) whereas imports 
reached US$ 495 million in 1993. This resulted in a trade surplus for Vietnam. 144 
141 It was followed by many official and semiofficial mutual visits for the purpose of discussing concrete 
problems, the major of which were: economic and technical cooperation with respect to Vietnamese 
projects; export of Japanese goods; the necessary financing for the above projects and export. See Vo Dai 
Luoc, Akie Ishida, et.al., op.cit, pp.218-9. 
142 Vietnam imported food, fuels, cloth, minerals, light industrial goods, chemical products and metals. 
Vietnam exported to Japan: food, raw material, minerals, processed goods. 
143 The others were Australia, France, Finland and Sweden. See Inada Juichi, "Japan's aid freeze to 
Vietnam: Historical process and its diplomatic implications", in Mio Tadashi (ed.), Indochina in 
transition: Confrontation or Co-prosperity (Tokyo: Japan Institute for International Affairs, 1989), pp. 
195-214. 
144 Vo Dai Luoc, Akie Ishida, et.al., op.cit., p.220. 
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Table 8: Vietnam's major trade partners, 1993 (million US$) 
Exports Imports Total trade turnover 
Singapore 350 750 1100 
Japan 950 495 1445 
Hong Kong 105 550 655 
Taiwan 130 260 390 
Malaysia 92 159 257 
South Korea 81 160 241 
China 110 80 220 
Source: Ministry of Trade of Vietnam 
Singapore is the largest trading partner and Japan comes second. In 1996, Japan 
provided Vietnam with more than US$ 800 million dollars in loans and grants to help 
the country's economic reforms. 145 Vietnam may need at least US$ 10 billion of ODA 
from now until the year 2000. 
Japan also supported Vietnam's efforts to normalise its relations with the 
international financial institutions. In July 1993, the United States relaxed its policy of 
blocking loans to Vietnam by international lending agencies such as the IMF, the WB 
and the ADB. IMF announced a US$ 535 million loan to Vietnam for its economic 
reform programmes from 1995-1997 .146 
The WB lent Vietnam US$ 450 million in the 1995 fiscal year, and a total of 
US$ 352 million in the 1994 fiscal year. The ADB has pledged loans worth US$ 1.2 to· 
1.4 billion, and non-refundable technical assistance of US$ 50 million for the period 
from 1995 to 1997. The ADB' s support for Vietnam since 1993 has included nine loans 
worth $634 and non-refundable aid of $ 30 million for technical support projects. The 
145 "Tokyo to provide 800m dollars in loans and grants", BBC Monitoring Service, 6 December 1995. 
146 "Economic news", Vietnam Business Opportunities, Vol.3 No.24 (December 1994), p.2. 
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loans granted were for irrigation, road improvement, Ho Chi Minh City's water supply, 
an agriculture programme, the Saigon port, the rehabilitation of power distribution and 
sanitation, and the fisheries industry. 147 
The lending figure is part of the ADB' s formal medium-term operational 
strategy for Vietnam, whose proposed priority areas are policy reform and institutional 
development, rural development, human development, environmental and natural 
resource management and infrastructure development. 
In 1995, foreign investors were greatly interested in Highway No.1, "the 
transport artery of Vietnam's economy". The highway is 2,300 kilometre long and links 
most of the provincial capitals and cultural, political and economic centres of the 
country. The road was damaged during the war years, but Vietnam has been provided 
with overseas aid to fund studies into upgrading and reconstructing the highway. 
The ADB has provided a loan of 114 million dollars to upgrade a 439 kilometre 
section between HCMC and Nha Trang, while the World Bank has granted Vietnam a 
176 million dollar loan for the rehabilitation of the Hanoi-Vinh and HCMC-Can Tho 
sectors. The Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund of Japan has also assigned a loan for 
construction and rehabilitation of 38 bridges along the highway. 148 
2.5.5. ASEAN 
After the 1989 Vietnamese troop withdrawal from Cambodia, ASEAN-
Vietnamese relations have improved immensely. Indonesian President Soeharto visited 
Vietnam in 1990.149 Vietnamese Premier, Vo Van Kiet, made his first foreign visit as 
Premier to Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore in November 1991 and visited all 
147 "ADB to grant Vietnam $1.5 billion loans by 1999", Reuter News Service, 3 February 1996. 
148 "Foreign aids being used to restore main highway", BBC Monitoring Service, 6 December 1995. 
149 The visit was the first one by an ASEAN member country's head of state since 1975. See more details 
of other leaders'visit exchange in Frost, Vietnam's Foreign Relations, op.cit., p.61-2. 
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ASEAN members by early 1992.150 Trade between ASEAN and Vietnam has nsen 
greatly from US$ 163 million in 1989 to over US$ 1.6 billion in 1992.151 
In July 1994 the rapprochement betvveen Vietnam and ASEAN reached a new 
height at the 27th ASEAN Annual Ministerial Meeting in Bangkok when the ministers 
of ASEAN agreed that Vietnam could join ASEAN as a member. (For details and 
discussion of membership, AFTA and ARF, see Chapter 3) 
Conclusion 
Based on the draft documents to be submitted to the Eighth National 
Congress ... in the next five-year plan ( 1996-2000). It should be noted that 
without industrialisation, fast sustainable economic growth cannot be 
obtained, effective agricultural and rural socioeconomic development and 
employment for the working people cannot be ensured, and the people 's living 
conditions cannot be improved ... Human resources are important factors that 
h 1 .d .l . . 152 ensure t e success o zn ustrza zsatzon. 
To sum up, the bottom-up pressures for reform pushed Vietnam to industrialise 
and modernise its country to promote its doi moi policy, which resulted in an increase of 
foreign direct investment. Domestic and external pressures for change caused further 
reform, which in turn led to a transition from central planning to a market economy.153 
Vietnam's political system has been reforming due to the socio-economic change. It is 
likely that the mono-organisational socialism will end in Vietnam. Vietnam's one-party 
system will be transformed into 'soft authoritarianism'. 
Vietnam's relations with foreign countries have been transformed, especially 
after the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, which caused 
the cutting of aid to Vietnam. Sino-Soviet normalisation occurred in 1989. Gorbachev' s 
new political thinking of reform, the Soviet dissatisfaction over Vietnamese misuse of 
150 Vietnam Courier, March 1992, No.29, p.l. 
151 Michael Richardson, "Southeast Asia wins Vietnam trade, investment share", The Australian Business 
Asia, 17-30 August 1994, p.8. 
152 "Party Chief Do Muoi stresses importance of industrialisation", BBC Monitoring Service, 12 January 
1996. 
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Soviet aid in the mid 1980s and the end of the Cambodian conflict pushed Vietnam to 
reform its economy and change its attitude toward foreign policy. 154 Vietnam 
normalised its relations with China in 1991 and with the U.S. in 1995. International 
financial agencies such as IMF, WB and ADB were allowed to give financial aid to 
Vietnam, that has facilitated the economic development in Vietnam. 
The balance of power in Southeast Asia is changing due to Chinese 
assertiveness. However, it is likely that an expanded ASEAN with Vietnam would be 
sufficient to stabilise a new balance. It must be combined in a new security framework 
that embraces the wider Asia-Pacific region. 
Despite greater industrialisation and cordial foreign relations, Vietnam still has 
internal problems. These include: a lack of good infrastructure, an inefficient public 
sector, investment in capital construction and a deficit in the state budget. The limited 
political renovation is mainly concerned with the creation of a more streamlined and 
effective system of government. Moreover, inflation, smuggling, corruption and other 
urgent social issues need to be solved. Education and personal training to create 
qualified people to meet the requirements of the industrialisation process need special 
attention. Importantly, Vietnam's under-developed legal system affects foreign 
investors. 
The Eighth National Party Congress in 1996 is a crucial turning point as it is 
reassessment of ten years of doi moi. It is certain that Vietnam needs to develop in 
industrialisation and modernisation at a higher growth rate, but economic growth should 
be 'harmonious with social development, balanced development between regions, the 
153 Thayer, Beyond Indochina, op.cit., p.62. 
154 Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle Thayer, Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam, op.cit., pp.77-80. 
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implementation of a campaign to eliminate hunger and reduce poverty, and the 
. . d 1 f . . '155 socioecononuc eve opment o mountain regions. 
The fundamental solution is to improve the efficiency and quality of the state-
managed economic sector and of the economy as a whole. 156 Vietnam will certainly take 
a longer time to reform its economy than others. Nonetheless, if the legal system 
protects both domestic and foreign investment, and the labour market, communications, 
banking system and political system are developed to be more effective, Vietnam can 
expect more foreign investments. 
Due to the current integration with the world economy, Vietnam has moved to 
open its door to every country both socialist and non-socialist including South Korea, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan and Israel. ASEAN economies, as Vietnam's neighbours, should 
have special attention. This influences Vietnam to think about being a full member of 
ASEAN, which is the first step to integration into the world economy with more 
acceptance. Hence, Vietnam needs to adjust its foreign policy outlook to be more 
practical and compatible in the present world. 
155 "Planning Minister interviewed on economic tasks and problems in 1996", BBC Monitoring Service, 2 
February 1996. 
156 Do Quoc Sam suggested two things to be done. First is enhancing the business efficiency and 
competitiveness of state businesses by improving business management and modernising technologies. 
Second is continuing the reorganisation of businesses to improve the competitiveness. For more details of 
his suggestion, see, Ibid. 
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Introduction 
Chapter 3 
Vietnam, ASEAN and The New Regional Order 
Leaders of disparate Southeast Asian countries, divided by language, religion 
and culture, are pushing ahead with an ambitious plan to integrate their 
booming economies into one of the world's largest common markets ... Last July 
[ 1995 J communist Vietnam, ASEAN's bogey man for its first two decades of 
existence, became the seventh member... "Wider and deeper" has become 
ASEAN' s rallying cry as leaders call for broader membership and deeper 
economic cooperation built on the foundation of their ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA) ... All the ASEAN countries have reaffirmed their determination to 
foster peace and prosperity for the peoples of Southeast Asia.157 
After the 1975 re-unification of Vietnam, ASEAN countries discussed the 
possibility of extending membership to the rest of Southeast Asian countries or to limit 
ASEAN membership in order to consolidate their achievements. ASEAN finally chose 
the latter. Suspicions set in between ASEAN and Vietnam, because of differences in 
their perceptions of threats to regional security and their preferred order for the region. 
After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was no 
longer a prevailing sense of ideological confrontation between major powers. These 
changes have led ASEAN countries to see the importance of their coming together in 
closer cooperation with Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Burma. In addition, economic 
globalisation has produced a greater interdependence amongst countries throughout the 
world, including Southeast Asia. Political changes in the world's communist and former 
communist countries has affected Southeast Asia and has permitted 'intractable 
situations to be addressed relatively successful.' 158 
157 Robert Birsel, "Feature-Asia's young dragons see strength in unity", Reuter News Service, 11 January 
1996. 
158 Narongchai Akrasanee and David Stifel, "A vision of Southeast Asia in the year 2000: Towards a 
common economic regime", Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.16, No.I, June 1994, pp.1-13, 5. 
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Significant dialogue between ASEAN and Vietnam began after Vietnam finally 
withdrew its troops from Cambodia in 1989. The 1991 Paris Agreement on Cambodia 
changed the regional environment, and finally caused Vietnam-ASEAN rapprochement. 
Vietnam developed closer contact with the ASEAN members in the early 1990s. 
Vietnam and Laos acceded to ASEAN's 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
(TAC) in July 1992. The Indochina-ASEAN normalisation proceeded well through the 
27th ASEAN Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Bangkok in 1994. Ministers of 
ASEAN admitted in principle that Vietnam could join the organisation as a new 
member. Vietnam became a full new member in July 1995. This was the first step in 
expanding ASEAN membership up to 10 members, including Laos, Cambodia and 
Burma, which would make ASEAN a truly regional association. 
This chapter outlines the process of Vietnam's entry into ASEAN from mid-
1986 onwards. It looks at political and economic and other advantages and incentives 
for both Vietnam and ASEAN following Vietnam's membership. Because of different 
levels of development and different political systems, both Vietnam and ASEAN may 
have some problems in an expanded ASEAN. This chapter discusses some key 
obstacles to Vietnam's entry into ASEAN, in particular the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF) and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). In addition, it considers some ways 
for their cooperation in order to solve problems constructively to strengthen the 
association. 
3.1. Vietnam's admission into ASEAN 
ASEAN-Vietnamese relations have passed through various periods alternating 
between political confrontation and diplomatic conciliation. Major turning points were 
in 1975 when communist forces swept to power in Vietnam; in 1978 when Vietnam 
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invaded Cambodia; in 1981 when ASEAN secured UN endorsement for its anti-
Vietnam political strategy; 1985 when Vietnamese military forces upset the military 
balance in Cambodia; and 1988 when the protagonists opened a dialogue in an effort to 
find a political solution to the conflict. 159 
In fact, Vietnam opened diplomatic ties with the Philippines in 1976, and with 
Malaysia in 1977. Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh visited Bangkok in January 
1978.160 However, ASEAN ceased its normalisation process with Vietnam for some 
time after Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, which posed a potential threat to ASEAN 
as a whole. ASEAN also placed a trade embargo on Vietnam to place an economic 
pressure on the latter during its occupation of Cambodia. 
When the Cambodian conflict was settled in 1989, Vietnam-ASEAN 
rapprochement was reinitiated. In response to years of severe economic problems, doi 
moi was officially announced as a new process of economic reform in Vietnam in 1986. 
Many regulations were lifted over subsequent years and market forces played an 
increasing role, thus creating new incentives for wider Vietnamese regional and 
international economic relations. 161 
As the Soviet Union cut military aid to Vietnam during the late 1980s, Vietnam 
decided to withdraw its military forces from Cambodia by September 1989 and began to 
seek international political acceptance. From late in 1990 there were an increasing 
number of ministerial visits between Vietnam and ASEAN states. Vo Van Kiet made 
his first foreign visit as Premier to Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia in 
159 Carlyle Thayer, "ASEAN and Indochina: The dialogue", in Alison Broinowski (ed.), ASEAN into the 
1990s (Hong Kong: The Macmillan Press, 1990), pp.138-159; 139. 
16° For more details of Vietnam and pre-existing ASEAN state in late 1970s, see Frank Frost, Vietnam's 
Foreign Relations: Dynamics of Change (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993), p.59 and 
Carlyle Thayer, "ASEAN and Indochina: The dialogue", Ibid., pp.143-146. 
161 I would like to thank Dr. Frank Frost for his valuable paper for my guideline, see Frank Frost, 
Vietnam's Membership of ASEAN: Issues and Implications (Canberra: The Department of the 
Parliamentary Library, 1995), p.3. After Doi Moi was officially announced in 1986, there were little 
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November 1991 and had visited all ASEAN countries by early 1992. Although the visits 
were brief, they were very successful to the building up of friendship, mutual trust and 
· · h · 162 cooperation 1n t e region. 
After the signing of the Paris Agreement in 1991, Vietnam-ASEAN relations 
improved greatly. It meant that Vietnam had ceased to be the central hegemon in 
Southeast Asia and had committed itself to pay attention to its domestic reconstruction. 
Trade and investment from the ASEAN members increased substantially.163 Senior 
leader exchanges were at a high level, such as President Suharto's visit to Vietnam in 
1990. These included a number of visits by military leaders to develop new contacts. 164 
"Vietnam's changed dispositions and rearranged priorities in turn meant an opportunity 
for fulfilling ASEAN' s almost three-decade-old dream of a region-wide order." 165 
In 1990, Vietnamese Premier Do Muoi announced that, "We wish to JOln 
ASEAN very much. Joining ASEAN would be helpful. We need more friends to build 
our country."166 It was a clear signal that Vietnam had changed its foreign policy and 
wished to have cordial ties with ASEAN. In 1992, Vietnam and Laos acceded to the 
TAC which, though officially not an ASEAN agreement, embodied ASEAN' s vision of 
a regional order. Subsequently, Vietnam and Laos were accorded observer status. 167 
In 1993, Vietnam attended ASEAN at the Consultative Meeting during the 26th 
ASEAN Ministerial Meetings (AMM) in Singapore for the first time. Its membership 
changes. The decisions were made then, but the major structural changes occurred in 1988. There had also 
been some important developments prior to 1986 such as liberalisation of agriculture in 1981. 
162 Vietnam Courier, March 1992, No.29, p.1. Indonesia's President Soeharto had a reciprocal visit to 
Vietnam in 1990 which was the first ASEAN head of state who visited since 1975 reunification. 
163 By 1994, Singapore was Vietnam's largest trading partner. 
164 Frank Frost, Vietnam's Membership of ASEAN, op.cit., p.3. 
165 Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "From ASEAN Six to ASEAN Ten: Issues and prospects", Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, Vol.16, No.3, December 1994, p.243-73, 245. 
166 Philip Bowring, "Into a wider world", FEER, 22 November 1990, p. 10. 
167 The accession of Vietnam to the Treaty indicates that Vietnam fully respects the principles of peaceful 
co-existence in the region. These are a)strict non-interference in the internal affairs of fellow members, 
b )peaceful settlement of disputes, c )respect for each other's independence, and d)strict respect for the 
territorial integrity of fellow members. See Bilson Kurus, "Understanding ASEAN: Benefits and raison 
d'etre", Asian Survey, Vol.33, no.8, August 1993, pp.819-31. 
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was considered "a necessary condition for Southeast Asia's future peace and 
prosperity". 168 In February 1994, during the ASEAN Secretary-General's official visit to 
Vietnam, the Vietnamese Foreign Minister said for the first time that Vietnam was ready 
to join ASEAN and wanted to know how and when it could become a full member. 
In July 1994, the 27th AMM in Bangkok was also important inasmuch as it 
established an ASEAN-based region-wide order in other respects. 169 The pre-existing 
members affirmed their readiness to accept Vietnam as a member of ASEAN and 
instructed their senior officials and ASEAN Secretary-General to undertake early 
consultation with Vietnamese officials concerning the appropriate modalities and 
arrangements. On 17 October 1994, the Vietnamese Foreign Minister submitted a letter 
of application for membership in ASEAN. 
In November 1994, it was recommended that Vietnam should be admitted as a 
member scheduled for July 1995 in Brunei Darussalam. Vietnam was accepted as a 
founder member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994. The Vietnamese 
delegation led by the Vietnamese Ambassador in Jakarta attended the third meeting of 
the 28th ASC held in Jakarta on 24-26 January 1995 as an observer for the first time. 
On 15 February 1995, four Vietnamese officials led by the deputy Director of the 
ASEAN Department started their training at the ASEAN Secretariat in a two-month 
attachment programme funded by the Ford Foundation. A second group of another four 
was scheduled to start a similar programme at the ASEAN Secretariat on 15 April 1995. 
The delegation led by Mr. Krirk-krai Jirapaet, Director General of the Business 
168 "The ASEAN-Vietnam Study group, shared destiny: Southeast Asia in the 21st century", Report of the 
ASEAN-Vietnam Study Group, February 1993, p.49. Quoted in Paribatra," From ASEAN Six to ASEAN 
Ten", op. cit. 
169 For the first time, Laos and Cambodia expressed its interest in joining ASEAN in 1997. They have 
already obtained observer status to ASEAN since 1992 and 1995 respectively. Burma has fulfilled the first 
requirement for membership by acceding to the TAC. See, Anurak Manibhandu, Saritdet Marukatat, 
Nussara Sawatsawong and Banyat Tasaneeyavej , "Regional unity under ASEAN a 'necessity"', Bangkok 
Post, 15 December 1995, p.5 and "PM lists peace and security as ASEAN's prime concerns", Bangkok 
Post, 22 December 1995, p.4. 
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Economic Department, visited Vietnam in January 1995 to find out whether Vietnam 
was ready to participate in ASEAN economic cooperation.170 In July 1995, Vietnam 
became a full new member of ASEAN. 
Vietnam has demonstrated an increasing willingness and capacity to participate 
1n and benefit from the global and regional economic development process. 
Undoubtedly, numerous difficulties still remain. But it seems that, after many years of 
war and isolation, Vietnam is moving in a much more positive direction and may soon 
be able to achieve a level of performance which can both enhance its peoples' well-
being and contribute to the vitality of the region's economy. More importantly, 
Vietnam's entry into ASEAN is a remarkable turning point for Vietnam-ASEAN ties. It 
represents the end of a long period of suspicion and tension. 
3.2. Factors pushing Vietnam to join ASEAN 
The Sixth and Seventh Congress 
Since the 1986 Sixth Party Congress, the economic imperative had cast a 
shadow over the political one. The congress launched an economic reform that 
attempted to rearrange the Vietnamese economic environment to make it conducive to 
foreign trade and investment. 171 As a consequence, Vietnam put emphasis on taking part 
in promoting economic relations with foreign countries on the basis of equality and 
mutual benefit. Another initiative of the Sixth Party Plenum was a proposal to study a 
tentative scheme 
170 Report from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand about the process of Vietnam's entry in to 
ASEAN in 1995. 
171 Kai M. Schelhorn, "Political and economic reforms in Vietnam", Contemporary Southeast Asia, 
Vol.14, No.3, December 1992, pp.235-9. 
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for a new method of attracting foreign investment by establishing an export processing 
d . 1 . 172 zone an spec1a econormc zones. 
Vietnam also sought bilateral cooperation with regional countries such as 
Thailand and Indonesia. By this time, Vietnam was advocating expanding economic 
relations with all countries, world organisations, transnational corporations and, above 
all, Southeast Asian economies. Vietnam had agreed to reserve privileges for the 
countries which invested heavily in Vietnam, enabling Vietnam to export goods to their 
markets. Integration with the region contributes to building a prosperous regional 
market. This is one of the most important directions of Vietnam's renovation course. 173 
At the 1991 Seventh Congress, Nguyen Manh Cam, Vietnam's Foreign Minister, 
stressed a "new outlook" on foreign policy, including Vietnam's desire to be a friend of 
all and to diversify its relations with all countries in the world regardless of their 
political and economic system. 174 Priority has therefore since been given to relationships 
with neighbouring countries, particularly ASEAN states. Most of ASEAN states 
welcomed Vietnam as they realised that it was crucial to build a new order in the region. 
As a result, Vietnam-ASEAN improvements in relations have occurred in all areas. 
Since the Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, Indonesian President 
Soeharto, Thai Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamad, and Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew all visited Vietnam. In the 
meantime, Vietnamese Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet has visited the ASEAN countries 
twice within less than a year in 1991, and his round-trip was followed up three times in 
172 Le Dang Doanh, "Economic renovation in Vietnam: achievements and prospects", in D. K. Forbes, T. 
H. Hull, D. G. Marr and B. Brogan (eds.), Doi Moi: Vietnam's Renovation Policy and Performance 
(Canberra: Australian National University, 1991), pp.81. 
173 Vo Dai Louc, "Some problems in renovating Vietnam's foreign economic policy in the new situation", 
in D. K. Forbes, T. H. Hull, D. G. Marr and B. Brogan (eds.), Doi Moi: Vietnam's Renovation Policy and 
Performance, op.cit., pp.140-42. 
174 Nguyen Manh Cam, Vietnamese Foreign Minister, "On the way to practise foreign policy in the new 
direction", Communist Review, No.4 1993, pp.11-5. Quoted in Hoang Anh Tuan, "Why hasn't Vietnam 
gained ASEAN membership?", Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.15, No.3, December 1993, pp.280-91. 
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1992. Accordingly, bilateral economic relations between Vietnam and the ASEAN 
countries have improved. 175 In addition, the relaxation in great power rivalry since the 
late 1980s has had a great impact on Southeast Asia. Importantly, the Vietnamese 
withdrawal from Cambodia in 1989 caused the Vietnam-ASEAN rapprochement. 
What can Vietnam gain by ;oining ASEAN? 
During his visit to the ASEAN states in 1991, Vo Van Kiet, Vietnamese Prime 
Minister, expressed that Vietnam needed to be integrated into the Southeast Asian 
community. 176 Because ASEAN has been successful in attaining international prestige 
as the 'speaker' of the region on regional issues, ASEAN membership can help Vietnam 
to gain wider access to markets leading to an increase in foreign trade and investment 
and economic cooperation. Foreign investors are now more confident to invest in 
Vietnam. Compared with 1991-1993 trade and investment figures, investment by the 
ASEAN states in Vietnam in 1994 has increased ten times amounting to US$ 882.5 
million. Singapore was the biggest investor with 49 projects and a total capital of more 
than US$ 366 million in 1994. Vietnam and ASEAN have signed more than forty 
agreements covering economic and trade cooperation, payments, credits, aviation, and 
navigation. 177 
Frost has added that Vietnamese leaders believed that full membership would 
assist Vietnam to gain acceptance as a legitimate part both of the Southeast Asia and of 
the international economy. The substantial bilateral cooperation between Vietnam and 
ASEAN states has been increasing, especially with Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, 
greatly helping Vietnam's economic reform. 178 
175 Hoang Anh Tuan, 'Why hasn't Vietnam gained ASEAN membership?", op.cit., p.281. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Hoang Anh Tuan, "Vietnam's membership in ASEAN: Economic, political and security implications", 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.16, No.3 , December 1994, pp.261-2. 
178 Frost, Vietnam's Membership of ASEAN, op.cit, p.4. 
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In addition, ASEAN membership would enhance Vietnam's diplomatic standing 
and integrate Vietnam's security with Southeast Asian security, thus creating an external 
environment favourable for economic development. The Vietnamese strategy is to 
pursue an 'omni-directional' foreign policy, maintaining good diplomatic relations with 
all countries and encouraging trade links, while avoiding restraining alliances, and 
economic dependence on any one country. An open door policy to attract foreign trade 
and investment as well as aid to boost the Vietnamese economic recovery have been 
primary considerations. 
ASEAN membership has also improved Vietnam's international relationships. 
Before Vietnam's entry into ASEAN, the U.S. normalised its diplomatic relations on 11 
July 1995. The U.S.-Vietnam ties improved greatly as Vietnamese officials released a 
number of photographs and more information of the fate of American servicemen listed 
as missing in action (MIA). In February 1994 the U.S. finally lifted its economic 
embargo on Vietnam and dropped its opposition to financial assistance to Vietnam by 
the IMF, WB and ADB .179 The achievement of the Vietnam's normalisation of ties with 
the U.S. and international financing institutions has resulted in an increase in business 
activities that will help to improve Vietnam's infrastructure. 
For the first time in many years, Vietnam has diplomatic relations with all major 
powers in the Asia-Pacific region. As an ASEAN member, Vietnam can now deal with 
those powers on a more equitable basis by participating in ASEAN's regular discussions 
with the U.S., Japan, China, Russia and European Union. The value of ASEAN 
membership to Vietnam has also been illustrated by the support it has gained for 
membership of the new World Trade Organisation, another international institution 
important for Vietnam's integration into the regional and international economy. 180 
179 Thayer, Beyond Indochina (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.59. 
18° Frost, Vietnam's Membership of ASEAN, op.cit, pp 5-6. 
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Frost stresses that ASEAN membership will serve to increase Vietnam's sense 
of confidence to deal with China, whose power is growing rapidly. Vietnam's leaders 
clearly consider that when China's economic strength is increasing and when it is 
upgrading its defence capability, membership in ASEAN can offer valuable support to 
Vietnam's security. 181 Although ASEAN is not a formal defence pact and membership 
does not involve a commitment to defence support, it is at least a respected regional 
grouping which could advance regional security. In the Spratly Islands conflict (which 
will be discussed in Chapter 4 ), as a result of its economic recovery and its military 
weakness, Vietnam has sought short-term security through foreign relations. By 
developing good relations with all countries, the Vietnamese are seeking to develop a 
base of diplomatic support, particularly in relation to the Spratly Islands dispute. 
Consequently, membership of ASEAN may provide Vietnam with an enhanced 
diplomatic advantage in future disputes with China, both in terms of the support of other 
ASEAN members who share the same concerns over the Spratlys and also the assistance 
of influential powers such as the U.S. and the European Union. Some observers, such as 
See Chak Mun, have stated that Vietnam's participation in ASEAN had something to do 
with a broader scheme to cope with China because Vietnam's membership had brought, 
for the first time, ASEAN into territorial juxtaposition with China. He went on to say 
that normalisation between the U.S. and Vietnam would lead to a change in the 
geopolitical environment in Southeast Asia. Obviously, the writer saw Vietnam joining 
ASEAN in the wider context of U.S. policy to contain China. 182 
ASEAN membership provides for Vietnam a valuable new identity as a 
legitimate, accepted part of Southeast Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific region. Vietnam's 
181 Ibid. 
182 "The economic and political implications of Vietnam's entry into ASEAN", Speech by See Chak Mun, 
a Singaporean Consul in Hong Kong, to the Vietnam Business Association on Friday, 28 July 1995. This 
source is from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand. 
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Vice Foreign Minister Vu Khoan emphasised in early 1995 that Vietnam cannot stand 
outside international organisations to see their members surging ahead, and cannot let 
time pass in isolation and be left behind. 183 
3.3. Advantages to ASEAN of accepting Vietnam as a full new member 
With the end of the Cold War and the Cambodian conflict, ASEAN has been 
playing a crucial role engaging in dialogue on security issues in Southeast and East Asia. 
There are many reasons for ASEAN to accept Vietnam as a member despite its different 
political and economic system. For ASEAN, admitting Vietnam makes ASEAN a more 
dynamic association which could finally encompass all ten Southeast Asian countries. 
Frost states that "it also provides for ASEAN' s pre-existing members the opportunity to 
help influence the evolution of Vietnam's foreign policy in the post Cold War period, 
especially its commitment to regional cooperation."184 
In addition, Vietnam-ASEAN cooperation can provide ASEAN with an 
increased 'weight' in its relations with major external powers. At least, Vietnam is a key 
player whose economic weight in ASEAN would provide a centrifugal force against 
China. 185 The advantages for ASEAN are seen principally in terms of regional political 
cohesion, economic benefit, and overall stability. There has also been a suggestion that 
Vietnam may provide a valuable buffer or counterbalance against Chinese power. There 
may also have been a fear that unless Vietnam was brought into the fold it might reach a 
bilateral accommodation with China over the Spratlys, dividing up the spoils between 
them. 186 
183 "Tensions in East ease as Vietnam makes peace" , Bangkok Post, 29 July 1995. 
184 Frost, Vietnam's Membership of ASEAN, opcit., pp.4-5. 
185 Mr. Keating, Australian ex-Prime Minister, noted that the defining element of the foreign policies of 
Vietnam was its suspicion towards China. See Carlyle Thayer, "Keating' s vision: SE Asia free from China 
orbit", The Australian, 18 December 1995, p.2. 
186 Rames Amer, "Sino-Vietnamese relations and Southeast Asian security", Contemporary Southeast 
Asia, Vol.14, No.4, March 1993, pp.314-31. 
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After Vietnam had become a full member, Indonesia's Foreign Minister Ali 
Alatas stressed that Vietnam's membership will enhance the vitality and the collective 
strength of the grouping. The Filipino Foreign Minister said that, 'Vietnam's entry into 
ASEAN therefore can only propel our region to new heights of unity and solidarity'. 
Thailand's Foreign Minister also stated that 'Thailand has long recognised that ASEAN 
will not be complete as long as there remains a country in Southeast Asia that is not yet 
a member.' 187 Thus, Vietnam's entry into ASEAN may be a catalyst that sees 
Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos become full members of ASEAN. 
Both Vietnam and ASEAN have gained benefits from Vietnam's membership. 
ASEAN has proven its capability to embrace a member whose political system differs 
greatly from that of any other ASEAN member. 188 Doan Manh Giao emphasised that: 
Vietnam with over 70 million people is rich in natural resources, human 
resources and has a large and almost untapped market. The voluntary 
participation of such a country in the economic cooperation with other ASEAN 
members under a common framework, shall surely contribute to the economic 
strengths of each member country and the Association on the whole. 189 
In sum, Vietnam's membership provides ASEAN with a way of broadening its 
coverage in Southeast Asia and improving its credibility as it would be able to expand 
its role in the post Cold War era. Vietnam also benefits from joining ASEAN, however, 
it also poses some significant problems about how the seven countries will cooperate to 
overcome the suspicion among them. Therefore, it is necessary to look both at the 
benefits and potential problems arising from the newly expanded ASEAN. 
187 Supapohn Kanwerayothin and Achara Ashayagachat, "Vietnam becomes latest member of ASEAN 
family", Bangkok Post, 29 July 1995, p.l. 
188 Frost, Vietnam's membership of ASEAN, op.cit., p.5. 
189 Doan Manh Giao is the vice-chairman of the Vietnam's office of the government. See Jimmy Yow, 
"Vietnam outlines 3 key factors for joining ASEAN", Business Times (Malaysia), 20 December 1995. 
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3.4. Problems within ASEAN after Vietnam has become new member 
Vietnam may face some problems in adapting and dealing with ASEAN' s 
operational style, which is both relatively informal and based on very frequent 
communication because of a lack of well-trained officials. Despite increasing ties, the 
level of cooperation between Vietnam and the other ASEAN members is still far short 
of the level of networking. There are about 260 ASEAN regular meetings and 
conferences annually among ASEAN officials from various ministries and agencies, but 
Vietnam has been participating in only six of the ASEAN committees and five 
projects. 190 ASEAN' s common language in every meeting is English. 191 Vietnam has 
few diplomats and other officials who are fully proficient in English. Although intensive 
English programs are underway to train Vietnam's officials both within and outside 
Vietnam, it will take time before Vietnam can easily accommodate the wide range of 
discussions in the association. 
In addition, the Communist Party's tradition of both concealed activity and of 
collective decision making may pose some difficulties. Although Vietnamese officials 
become fully proficient, they are not likely to adapt easily to the existing ASEAN style 
of frequent discussion and informal confidence building. 'Vietnamese leaders at 
conferences will be very much representatives of the collective decision making group, 
and may not feel free to act in a similar manner to their ASEAN counterparts.' 192 
Besides the benefits, Vietnam and the other ASEAN partners also face some 
challenges and uncertainties in their new association. There are a number of potential 
problems which may cause trouble for the expansion of ASEAN. Singapore's Foreign 
Minister J ayakumar warned that an expanded ASEAN would face challenges to its 
190 Hoang Anh Tuan, "Vietnam's membership in ASEAN", op.cit, p.262. 
191 English is widely spoken in Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei, and is taught extensively 
in Indonesia and Thailand. At present, Singapore, Australia and Britain assist Vietnamese officials to train 
English. 
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unity. "All is not rosy. There are worrying trends and developments in the Asia-Pacific 
region. The challenges ahead will test our unity and diplomatic skills."193 
3.4.1. Political difficulties 
The founding declaration of A SEAN stated that all Southeast Asian countries 
could participate in the Association if they acceded to its principles and purposes. 
Nevertheless, there are some concerns about the differences in political systems between 
Vietnam and other ASEAN countries after Vietnam's entry into ASEAN. It is the first 
time that ASEAN, which has been an anti-communist group, has admitted the first 
communist member. 
Although Vietnam has become an ASEAN member, distrust may still exist 
among ASEAN members for a long time over the Cambodian conflict. It is clear that 
there remain territorial disputes, despite the long period since the establishment of the 
Association. At present, there are some unresolved territorial disputes between Vietnam 
and some ASEAN states, notably Spratly Island conflict which involves Vietnam, the 
Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan and China. Malaysia and Indonesia still dispute 
the delimitation of the continental shelf and friction over fishing rights. Territorial 
conflict between Vietnam and Thailand still remain. Thayer pointes out that despite 
frequent military exchanges, Vietnam is still regarded as a security threat by Thailand. 
Because of its growing economy, Vietnam can improve its defence capability, which 
poses a potential threat to both Cambodia and Thailand. 194 Moreover, there remain 
disputes of the Philippines continuing to suspect Malaysia of supporting the Moro 
secessionist front in 
192 Frost, Vietnam's Membership of ASEAN, op.cit, pp.6-7. 
193 Kanwerayothin and Ashayagachat, "Vietnam becomes latest member of ASEAN family", op.cit., 
p.1. 
194 Thayer, Beyond Indochina, op.cit., p.47. 
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Mindanao, the dispute between Malaysia and Singapore over Pedra Branca, and that 
between Malaysia and Brunei over Limbang. 195 However, Tuan suggested that: 196 
among the ASEAN states, there is a desire to push aside disagreements to keep 
on talking to maintain relations [ even] without resolving issues. Thus, 
although disagreements continue to exist, they have not hindered cooperation 
among the members, and intra-ASEAN relations have continued to develop. 
Vietnam's membership does not mean that these disputes have come to an end. 
Rather, the disputes will impede the development of commercial relationships. 197 Tuan 
stressed that while most ASEAN leaders have clearly welcomed Vietnam, some 
bilateral relations, especially with Thailand, may need more time and confidence 
building to be comfortable. 198 Frost has also mentioned some potential difficulties after 
Vietnam's entry into ASEAN. Vietnam and other ASEAN members may have some 
difficulties in maintaining a consensus in many issues such as how they should cope 
with China, and an issue which has seen substantial differences in emphasis among the 
ASEAN members in the past. Paribatra claimed that after Vietnam's entry into ASEAN, 
posturing and bargaining will replace consultation and consensus-building as the 
predominant form of conducting intra-mural affairs. 199 
Sino-Vietnamese relations have been very complicated. China invaded Vietnam 
in 1979 after Vietnam invaded Cambodia. The Sino-Vietnamese conflict caused the loss 
of thousands of lives on both sides. Vietnam and China have conflicting claims in the 
South China Sea (see the discussion in Chapter 4). While Vietnam would not expect any 
direct assistance from its ASEAN partners in a possible clash with China, it would 
195 The potential for sensitivity among the pre-existing ASEAN members has been recently illustrated by 
the tensions between Singapore and the Philippines because the Filipino maid Folor Contemplation was 
hanged in Singapore after being convicted of murder. See Frank Frost, Vietnam's Members hip of ASEAN, 
op.cit., pp.6-7. 
196 Hoang Anh Tuan, "Vietnam's membership in ASEAN", op.cit., p.265. 
197 Thayer, Beyond Indochina, op.cit, pp.31-48. 
198 Hoang Anh Tuan, "Vietnam's membership in ASEAN", op.cit, pp.265. 
199 Paribatra, "From ASEAN Six to ASEAN Ten: Issues and prospects", op.cit., pp.252-3. 
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expect diplomatic support. However, it is uncertain how other ASEAN members, 
especially Thailand and Singapore, might react in such a situation. 
Another problem is what Paribatra called the southward geoeconomic advance 
of China. He notes that Chinese economic expansion seems to be moving from the 
Hong Kong-Taiwan-Shenzhen/Guangdong/Fujian triangle, through Yunnan and Hainan, 
towards the countries of mainland Southeast Asia. It is expected that Chinese presence 
in Southeast Asia may prompt regional states contesting claims in the South China Sea 
to accelerate their arms purchases and military modernisation programmes, thus 
1 . . h . 200 F h d h 201 cata ysing an arms race in t e region. rost as note t at: 
while Vietnam brings to ASEAN substantial military capacities and diplomatic 
skills, its accession to membership may pose some medium term challenges for 
ASEAN in maintaining a cohesive approach towards the most important 
regional security issue the members face, the growing power of China 
A further issue is that while other ASEAN members allow travel among 
themselves on a 'visa-free' basis, Vietnam requires visas for all visitors, a policy which 
is not likely to change in the near future. However, Vietnam relaxed its visa 
requirements for official passport holders from ASEAN countries in November 1995 by 
issuing Decree No.76/CP to amend the country's immigration procedure.202 
Even though ASEAN' s commitment to transform itself into a truly regional 
organisation over the long term has been publicly affirmed, doubts remain in some 
matters. Paribatra has pointed out that, unlike the case of Brunei's membership in 1984, 
a variety of conditions will be set to govern its entry. 
200 Ibid, pp.248. 
201 Frost, Vietnam's Membership of ASEAN, op.cit, p.8. 
202 Ordinary passport holders from ASEAN states (who are attending ASEAN activities in Vietnam will 
also exempted for 15 days. See Achara Ashayagachat, "VN relaxes visa rules for ASEAN passport 
holders", Bangkok Post, 9 November 1995, p.2. 
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Undoubtedly, the difference in treatment reflects the growing volume and 
complexity of ASEAN's agenda and activities since 1984. But it may also be 
due to the founding members' recognition that, given its small size , its history 
and culture, and its geopolitical constraints, the entry of Brunei was a 
'natural' extension of the ASEAN family, and that, for precisely the opposite 
reasons, Vietnam's membership will be the first momentous act of expansion in 
h h . if h . l . . 203 t e istory o t e regiona organisation. 
It seems that Vietnam is not an easy partner to deal with because its diplomatic 
history has been shaped by the need to deal with adversaries. Paribatra has concluded 
that there are a number of problems which have the potential to act as constraints upon 
the process of expanding ASEAN membership. There are some questions concerning 
the timing and conditions of expansion. It may take years to form an ASEAN esprit de 
corps among new members. Moreover, ASEAN 'standard' may be 'imposed' on 
Vietnam. 
Vietnam's history is a record of a nation's · proud struggle to become 
independent, and its post-colonial political development has been shaped by communist 
party cadres. Their strengths have been relatively high degrees of unity and pride. They 
may not want to change anything to loosen their power which may impede the process 
of ASEAN expansion. It may take years to overcome these difficulties. ASEAN must 
also have the collective political will to transcend difficult challenges at difficult 
moments.204 Importantly, pressure by -the U.S., the West, the European Union and 
NGOs (Non-Governmental Organisations) on issues such as trade and human rights to 
Vietnam may cause some troubles. However, in fact, Vietnam and ASEAN states would 
have a common stand on such issues because ASEAN states are under this pressure by 
different degrees. 205 
203 Paribatra, op.cit., pp.252-3. 
204 Ibid, pp.255-7. 
205 Hoang Anh Tuan, "Vietnam's membership in ASEAN", op.cit., p.264. 
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These problems affect the ASEAN Regional Forum, which was inaugurated as 
the main framework for wide-ranging dialogues on political and security issues, not only 
for Southeast Asia but for the whole Asia-Pacific region. 
Vietnam and the ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF)2°6 
When the Soviet military alliance with Vietnam ended during the late 1980s, . 
ASEAN set up the ARF in July 1993. ARF is officially billed as a multilateral 
consultative forum aimed at promoting security in Asia-Pacific region. It constituted a 
significant step in transforming ASEAN into a truly regional organisation, undertaking 
mutual confidence-building and preventive diplomacy activities. 207 Frost pointed out 
that:2os 
ASEAN since 1967 has been able to play a considerable role in facilitating 
stability in Southeast Asia. It now has an ambitious post Cold War agenda to 
both stimulate trade and investment through AFTA and to help promote 
dialogue over security issues in Southeast Asia and in the wider Asia-Pacific 
region through the ASEAN Regional Forum. 
ARF was created in a new post-Cold War era. Pakaphasvivat, a Thai economist, 
emphasised that, "With the gradual withdrawal of the U.S. from the region we're facing 
the challenge of a power vacuum. We' re afraid either China or Japan will fill that 
vacuum. ASEAN needs a multilateral approach, a united front on political terms to face 
the vacuum."209 The ASEAN countries have emerged with an increasing role in the 
region. They have come to balance and engage former enemies and potential antagonists 
and have laid down the principles of security regime. 
206 During the Jakarta AMM in July 1990, Australia and Canada proposed new forums on security 
encompassing ASEAN and states in the Asia-Pacific to 'build confidence and patterns of cooperation both 
between old friends and between old adversaries'. Then, this created the ASEAN Regional Forum. See 
Michael Vatikiotis, "Feeling the heat", PEER, 9 August 1990, p.8. 
207 Robert Birsel, "Feature-Asia' s young dragons see strength in unity", Reuter News Service, 11 January 
1996 and Sukhumbhand Paribatra, op.cit., pp.245-6. 
208 Frost, Vietnam's Membership of ASEAN, op.cit, pp.ii. 
209 Robert Birsel, "Feature-Asia's young dragons see strength in unity", op.cit., pp.245-6. 
67 
111: 
By 1993, both the United States and Japan had begun to give greater support to 
the ARF concept. Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa called for a long-term 
development of peace and security in the region. Japan would actively take part in such 
discussions. 210 Significantly, the new Clinton Administration also expressed a volte-face 
for the ARF: "We must develop new mechanisms to manage or prevent emerging 
concerns. [These talks can help] share information, convey intentions, ease tensions, 
1 d. d + f' d ,,211 reso ve 1sputes an 1oster con 1 ence. 
However, there were some suspicions before announcing the ARF. For instance, 
Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas expressed his hesitation that: "We don't think 
that a multilateral, pan-East Asia institutional framework should be undertaken 
prematurely ... I don't believe the situation in East Asia and the Pacific at this moment 
would warrant an immediate multilateral institutional thing". 212 Nonetheless, the 
naming of the forum finally represented an accommodation of concerns about 
institutionalisation and ASEAN' s role at large. 
The ASEAN states have also constructively engaged China and Vietnam through 
emphasising what could be gained by having a predictable and stable order. This began 
with the peace settlement in Cambodia which removed that obstacle to their 
involvement. Eventually, the first meeting of the ARF was held in Bangkok on 25 July 
1994, following a principle of step-by-step evolution. 213 Rather than focusing on 
problem-solving, the ASEAN heads of state and government proclaimed their intent to 
intensify ASEAN' s external dialogue in political and security matters as a means of 
210 Paul Handley, "Japan's clarion call", FEER, 28 January 1993, p.21. 
211 Elaine Sciolino, "US to urge Asia to build security", New York Times, 1 April 1993. Quoted in Michael 
Antolik, "The ASEAN Regional Forum: the spirit of constructive engagement", Contemporary Southeast 
Asia, Vol.16, No.2, September 1994, p.120. 
212 Michael Antolik, "The ASEAN Regional Forum", Ibid., p.120. 
213 The members for the annual ARF meetings are all ASEAN economies, China, Russia, the U.S., Japan, 
the European Union, South Korea, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Laos, Papua New Guinea and 
Cambodia. See, Robert Birsel, "Feature-Asia's young dragons see strength in unity", op.cit., and "The 
ASEAN Regional Forum", Document from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand. 
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building cooperative ties with states in Southeast Asia and Asia-Pacific region as a 
whole.214 
The Second ARF was held on 1 August 1995 in Brunei. Many positive steps 
have been taken. In connection with the development of mechanism for cooperation, the 
meeting agreed that the approach should be evolutionary to promote confidence 
building, to develop preventive diplomacy and to encourage all ARF countries to 
improve their dialogues and consultations on political and security cooperation on a 
bilateral, sub-regional, and regional basis. 215 
Consequently, the ARF is a regional system in that it comprises all the great 
powers. It maintains openness by limiting obligations and protocol and allows for an 
evolutionary approach and full regional inclusion. As such, it is what many in the region 
see as a preferable alternative to legal institutional approaches that might bog down 
participants in sterile procedural debates. Instead, it focuses on the pragmatic benefits of 
preventive diplomacy and constructive engagement, in order to foster understanding, 
confidence, communication and stability. 216 
However, regarding the regional situation, all ministers expressed concern on 
overlapping sovereignty dispute in the region, particularly in the South China Sea. In 
addition, Vietnam, which has a different political and social system from that of 
ASEAN might make the ARF more divergent, and the decision-making based on 
consensus will become more varied and difficult. Its formation recalls ASEAN' s own 
cautious concern for building consensus and bilateral understandings in preparation for a 
multilateral endeavour. The ARF rejects force and interference in other states' domestic 
214 Muthiah Alagappa, "Regional arrangements and international security in Southeast Asia: Going beyond 
ZOPFAN", Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.12. No.4, March 1991, p.269. 
215 "Chairman's statement of the second ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)", in Bandar Seri Begawan on 1 
August 1995. This document is from Thailand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
216 Muthiah Alagappa, "Regional arrangements and international security in Southeast Asia: Going beyond 
ZOPFAN", op.cit., pp.133-4. 
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affairs. To achieve regional stability through a balance of great powers, the ASEAN 
states have often facilitated the inclusion of all through an informal diplomacy that 
limits obligations and protocol."217 Moreover, the long history of animosity between 
Thailand, China and Vietnam may further aggravate the problem. 218 Vietnam and all 
partners must develop a congenial working relationship to overcome these problems. 
3.4.2. Economic difficulties 
Because of the economic development gap between Vietnam and the ASEAN 
countries and Vietnam's lack of experience in regional economic cooperation, it is likely 
that at the beginning of Vietnam's entry into ASEAN, there will be some economic 
problems between the former and the latter. Moreover, within ASEAN itself, economic 
development gaps also exist among members, for instance, between the Philippines and 
Singapore. The wide disparities in wealth among the seven ASEAN members are: 
'Vietnam in 1993 had a Gross Domestic Product estimated by the Asian Development 
Bank at US$ 170, compared with Indonesia ($730), the Philippines ($830), Thailand 
($2,040), Malaysia ($3,160) and Singapore ($19,310).' 219 Vietnam is among the world's 
poorest countries with an average per-capita income of less than US$ 200-about 1 % of 
the wealthiest ASEAN state Singapore. 
Although the trade volume between Vietnam and the ASEAN states, mainly 
with Singapore, presently accounts for approximately 30% of the former' s total trade, 
which is more than the 20% recorded for intra-ASEAN trade, it does not mean that the 
Vietnamese economy is more integrated with that of the ASEAN economies. This is 
because, firstly, the trade volume between Vietnam and the ASEAN states is still 
217 Ibid., p.117. 
218 Surin Maisrikrod, "Thailand's policy dilemmas towards Indochina", Contemporary Southeast Asia, 
Vol.I, No.3, December 1992, pp.287-300 and Ky Cao, "Indochina's prospect for stability", 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.15, No.4, March 1994, pp.385-406. 
219 Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 1995/1996 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), p.240. Quoted in Frank Frost, Vietnam's Membership of ASEAN, op.cit, p.9. 
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comparatively small. Secondly, the ASEAN members promote economic cooperation 
among themselves through various institutions that Vietnam cannot participate if it is 
220 not a full member of ASEAN. 
Johnson has noted that ASEAN membership might cause some troubles for 
Vietnam. Firstly, with free-trade and open borders across the region, cheap imports and 
competition are bound to wipe out centrally planned heavy industries in Vietnam, 
causing unemployment. Secondly, it will probably destroy the region's traditional 
farming methods encourage massive urbanisation. 221 Moreover, ASEAN manufacturers 
in Vietnam can export to the U.S. under Vietnam's quota that would be more 
competitive than Vietnam's domestic manufacturers. 
Additionally, there is a great contrast between the economic ideologies between 
ASEAN and Vietnam. The ASEAN states are bound by a common basic economic 
ideology which accepts the importance of market forces and efficient and equitable 
performance. The Vietnamese government, on the other hand, has managed its economy 
through 'heavy-handed central planning'. The degree of its integration into ASEAN will 
depend on how economic reforms proceed there. 222 
ASEAN still has its own problems. The strengthening of trade blocs in Europe 
and North America might affect ASEAN exports to these traditional markets. Economic 
reforms in India, Latin America and China might draw foreign direct investment away 
from the ASEAN states. 223 This may have a detrimental effect because each regional 
state may unilaterally seek to protect its own interests in its relationships with extra-
22° For more information, see Hoang Anh Tuan, "Vietnam's membership in ASEAN", op.cit, p.263. 
221 Chris Johnson, "Tough terms for poor Indochina joining rich ASEAN", Reuter News Service, 13 
December 1995. 
222 Narongchai Akrasanee, David Stifel, "A vision of Southeast Asia in the Year 2000: Toward a common 
economic regime", op.cit., pp .. 1-13,2. 
223 Hoang Anh Tuan, "Vietnam's membership in ASEAN", op.cit, p.260. 
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regional economic partners. 224 "On the surface the leaders make a display of unity but in 
practice they are very competitive with each other."225 
However, Pakaphasvivat has argued that ASEAN flexibility and willingness to 
compromise is the way to accommodate its core strengths.226 It has achieved more than 
compromise because of its flexibility", he adds. 227 AFT A, for example, has been set up 
to strengthen economic development and to lessen the competitiveness between intra-
ASEAN and to attract foreign investment. 
Vietnam and ASEAN Free Trade Area(AFTA) 
The AFTA proposal was inaugurated in 1993 and has the ambitious aim 
of liberalising trade within ASEAN, creating a more integrated market of 
over 400 million people, and attracting increased levels of foreign 
investment. ASEAN' s major means for achieving this is the Common 
Effective Preferential Tariff ( CEPT) which established a formula for the 
phased reduction of intra-ASEAN tariffs to levels of no more than 5% in 
ten years from January 1993 [2003]. 228 
Frost has added that AFTA' s overall purpose is 'to ensure that in a competitive 
international economic environment ASEAN bolsters its potential as a regional market 
and its attractiveness to foreign investors whose funds are also sought eagerly by other 
rapidly developing economies such as China and India. ' 229 
Due to its entry into ASEAN, Vietnam has to consider the advantages and 
disadvantages of joining AFT A. While tariff reduction brings trade benefits, it also 
produces some problems for the domestic economy. For example, in 1994 under AFT A, 
tariffs on all manufactured goods with 40% or more ASEAN content are to be reduced 
224 Paribatra suggested that trade blocs may also further undermine close U.S.-Japan ties, which may lead 
to increased defence expenditure and a greater military role on the part of Japan. If this eventuates, the 
ASEAN states may step up arms purchase and military modernisation programmes, with possible adverse 
consequences and implications for regional-cooperation. See Sukhumbhand Paribatra, op.cit, 
p.248. 
225 Chaiwat Kampucho, a lecturer at Bangkok University, said in Robert Birsel, "Feature-Asia's young 
dragons see strength in unity", Reuter News Service, 11 January 1996. 
226 Robert Birsel, "Feature-Asia's young dragons see strength in unity", Ibid. 
227 Ibid. 
228 Frost, Vietnam's Membership of ASEAN, op.cit., p.9. 
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to 0-5% by the year 2003. In addition, the ASEAN states have so far agreed to place 
40,000 different items under AFT A, or 80% of the Association's manufactured 
goods.230 Vietnam is required to lower its tariffs for market-oriented economic reforms. 
An immediate tariff reduction may expose Vietnam's industries to competition from 
low-priced manufactured goods from other ASEAN states. Nevertheless, as Vietnamese 
enterprises catch up by capitalising on the country's lower wages and huge natural and 
human resources, the advantage will reverse, with Vietnamese goods gaining liberal 
access to an ASEAN-wide market. Hoang Anh Tuan has suggested that new members 
with a lower level of economic development may gain more benefits than the more 
231 developed ones. 
However, Vietnam must adjust to the requirements of the AFT A. ASEAN has 
agreed that Vietnam should be allowed to delay implementing AFTA until three years 
after the other ASEAN members (2006). Nonetheless, 'Vietnam cannot go slower than 
this if it wants to integrate into the world community. They have to move forward like 
other members do. Some workshops or training can be acquired from other members 
and from foreign countries'. 232 
Vietnam's participation in AFTA has also produced some concerns. While 
economic relations have been developing rapidly between the new partner and ASEAN 
members, Vietnam is still building up the development of a market economy. Ms. Lan, 
Vietnam's representative, has expressed concerns about the impact of AFTA and 
Vietnam's preparedness for it, because Vietnam's participation in AFT A would produce 
229 Ibid. 
230 John McBeth and Rigoberto Tiglao, "Profitable partnership", FEER, 28 July 1994, pp.30-1. 
231 For example, Spain and Portugal's entry into the European Union. See, Hoang Anh Tuan, "Vietnam's 
membership in ASEAN", op.cit, p.263. 
232 Achara Ashayagachat, "ASEAN: Customs procedures on ASEAN agenda", Bangkok Post, 29 
November 1995. 
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competitiveness in the domestic market. Thai Van Huong, Vice Director of the Shoe 
and Leather Association of Vietnam, noted that "businesses are still not ready for this 
event. Besides the lack of capital, technology and infrastructure, we don't have capable 
management who know international laws and trading rules. Unless we prepare well it 
will be only the Vietnamese firms who suffer."233 Vietnam's Finance Minister Ho Te 
emphasised that Vietnam faces many problems in its transition from a centrally planned 
economy to a market economy, including standardisation of its tax system, infant 
industry and lack of experience in trade and services. 234 He also added that Vietnam still 
required some time to carefully study the importation of each item. Vietnam will start 
reducing tariffs from 1 January 1996, at the same time as the other members, but will be 
three years behind schedule in completing the tariff reduction scheme. 235 
Participation in AFT A thus involves some challenges for both Vietnam's 
economy. Vietnam still has a large and inefficient state industrial sector which receives 
extensive state subsidies; privatisation has been explored in only a tentative way so far; 
and many aspects of infrastructure ( such as commercial law) remain underdeveloped. 236 
Another set of problems is Vietnam's lack of appropriately trained personnel and 
strong financial base, together with its relatively low level of economic development, 
which could obstruct its full participation in ASEAN, AFTA and Common Effective 
Preferential Tariff (CEPT). Nevertheless, the Vietnamese manpower base and economy 
are large enough to surmount many of the problems over the longer term. 237 
233 "Vietnam 'to feel stiff winds of competition"', Bangkok Post, 24 July 1995. 
234 Frost, Vietnam's Membership of ASEAN, op.cit, p.9-10. 
235 Vietnam's 'sensitive list', goods which are mostly taxed above 20%, will remain at the same rate 
including vehicles, washing machines, steel, textiles and agricultural products. See Achara Ashayagachat, 
"Vietnam stalls on list of goods for tariff cuts scheme", Bangkok Post, 6 December 1995. 
236 Thayer, Beyond Indochina, op.cit., pp.8-18. 
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However, Frost has concluded that ASEAN membership is likely to exert added 
pressure on Vietnam to continue the process of economic reform so that its economy 
can interact fully effectively with both ASEAN and international trade and investment 
partners. 238 Hoang Anh Tuan also claims that the economic gap between Vietnam and 
other ASEAN states should not be over-emphasised. Because Vietnam has achieved 
high economic performance as a result of its economic reforms, 'this gap is being 
bridged somewhat.' 239 It seems that the real benefits Vietnam may receive from ASEAN 
membership are not very significant as ASEAN' s current economic performance has 
been achieved through the endeavours of individual members, and not by any collective 
ASEAN effort. Furthermore, the ASEAN states are still at an early stage of economic 
cooperation and there is still a long way towards full economic integration. 240 
Basically, the ASEAN states are not keen to increase intra-ASEAN trade for its 
own sake. They are all trying to attract direct foreign investment for their own national 
development. AFT A offers attractions for direct foreign investment. It is attractive for 
Multi National Companies (MN Cs) seeking a production and marketing base, using the 
mix of strategic location, cheap labour, and efficient infrastructure provided by all 
members. ASEAN's population of more than 400 million is also attractive because of its 
large and growing domestic market. 241 Thus, in the immediate future, greater linkage 
between the Vietnamese economy and the larger economic framework of the region 
would also help Vie:tnam to attract more foreign investment. 
237 Sukhumbhand Paribatra, op.cit, p.254. 
238 Frost, Vietnam's Membership of ASEAN, op.cit, p.10. 
239 Hoang Anh Tuan, "Vietnam's membership in ASEAN", op.cit, pp.262-3. 
24° Carolina Hernandez, "The ASEAN Free Trade Area: A step towards economic integration", in 
Wolfgang Moellers and Rohana Mahmood (eds.), ASEAN: Future Economic and Political Cooperation 
(Malaysia: Institute of Strategic and International Studies, 1993. Hernandez explained that there are five 
stages of economic integration: a) Preferential Trade Area (PTA), b) Free Trade Area (FTA), c) Customs 
Union, d) Common Market and e) Economic Union. ASEAN is now only at the beginning of the Free 
Trade Area phase. 
241 Anwar Nasution, "Open regionalism: The case of ASEAN Free Trade Area", in Wolfgang Moellers 
and Rohana Mahmood (eds.), ASEAN: Future Economic and Political Cooperation, Ibid. 
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It is accepted that Vietnam will meet the requirements on tariff and non-tariff 
reductions over a ten year period, beginning on 1 January 1996. Vietnam has been 
preparing a plan of how and when to apply for inclusion within the CEPT. Tariff rates 
on agreed 'fast track' items should be reduced to 5% by 2003 and goods which have at 
present a tariff rate of below 20% should be placed immediately on the CEPT list. 242 
Recently, Vietnamese Financial Minister Ho Te stated in December 1995 that Vietnam 
was facing difficulties, as it had only been in ASEAN for a short time. However, 'with 
its own determination and warm assistance from other ASEAN members, Vietnam has 
provided all the required lists for AFT A on time.' 243 
To sum up, since the Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, there have been 
frequent exchanges of visits by leaders of Vietnam and the other ASEAN states such as 
when the Malaysian Prime Minister met the Vietnamese Prime Minister, Vo Van Kiet, 
in January, April and July in 1992.244 Consequently, relations between governmental 
institutions in Vietnam and other ASEAN states have also been improving greatly. Plans 
for an AFTA are in line with ASEAN' s goal of opening intra-ASEAN markets for most 
products by 2003. The ARF has proved so popular that would-be members including 
India, Myanmar, UK and France are on a waiting list. And APEC, which ASEAN 
helped create and promote has become the premier policy arena for regional trade 
Ii beralisati on. 
Despite increasing ties, Vietnam's participation in ASEAN' s activities 1s 
necessary to catch up with other members. The way to overcome difficulties is to 
242 "Vietnamese Finance Minister attends ASEAN Free Trade Meeting", BBC Monitoring Service , 12 
December 199 5. 
243 "Vietnamese Finance Minister attends ASEAN Free Trade Meeting", BBC Monitoring Service, ibid. 
244 Both sides confirmed their friendship and cooperation that would produce peace and security in the 
region. For more details of exchanges of visits, see Michael Antolik, "ASEAN' s bridges to Vietnam and 
Laos", Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.15, No.2, September 1993, p.201-3. 
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strengthen their political will to close the psychological gap caused by the mutual 
distrust of the past. 
The problem is that as ASEAN becomes larger, it may lose cohesion and the 
ability to reach a consensus on tough issues. Vietnam's membership has brought 
ASEAN into territorial juxtaposition with China. It is likely that normalisation of 
relations between the U.S. and Vietnam will lead to a change in the geopolitical 
environment in Southeast Asia. 
Obviously, Vietnam joining ASEAN is in a wider context of a U.S. policy to 
contain China. 245 In addition, there are also questions over the ease of accommodation 
between Vietnam and ASEAN, both in economic and political terms. 
3.5. ASEAN-Vietnamese organisational restructuring 
ASEAN itself has undertaken some steps to adjust to the changing regional and 
global environment for new challenges. 246 Firstly, the ASEAN Secretariat is being 
transformed from a passive role to a more active one by raising the status of the ASEAN 
Secretary General and the allocation of more resources to the Secretariat.247 Secondly, 
AFT A has been created to improve ASEAN economic cooperation. 248 Immense benefits 
can accrue to members from the pooling of resources and sharing of markets. Three 
growth-triangles have been established to facilitate the implementation of AFT A which 
245 "The economic and political implications of Vietnam's entry into ASEAN", Speech by Commissioner 
See Chak Mun to the Vietnam Business Association on Friday, 28 July 1995. This source is from Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Thailand. 
246 Steps to strengthen ASEAN have been announced after the 1991 ASEAN AMM in Kuala Lumper. See 
Mohammed Jawhar, "The making of a new Southeast Asia" in Desmond Ball and David Horner (eds), 
Strategic Studies in a Changing World: Global, Regional and Australian Perspectives, Paper on Strategy 
and Defence No. 89 (Canberra: ANU, 1992), pp.301-3. 
247 ASEAN Foreign Ministers have signed a new agreement in Bangkok 1994 to transfer the equivalent of 
US$ 1 million from the ASEAN Fund to the ASEAN Secretariat for joint project. See "ASEAN: ASEAN 
FMS to sign $1 M fund Transfer Agreement", Bangkok Post, 21 July 1994. 
248 The agreement to create AFT A must be seen as one of considerable political will because of less 
successful ASEAN economic ventures in the past. For more information, see Seiji Naya and Pearl Imada, 
"Implementing AFTA, 1992-2007", in K.S. Sandhu, et.al (comp.), The ASEAN Reader (Singapore: 
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is expected to be completed in 2007.249 Thirdly, ASEAN is addressing the threat posed 
to non-discriminatory global trade by human rights, social issues250 and security 
issues.251 This has led to the creation of the ARF in which all major powers participated 
for the first time in July 1994 in Bangkok (which has previously been discussed). By 
using the wider approach to security issues, ASEAN' s own security issues will be 
somewhat diluted, thereby enhancing the integration of Indochina. Furthermore, an 
expanded ASEAN will have a greater influence in Asia-Pacific forum such as APEC on 
the issues that are of mutual benefit. Crone has written that "by strengthening its own 
institutions, expanding ASEAN ties with Indochina and participating in larger 
institutional forums, the ASEAN members are attempting to adopt their pursuit of 
economic security to current political and economic realities."252 
ASEAN with Vietnam will take on more economic and political weight in 
international affairs. However, the incorporation of Vietnam into a successful 
organisation like ASEAN, would bring about some side effects. Thus, it is important to 
look at the economic, political and security consequences of Vietnam's membership. 
The basis for ASEAN to consider Vietnam's membership is that it will help to 
reduce any concern in ASEAN of Vietnam as a possible security threat. Vietnam's 
desire to create a peaceful regional environment favourable for economic development 
is shared by all the ASEAN states. ASEAN countries can see Vietnam as a partner in 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992), pp.513-15 and Sree Kumar, "Assessing AFTA", in K.S. 
Sandhu, et.al (comp.), The ASEAN Reader, op.cit, pp.516-18. 
249 The three growth areas encompass southern Thailand, Indonesia's Sumatra and northern and southern 
Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia; and the southern Philippines, Indonesia's Sulawesi Island and 
Malaysia's Sabah. 
25° For example, the West is trying to link labour issues and international trade and wants to incorporate 
the issues with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) which replaced GATT on 1 January 1995. There 
has been a clash of views on these issues between ASEAN ministers and their dialogue partners during 
July 1994 PMC (Post Ministerial Conference) in Bangkok. See Ahirudin Attan and Lokman Mansor, 
"Thailand: Call for greater cooperation, freer trade", Business Times, 27 July 1994. 
251 Michael Leifer points out that integration of Indochina into ASEAN does not provide a sufficient basis 
for a post-Cold War security order in Southeast Asia and the question of security must be addressed 
within a wider East Asian frame work. See Michael Leifer, "Indochina and ASEAN: Seeking a new 
balance", Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.15, No.3. December 1993, pp.269-279. 
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their efforts to build a new regional order and as an advantageous market to expand 
trade and investments. 253 ASEAN has experienced reduced access to traditional markets 
in Europe and North America because of protectionism. Thus, many achievements have 
been recorded in economic relations between Vietnam and the ASEAN states. 
The Bangkok Fifth ASEAN Summit in 1995 is a key turning point for all ten 
Southeast Asian economies, as it was the first time that Vietnam joined an ASEAN 
meeting as a full member and was the first step for the rest of the Indochinese states to 
join ASEAN. Vietnam has gradually made its economic policies similar to those of the 
other ASEAN states, particularly in AFT A. A list of more than 1,000 products has been 
issued by the Vietnamese government to comply with the CEPT for ASEAN countries 
in 1996. The reduced tariff came into effect as from 1 January 1996.254 
ASEAN' s fifth summit brought together for the first time leaders of all ten 
Southeast Asian countries - including Burma, Laos and Cambodia - in a preview of 
future ASEAN meeting. Thailand's Prime Minister, Banham Silpa-archa, urged 
Vietnam to carry on the ASEAN vision of 'One Southeast Asia' by inviting Laos, 
Cambodia and Burma to attend the next ASEAN summit held in Hanoi in 1998.255 
ASEAN leaders have signed a treaty creating a Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free 
Zone (SEANWFZ). ASEAN hopes that the treaty will eventually be endorsed by the 
U.S., China and other nuclear powers. Vo Van Kiet said that, "it is our hope that the 
countries outside the region ... will respect Southeast Asia's aspirations to fully and early 
implement comprehensive denuclearisation."256 The 1995 ASEAN Summit also decided 
252 Donald Crone, cited in Rodney Tasker, et.al, "Growing pain", FEER, 28 July 1994, p.23. 
253 Hoang Anh Tuan, "Vietnam's membership in ASEAN", op.cit, p.261. 
254"Vietnam's government issues list of products with reduced tariff', BBC Monitoring Service, 3 January 
1996. 
255 Rita Patiyasevi and Surachai Chupaka, "Vietnam encouraged to promote one-Asia", The Nation, 14 
December 1995, pp.Al, A2. 
256 The treaty bans the dumping of nuclear waste in ASEAN waters and gives guidelines for the 
monitoring of nuclear power. It allows 'innocent passage' of foreign submarines which may be conveying 
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that Vietnamese refugees across Asia should be repatriated by the end of June 1996 
because the UN, Asian and Wes tern donor nations have agreed to stop funds for boat 
people.257 
In addition, for the first time, ASEAN leaders also formally approved some 
economic agreements of broader liberalisation of trade and services. The summit could 
also see new ideas floated for more economic integration in the future. 258 Importantly, 
there has been an agreement in the 1995 fifth summit that the ASEAN countries assist in 
the Mekong River Delta development with China, Burma, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam 
and Thailand.259 ASEAN has approved a joint drive with China to develop the Mekong 
basin and to lure investment from Japan and South Korea. 
The most crucial political event of this fifth summit was the appearance of the 
non-ASEAN Southeast Asian leaders.260 As Birsel has written, 'Leaders of disparate 
Southeast Asian states, divided by language, religion and culture, are pushing ahead 
with an ambitious plan to integrate their booming economies into one of the world's 
largest common markets.' 261 Nonetheless, Laos and Cambodia, both economically 
shaky, with weak authoritarian governments, could be more disadvantageous than 
nuclear weapons if they show no warlike intentions. See Chris Johnson, "Southeast Asia asks world to 
back nuclear pact", Reuter News Services, 16 December 1995. 
257 The time frame is prolonged for 20,000 Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong. The return will keep on 
although Vietnam refused to accept so far a U.S. plan for second interviews for those who go back, but 
they can apply for resettlement under existing emigration procedures. See, Evan Williams, "Regional 
meeting decides boat people must return", BBC Monitoring Service, 16 January 1996. 
258 Raphael Pura, "Nukes, neighbours and trade to dominate ASEAN Summit", The Asian Wall Street 
Journal, 14 December 1995, p.2. 
259 The Mekong basin, covering Southern China, Burma, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and Thailand, is 
underdeveloped. Yet, ASEAN sees it as a potential trading and industrial hub. See, "ASEAN approves 
joint drive to develop Mekong", Reuter News Service, 16 December 1995. 
260 Laos and Cambodia already have observer status in ASEAN in preparation for full membership that is 
likely to be in 1997. At the beginning of 1996, Burma signed ASEAN's 1976 TAC. It has since applied 
for observer status which could be granted in 1996. ASEAN expects that full membership for Burma 
could come before 2000. ASEAN 10 has become a visionary slogan for the foreign ministers as they seek 
to realise the dream of ASEAN' s founding fathers to have the whole of Southeast Asia united. See Yang 
Razali Kassim, "Vietnam joins ASEAN as its seventh member", Business Time (Singapore), 
29 July 1995. 
261 Robert Birsel, "Feature-Asia's young dragons see strength in unity", op.cit. 
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beneficial to ASEAN for some time. Burma, with a large market and natural resource 
base, now seeks to be admitted to ASEAN as soon as possible. 
ASEAN leaders formally endorsed a new 2003 target date for cutting tariffs on 
intra-ASEAN trade of manufactured and agricultural products to no more than 5% and 
encouraged members to meet that goal by 2000 on a "voluntary" basis. According to 
Antolik, in 1995 ASEAN has set a deadline of 1998 for its members to complete 
negotiations to 'open certain service industries - including tourism, finance, 
telecommunication, aviation and business services - to intra-ASEAN investment and 
· · · ,262 part1c1patlon. 
Despite some doubts about Vietnam's membership of ASEAN, some 
suggestions have been mentioned to enhance cooperation. Bui Xuan Nhat, Director of 
the Department for Economic and Cultural Cooperation of Vietnam, listed four 
conditions for ASEAN-Vietnamese cooperation. Firstly, ASEAN and Vietnam should 
learn from each other. Secondly, they should not impose one country's ideas on another. 
Thirdly, there should be mutual trust. Finally, there should be more awareness in 
handling elements outside the region. Other ASEAN members have attempted to make 
the transformation of Vietnam easier by offering aid in form of educational and 
development projects. Singapore's Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong stressed that, "the 
first easy task we can do is to help their officials training in English."263 
The income gaps between the richer states and the poorer ones could create 
resentment from those who are disadvantaged (possibly Vietnam). To avoid this tension, 
efforts should begin with steps to reconstruct Vietnam's economy to assure that 
Vietnam will be strong and the rest are sure to benefit. Further efforts should be made to 
improve the commercial infrastructure within and between countries in Southeast Asia 
262 Michael Antolik, "The ASEAN Regional Forum: the spirit of constructive engagement", op.cit, 
pp.2, 7. 
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so that 'the distribution of the gain from growth are more evenly distributed' .264 What 
ASEAN can do next is to further raise the prospects of stability within the region by 
formulating a federal system for Indochina that would be acceptable to the grouping 
itself. From there, the process could extend to other states in the Asia-Pacific region. 265 
Conclusion 
With the uncertainty and complexity of the strategic environment in the post 
Cold War period, ASEAN needs an expanded membership and role. Vietnam, the first 
Indochinese state to join ASEAN, became a full new member of ASEAN in 1995. All 
Indochinese states have shown their interest in joining ASEAN.266 Over the past three 
decades, ASEAN has tried to embrace all ten Southeast Asian countries to enhance 
confidence and inter-state cooperation among its members. Frank Frost has pointed out 
that:267 
ASEAN since 1967 has been able to play a considerable role in facilitating 
stability in Southeast Asia. It now has an ambitious post Cold War agenda to 
both stimulate trade and investment through AFTA and to help promote 
dialogue over security issues in Southeast Asia and in the wider Asia-Pacific 
region through the ASEAN Regional Forum. 
For Vietnam, AFTA is a very important aspect of its membership in ASEAN. If 
Vietnam can adapt successfully to the liberalisation proposed by AFT A then it will be in 
a credible position to request acceptance in APEC when that group is willing to consider 
263 Chris Johnson, "Tough terms for poor Indochina", op.cit. 
264 The commonality of standard and practices are required. Common standards will allow each state to 
produce similar goods with differing specifications for countries with unique standards. Common legal 
practice, intellectual property rights as well as human rights and the environment and safety standards are 
playing an increasing important role in economic relations. For more details, see Narongchai Akrasanee 
and David Stifel, op.cit, p.9-11. 
265 In particular, China, Australia and Japan will be involved. See Ky Cao, "Indochina's prospects for 
stability", Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.15, No.4, March 1994, p.403. 
266 Saritdet Marukatat and Surapohn Kanwerayotin, "Thailand: Laos signals it wants to become ASEAN 
member", Bangkok Post, 24 July 1994. 
267 Frost, Vietnam's Membership of ASEAN, op.cit, p.11. 
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new members.268 Vietnam has all to gain by joining ASEAN. ASEAN decided to 
accept Vietnam as a member because it would bring greater stability to Southeast Asia 
and increase foreign trade and investment in the region. 
However, Vietnam's membership in ASEAN may affect the cohesion of 
ASEAN and the security of Southeast Asia as a whole. The incompatible political and 
social system of Vietnam with that of ASEAN will make ASEAN less cohesive. In 
addition, ASEAN' s consensus on any issue will become more difficult. Moreover, the 
sense of animosity and distrust between Vietnam, China and Thailand may pose some 
problems. As the conflict of Spratly Islands still remains between Vietnam and China, it 
is likely that the ASEAN-China relationship may deteriorate. The Spratly conflict might 
cause some troubles for Southeast Asia as a whole. However, ASEAN, with Vietnam as 
a full new member, would indeed act as a counter-weight to China.269 In the case of 
Vietnam-Thailand ties, however, they have begun a new relationship which is 
increasingly characterised by economic interests, thereby reducing historical political 
animosity between them. 270 
Ways to integrate the Indochinese states into ASEAN have been suggested. 271 
Due to different levels of development, they should initially engage in functional 
cooperation with ASEAN on a selective basis, in areas that are mutually beneficial, and 
where they are ready, willing and able. This type of initial cooperation will facilitate 
harmonisation, engagement and integration, and let each country set its own pace 
towards full integration. Snitwongse noted that economic development is a priority in 
268 "Vietnam hopes to draw up tariff reduction list on time", Bangkok Post, 29 July 1995. 
269 Carlyle Thayer, "Keating's vision: SE Asia free from China orbit", The Australian, 18 December 1995, 
p.2. 
270 Surin Maisrikrod, "The peace dividend in Southeast Asia: The political economy of New Thai-
Vietnamese Relations", Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.16, No.1, June 1994, p.46. 
271 Mohammed Jawhar, "The making of a new Southeast Asia" in Desmond Ball and David Horner (eds), 
Strategic Studies in a Changing World: Global, Regional and Australian Perspectives, op.cit, 
pp.298-301. 
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the formulation of national policy, thus removing the barriers between Vietnam and 
ASEAN.272 Vietnam will gradually embrace the ASEAN 'spirit'. 
Vietnam's integration challenges ASEAN to maintain its relevance in a changing 
world. By expanding its membership and role in larger gatherings such as the ARF and 
APEC, ASEAN leaders have shown their wish to maintain the association's momentum. 
The pragmatic approach is also evident in the ASEAN preference of 'power 
equilibrium' to the elusive Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) concept. 
The approach provides a balance of external powers in a multi-polar world and one of 
the means towards the survival and relevance of Southeast Asia. 
Vietnam's entry into ASEAN is the most remarkable development in the 
Association's history, because it is the first time that ASEAN has accepted a 
Communist-state member. Vietnam has tried to convince ASEAN members that its 
entry would not obstruct ASEAN' s process and development. Vo Van Kiet, Vietnam's 
premier, stated at his first appearance at the 1995 ASEAN Summit that Vietnam's 
integration has affected some of ASEAN' s working mechanisms and may disrupt the 
grouping's dynamism. He also said that Hanoi has been a "small but constructive 
contribution as the youngest member of the ASEAN family."273 Yow has added that 
Vietnam's entry into ASEAN would not cause problems to the other members as it joins 
ASEAN with political goodwill. Vietnam is indeed reforming and has successfully 
developed its economy. ASEAN, with Vietnam, will be an association of greater 
importance with a larger market and a rich and diversified culture.274 
272 "ASEAN sees challenges, benefits in united Southeast Asia", Japan Economic Newswire, 31 July 
1995. Quoted in Frank, Vietnam's Membership of ASEAN, op.cit, p.11. 
273 Kulachada Chaipipat, Rita Patiyasevi, "Vo Van Kiet to tell leaders that VN will not weaken ASEAN", 
The Nation, 14 December 1995, p.A6. 
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Importantly, Vietnam may become the next Newly-Industrialising Economy 
(NIE) of Southeast Asia if it can improve domestic stability and manage the paradox of 
combining socialist and free-market systems.275 The most important challenge for 
ASEAN is to continue vitality, international credibility and capacity to continue to 
contribute to regional stability.276 
274 Jimmy Yow, "Vietnam outlines 3 keys factors for joining ASEAN", op.cit. 
275 Klintworth, "Forces of change", op.cit., p.232. 
276 Frost, Vietnam's Membership of ASEAN, op.cit., p.11. 
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Introduction 
Chapter 4 
Sino-Vietnamese Relations during the 1990s 
For the first time in a generation, Southeast Asia has an opportunity for lasting 
peace. The end of the Cold War, the ebbing of the Cambodian conflict and 
rapprochement between Vietnam and China, and between Vietnam and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), have set the stage for a 
positive regional security relationship. But the dispute over the Spratly Islands 
in the South China Sea has become an obstacle to realising this goal. Six 
governments-China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei-
claim all or a part of the Spratly Islands and/or their attendant maritime 
277 area. 
Sino-Vietnamese relations have been complicated for a long time. In the last two 
decades, there have been some serious disputes between the two countries, for example, 
the 1979 Chinese punitive invasion of Vietnam.278 Another event was the naval 
skirmish between Vietnam and China in March 1988 arising from the sovereignty 
disputes over the Spratly Island in the South China Sea. Moreover, there has been 
conflict over land borders affecting railway links between the two countries, which 
would increase trade between the two nations.279 Vietnamese refugees in other Asian 
countries, including China, create problems of their own regarding repatriation. 
However, because of rapid change in the international political arena and their 
respective domestic economic problems, China and Vietnam have sought to normalise 
their relations. Sino-Vietnamese relations have improved greatly since the Paris 
Agreements regarding Cambodia. The normalisation of relations between the two 
countries achieved in November 1991 produced the exchange of delegations from both 
277 Mark J. Valencia, "Spratly solution still at sea", The Pacific Review, Vol.6, No.2, 1993, p.155. 
278 This clash occurred after Vietnam invaded Cambodia. Large casualties resulted on both sides. 
279 Carlyle Thayer, Beyond Indochina, Adelphi Paper No. 29 (London: Oxford University Press, 1995), 
pp. 31-8. However, the railway links between two countries were currently reopened in February 1996. 
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sides as well as the increasing of trade. Although tensions still exist, it now seems that 
any future conflict can be resolved by peaceful means . 
Significantly, Vietnam's membership in ASEAN can affect ASEAN approaches 
towards China. This concern is complicated by some different perceptions towards 
China among ASEAN members. Frost points out that Indonesia and Malaysia have 
some doubts about China's potential for influence in the region, whereas Thailand and 
Singapore have been encouraging the development of relations with China. 280 
At present, the territorial dispute in the South China Sea is still a hot issue 
between China and Vietnam. China claims that the Spratlys are part of its sea territory. 
With strategic locations, potential abundance in natural resources such as fish stocks and 
oil, with China, Taiwan and four ASEAN countries (Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines 
and Vietnam) as claimants; the Spratlys dispute represents a major security concern to 
Southeast Asia as a whole. 
This chapter focuses on the relations between China and Vietnam before and 
after the Cambodian . conflict. Since Vietnam decided to withdraw its troops from 
Cambodia in the late 1980s, Chinese foreign policy towards Vietnam has changed. The 
study also investigates Sino-Vietnamese relations after their normalisation in 1991. 
Some problems which may yet affect these improved Sino-Vietnamese relations are 
discussed. They include the overlapping territorial claims both at sea and land, 
smuggling and Vietnamese refugees. The South China Sea dispute will be discussed in 
particular as this has the greatest potential to provoke Sino-Vietnamese conflict. The 
discussion will focus on the differences between Chinese and Vietnamese claims. The 
attempt of China, Vietnam and other countries in ASEAN to help find the way to settle 
280 The differences are discernible during the period of the Cambodian conflict. For instance, Indonesia 
had been critical about the extent to which Thailand had improved relations with China. However, nothing 
eventuated in the end, because ASEAN wanted to maintain an agreed position over Cambodia. For more 
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the dispute will also be discussed. Furthermore, ASEAN, with Vietnam as a full new 
member, has to consider carefully its foreign policy towards China. Some ways to deal 
with China and to resolve outstanding problems are mentioned in this chapter. 
4.1. Sino-Vietnamese relations. 
Over the last four decades Sino-Vietnamese relations have been complicated. 
Ideology once brought China and Vietnam in a relationship characterised as "close as 
lips and teeth" or "comrade plus brother" during the 1950s.281 Now, in the post Cold-
War era, Vietnam finds itself in a unique position, but must always consider Chinese 
power and interests when designing its own foreign policy. 282 Frost has pointed out 
that: 283 
Strong differences in interest and perspectives emerged in the early 1970s, when China 
was intent on promoting detente with the United States while the Second Indochina 
War was still continuing. After the end of the war, Vietnam hoped to retain aid from 
China but a series of disputes and the onset of the conflict in Cambodia saw relations 
decline dramatically 
4.1.1. Sino-Vietnamese relations since 1975 
Since the re-unification of Vietnam in April 1975, China has been fearful of 
Vietnamese regional hegemony because of the Vietnamese-Soviet alliance relationship, 
which posed a serious threat to Chinese security.284 In 1978, the Vietnamese Communist 
Party (VCP) declared that 'China was the dangerous and most direct enemy of the 
Vietnamese people' because of Chinese support for Democratic Kampuchea. The Sino-
explanation, see Frank Frost, Vietnam's Membership of ASEAN: Issues and Implications, Current Issues 
Brief No. 3 (Canberra: The Department of the Parliamentary Library, 1995), pp. 7-8. 
281 See more details in Carlyle Thayer, "Comrade plus brother: The new Sino-Vietnamese relations", The 
Pacific Review, Vol. 5, No.4, September 1992, pp.402-6: 402 and Carlyle Thayer, "Sino-Vietnamese 
relations: The interplay of ideology and national interest", Asian Survey, Vol.34, No.6, June 1994, 
pp.513-28: 513. 
282 Carlyle Thayer, "Vietnam: Coping with China", in Dajlit Singh (ed.), South-east Asian Affairs 1994 
(Singapore: Institute of South-east Asian Studies, 1994 ), pp. 351-67: 351. 
283 Frank Frost, Vietnam's Foreign Relations: Dynamics of change (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 1993), p.30. 
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Vietnamese border of February-March 1979 was triggered by Vietnam's invasion of 
Cambodia in late 197 8. 285 
For almost five years later, relations between both sides were bad because of 
China's policy of 'bleeding Vietnam white' .286 Before Vietnam invaded Cambodia 
(May-June 1978), China had refused to offer any benefits and aid to Vietnam; China 
taught Vietnam a crucial lesson that any challenge to Chinese power would fail. 
However, by 1981-1982, Vietnam's foreign policy towards China began to 
change with Brezhnev's desire to normalise the relations with China. In the 1982 Fifth 
Party Congress, Vietnam called for friendly relations with China on the basis of the 
. . 1 f f 1 . 287 pnnc1p es o peace u coexistence. 
After the Cambodian conflict, changes in international relations and many 
internal factors, especially the 1986 Sixth Party Congress, caused China and Vietnam to 
end hostilities, resulting in discussions on the resolution of the Cambodian conflict. In 
addition, China's foreign policy has been described as coercive diplomacy. 288 In 1986, 
China indicated that Soviet support for the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia was an 
obstacle to Sino-Soviet normalisation. Pressure from China and internal problems 
forced the Soviet Union to adjust its foreign policy towards Vietnam. For instance, when 
China and Vietnam clashed over control of some of the Spratly Islands in March 1988, 
the Soviet Union remained almost totally silent.289 Sino-Soviet rapprochement was 
achieved at the Gorbachev-Deng summit of May 1989. Subsequently, Vietnam 
284 For a discussion of China's Vietnam policy after the Vietnam War, see Robert S. Ross, The Indochina 
Tangle: China's Vietnam Policy 1975-1979 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988). 
285 Carlyle Thayer, "China's domestic crisis and Vietnamese responses, April-July 1989", in Gary 
Klintworth (ed), China 's Crisis: The International Implications (Canberra: Australian National 
University, 1989), pp.83-97: 90. 
286 For more details, see Carlyle Thayer, "China's domestic crisis", Ibid., p.90. 
287 Ibid., pp.90-91. 
288 Robert S. Ross, "China and the Cambodian peace process: The value of coercive diplomacy", Asian 
Survey, Vol.16, No.12, December 1991, pp. 1170-85. 
289 Ibid, pp.1174-75. 
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predicted the withdrawal of Soviet support and prepared a strategy for withdrawal from 
C b d. 290 am o Ia. 
In addition, Chinese military support for the Khmer Rouge and international 
political and economic isolation also pushed Vietnam to change its foreign policy 
towards China. The success of Chinese coercive diplomacy has brought about the peace 
settlement in the Cambodian conflict. As Vietnam tried to negotiate to end the 
Cambodian conflict following its 1984/85 Dry Season Offensive (K-5 Plan), China 
toned down its shelling of Vietnam's border provinces that affected the decoupling of 
the situation in Cambodia from the situation along its frontier with Vietnam. 291 It was 
soon evident that the Vietnam-China border conflict was a 'phoney war' 292 and that a 
h . h 1 . h. d 293 t aw In t ere ations Ip was un erway. 
In mid-1987, Vietnam adopted a crucial new national-security doctrine 
manifested in Politburo Resolution 2 to strengthen 'National Defence in the New 
Revolutionary Stage' overturning the security orientation of the previous decade.294 By 
1987 China and Vietnam reached a modus vivendi. 295 A Vietnamese diplomat stated in 
1988 that Vietnam was ready to 'do a bit of kowtowing to the Chinese' .296 The 
Vietnamese soldiers were officially withdrawn in 1987, the last one leaving In 
290 There was a failure in that no internationally-sanctioned observers kept an eye on the withdrawal. As a 
result, Vietnam could not get any immediate benefits of increased economic assistance. For more 
information, see Roland J. Cima, "Vietnam in 1989: Initiating the post-Cambodia period", Asian Survey, 
Vol.30, No.1 (January 1990), pp.88-95, 88-90. And Gary Klintworth, "Forces of change", in Dean K 
Forbes, Terence H. Hull, David G. Marr and Brian Brogan (eds.), Doi Moi: Vietnam's Renovation Policy 
and Performance (Canberra: The Australian National University, 1991), p.219. 
291 Thayer, "China's domestic crisis", op.cit., p.91. 
292 Carlyle Thayer, Security issues in Southeast Asia: The Third Indochina War, Paper delivered to 
Conference on Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific, Research School of Pacific Studies, The 
Australian National University, Canberra, 12-14 August 1987. 
293 This was signalled y the appearance of Nguyen Co Thach at Chinese National Day celebrations held at 
the Chinese embassy in Hanoi, and the exchange of prisoners. See more details in Carlyle Thayer, 
"China's domestic crisis and Vietnamese response, April-July 1989", op.cit., pp.91-2. 
294 See more details in Carlyle Thayer, Beyond Indochina, op.cit., p.23. 
295 Thayer, "Vietnam: Coping with China", op.cit., p.353. 
296 Nayan Chanda, "Taking a soft line", FEER, 8 December 1988, p.27. 
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September 1989. Except for perhaps 1,500-2,000 technical advisers, the entire 
Vietnamese occupation force has been fully demobilised.297 
Regarding its economy and international isolation, Vietnam has re-evaluated its 
international relationships following its withdrawal from Cambodia. Vietnam expected 
the Asian community to end its isolation and lessen distrust and suspicion of Vietnam. 
The Vietnamese withdrawal reflected the normalisation of relations with China after 
over a decade of mutual antagonism. Frost points out that although susp1c1on and 
potential conflict of interests between Vietnam and China still remain, internal and 
external factors in both countries have encouraged an improvement of relations. 298 
The Vietnamese attitude towards China has changed. This was clear in that at the 
1996 Sixth Congress, as Thayer has stated, all hostile references to China were deleted 
from the state constitution and tension on the Sino-Vietnamese border was gradually 
reduced. 299 In addition, cross-border trade developed extensively in the late 1980s. 
4.1.2. Sino-Vietnamese relations after the 1991 normalisation 
Politics 
The normalisation with China provoked dispute between party leaders whether 
or not to establish military relations with China. A group centred in the Vietnam 
People's Army (VPA), on the one hand, advocated going beyond normalisation and re-
establishing formal military and security ties. On the other hand, it was argued that 
Vietnam should continue an omni-directional foreign policy with all countries as the 
best guarantee of its security. 300 
297 In fact, Vietnam first started withdrawing its troops in 1982. See Gary Klintworth, "Forces of change", 
op.cit., p.219. 
298 Frost, "Vietnam and the Asia-Pacific Major Powers", Vietnam's Foreign Relations: Dynamics of 
Change, op.cit., p.30. 
299 Thayer, "China's domestic crisis and Vietnamese responses, April-July 1989", op.cit., p.81-97, 90-2. 
300 For details of discussion of these two groups, see Carlyle Thayer, "Sino-Vietnamese relations: The 
interplay of ideology and national interest", op.cit., pp. 513-28, Carlyle Thayer, "Vietnam: Coping with 
China", op.cit., pp. 351-67. 
91 
After a 1990 secret summit of party leaders in Chengdu, southern China, 
Vietnam's 'pro-China lobby' became ascendant within the VCP. Chinese and 
Vietnamese heads of government and heads of party signalled a move towards mutual 
self-restraint. Both were ready to settle differences as socialist states' placing emphasis 
on solidarity. 
At the seventh national party congress in mid-1991, the main opponent of the re-
establishment of relations with China, Foreign Minister and Politburo-member Nguyen 
Co Thach, was dismissed.301 This congress made crucial steps to promote 
rapprochement with China. General Le Due Anh, Minister for National Defence, went 
to China to press for normalisation. Agreement was reached, and in November 1991 
Sino-Vietnamese relations were normalised on a party-to-party basis which ended more 
than a decade of hostility. The summit between Premier Vo Van Kiet and Party Chief 
Do Muoi and their Chinese counterparts in Beijing was public and proved to be 
especially cordial. 302 
At this meeting, Vietnam pressed China to expand the relationship to include 
security guarantees just short of a formal military alliance. China and Vietnam in the 
late 1980s have reached an agreement producing a cease fire along the border, the end of 
hostile media campaigns, the monitoring of military activities along the border, the end 
of harassment of peasants, and the liberalisation of border exchanges to allow trading 
and visits. 303 
Most significantly, the Soviet decline in Southeast Asia lessened China's 
suspicion of encirclement through Vietnam and Cambodia. The collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the reduction of US military power in the region and Sino-Vietnamese 
301 Thayer, "Comrade plus brother: The new Sino-Vietnamese relations", op. cit., pp.402-6. 
302 Michael Antolik, "The ASEAN Regional Forum: The spirit of constructive engagement", 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.16, No.2, September 1994, pp.129-30. 
303 Thayer, "China's domestic crisis", op. cit., p.92. 
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normalisation contributed towards peaceful relations. Also normalisation was not to be 
hindered by territorial disputes. China's participation in the 1991 workshop on the South 
China Sea in Indonesia indicated that this dispute could well be handled by negotiations 
among all parties concerned. China offered prospects for renewed cooperation with 
Vietnam in areas such as economics and trade, and a summit in Beijing. 304 
Since then, several ministers, foreign ministers, and premiers of both sides have 
exchanged visits. Many major agreements touching on aid, trade, investment, 
commercial arrangements, scientific and technological exchange, cultural and 
educational matters were signed. A framework for bilateral relations was also set out in 
a joint communique issued in 1991 that included guidelines for Vietnam's relations with 
Taiwan - a sensitive subject for Beijing. 
Despite the improvement of Sino-Vietnamese relations since 1991, the relations 
have been described as 'comrades but not allies', 305 because border disputes in the 
South China Sea remain. In February 1992, the Chinese National People's Congress laid 
claim over the South China Sea. In May 1992, the government signed an agreement with 
a U.S. firm to explore for oil in an area disputed with Vietnam. In June 1992, Chinese 
troops set up another outpost on a reef. However, it seems that China and Vietnam 
believe that it is better to improve their relations. In December 1992 Premier Li Peng 
visited Vietnam, the first for a Chinese head of government in 21 years. He reassured 
Hanoi that "the common points between Vietnam and China outweigh and outnumber 
their disputes."306 
304 Murray Hiebert and Tai Ming Cheung, "Comrades again", FEER, 22 August 1991, pp.8-9. 
305 For more information, see "Li Peng in Vietnam", Economist, 5 December 1992, Thayer, "Vietnam: 
Coping with China", op.cit., p.355 and Carlyle Thayer, "Coping with China: Vietnam's strategic 
readjustment", Paper presented to the Workshop on China as a Great Power in the Asia-Pacific: Myths, 
Realities and Challenges (Canberra: The Australian National University, December 1993), pp.240-1. 
306 Murray Hiebert, "Comrades Apart", FEER, 17 December 1992, p.9. 
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Following the rapprochement, China's Defence Minister, Sr. Lt-General, Chi 
Haotian, visited to Vietnam in May 1993. He stated that 'friendly relations between the 
two countries are historic and should be developed'. 307 Vietnam has also maintained its 
omni-directional foreign relations in particular with the ASEAN countries. However, its 
membership of ASEAN does not assure that Vietnam's relations with China will 
become stronger. ASEAN stands to gain little if Vietnam became a new front-line 
state.308 
Economics and trade 
Sino-Vietnamese economic relations have been strengthened gradually since the 
1991 normalisation despite a border dispute and occasional incidents in the Gulf of 
Tonkin. Cross-border trade increased from US$ 40 million in 1991, to US$ 179 million 
in 1992, and US$ 330 million in 1993. Sino-Vietnamese trade in 1995 increased 
markedly to almost 1 billion dollars, up from 534 million dollars in 1994. Vietnam is 
Guangxi province's second largest foreign trading partner, illustrating the importance of 
cross-border trade to the local economies concerned. 309 
While Sino-Vietnamese bilateral relations improve, Vietnam must consider the 
implications of future developments in China. Vietnam would be badly shaken if China 
became unstable. To a certain degree, "Vietnamese regime security is indirectly 
dependent on the longevity of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime."310 Thus, in 
sum, the Sino-Vietnamese normalisation is not only in the world's and region's 
economic interests but it also in the interest of peace in the political sense that the two 
are gradually integrated into the global arena. However, there are some problems 
307 See, Xinhua, 8 December 1992 and Xinhua, 14 May 1993. Quoted in Carlyle Thayer, Beyond 
Indochina, op.cit., p.57. 
308 Thayer, Beyond Indochina, op.cit., p.58. 
309 For details of Sino-Vietnamese cross-border trade since the 1991 normalisation, see Brantly Womack, 
"Sino-Vietnamese border trade", Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 6, June 1994, pp. 495-512: 503-5. 
310 Thayer, Beyond Indochina, op.cit., p.56. 
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needing to be addressed including Vietnamese refugees and the smuggling of cheap 
Chinese goods into the Vietnamese market. Most importantly, there are unresolved 
territorial disputes over the land and sea border such as the Spratly Islands, which China 
claims as part of its 'inland waters'. 
4.2. Maritime Disputes 
4.2.1. The South China Sea dispute 
General background and causes of dispute 
The Spratly Islands archipelago is situated in the South China Sea. It comprises 
hundreds of shoals, reefs, atolls, and small, mostly uninhabited islets. The Spratly 
Islands lie 900 miles south of Hainan (the Chinese Island), 230 miles east of the 
Vietnamese coast, 120 miles west of Palawan (the Philippines Island) , and 150 miles 
north-west of Sabah (the Malaysian state). The area of the archipelago is approximately 
150,000 square miles. 311 
The Spratlys are separated from the continental shelves of China and Taiwan 
by a 3,000 metre trench to the north and north-east and from the Philippines, 
Brunei, and Sabah (Malaysia) by the East Palawan Trough. The area is poorly 
surveyed and marked as "Dangerous Ground" on navigation charts. The 
largest island, !tu Aha, is 0.4 square miles in area, and Spratly Island is 0.5 
.1 312 square mi es. 
The Spratlys are strategically vital because they are located astride the sea lines 
of communication that link the Indian and Pacific Oceans via the Malacca, Sunda and 
Lombok Straits. "Exercise of sovereign control of the Spratlys, with the attendant 
territorial seas and exclusive economic zones (EEZs), presents a potentially central and 
commanding position in the region."313 
311 Dato' Haji Mohammad Aii bin Alwi, Brigadier Malaysian Defence Force, "Conflicting claims in the 
South China Sea", Asian Defence Journal, Edition 6/92, p.10. 
312 Lee G. Cordner Am Ran, "The Spratly Islands dispute and the law of the sea", Journal of the 
Australian Naval Institute, May/July 1994, p.35 . 
313 Ibid. 
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It was reported that the area was rich in hydrocarbon deposits. 314 The granting 
of petroleum and natural gas concession in the disputed areas is a common but 
provocative means for claimants to exercise their jurisdiction.315 China, Taiwan and 
Vietnam claim all islands in the Spratly area. Malaysia and the Philippines claim several 
islands, and Brunei claims one reef. The Chinese, Taiwanese and Vietnamese claims are 
based upon historical reasons. The right of discovery is claimed by the Philippines while 
continental shelves and the law of the sea are pronounced for their occupations by 
Malaysia and Brunei.316 (See Maps in Appendix A and Appendix B) 
China has taken a remarkable role in claiming its sovereignty over the Spratlys. 
China's approach toward the dispute has changed from a low-profile one in the 1950s 
and the 1960s, to growing concern in the 1970s and an assertive policy since the 1980s. 
This concern has grown since the Filipino President, Marcos, claimed that the 
"Kalayaan Islands" were its extension of Palawan Island, in 1971. South Vietnam 
claimed the Paracel Island in 1973. Then, Malaysia formally claimed certain islands and 
reefs within its 200 mile exclusive economic zones.317 These claims challenged China to 
express concern and to adopt a more assertive role towards the area. 
Significantly, China's increasing demand for oil for industrialisation has forced 
it to show greater concern.318 Because of this, China cannot let the Spratlys be occupied 
by other claimants, in particular its major challenger, Vietnam. In 1986, UNESCO's 
Ocean Committee cooperated with China to construct two observation posts in the 
314 See Haller-Trost R., "The Spratly Islands: A study on the limitations of international law", Occasional 
Paper No. 14 (Canterbury: University of Kent at Canterbury, 1990), pp. 54-5. Quoted in Lee G. Cordner 
Am Ran, op.cit., p.35. 
315 Mark J. Valencia, China and the South China Sea Disputes, Adelphi Paper No. 298 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.8-75: 8. 
316 Ibid., p.8. 
317 Shee Poon Kim, "China's changing policies toward the South China Sea", American Asian Review, 
Vol.12, No.4, Winter, 1994, pp. 301-321: 304. 
318 However, it appears that reports of large oil and gas reserves are based on insufficient information and 
that the Spratly area is not presently a high priority for major oil companies. See Mark J. Valencia, China 
and the South China Sea Disputes, op.cit., p.11. 
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Spratlys. Consequently, Shee Poon Kim has pointed out that this assumed Chinese 
justification to have a greater presence in South China Sea.319 
The most serious Chinese action over the South China Sea was the March 1988 
naval skirmish over the Spratly Islands near Landsdowne Reef between China and 
Vietnam.320 It was reported that three Vietnamese ships were sunk and about 70 
killed.321 Apparently, both countries continue to station troops and establish markers on 
previously unoccupied features. 322 China has continued to strengthen its blue-water 
naval and air capacity in the area by deploying its high-technological aircraft323 to 
protect the coastal economy, sea trade and fishing industries, resources in the South 
China Sea, and control the sea lanes that assumes China's naval capability to be a major 
sea power. 324 
In 1987, China announced that the Spratlys were part of Hainan province. It also 
passed a Law on Territorial Waters and Their Contiguous Areas which made its 
sovereignty claim over the Paracel and Spratly Islands more solid.325 Importantly, China 
gave a concession to the Crestone Energy Corporation of the U.S. to search for oil in the 
Vanguard Bank area; an area which Vietnam has claimed as part of its continental shelf. 
319 Shee Poon Kim, "China's changing policies toward the South China Sea", op.cit., p.305. 
32° For more details, see Chang Pao-min, "A new cradle for the South China Sea islands", Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, 1990, Vol.12, No.20, pp.25-9; Shee Poon Kim, "The March 1988 skirmish over the 
Spratly Islands and its implications for Sino-Vietnamese relations" in R.D. Hill, Norman G. Owen and 
E.V. Roberts (eds.), Fishing in Troubled Waters: Proceedings of an Academic Conference on Territorial 
Claims in the South China Sea (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1991), 
pp.177-91. 
321 "Intelligence", FEER, 26 April 1990, p.8. 
322 "China stirs the pot", FEER, 9 July 1992, pp.14-5. 
323 China decided to build a 260,000 square feet air strip and stationed some troops and artillery unit on 
the Paracels. For more information, see Shee Poon Kim, "China's changing policies toward the South 
China Sea", op.cit., 1994, pp. 301-321: 306 and Nayan Chanda, "China acquires sensitive military gear", 
Asian Wall Street Journal, 23 March 1992, p.2. 
324 You Ji and You Xu, "In search of blue water power: The PLA Navy's Maritime strategy in the 1990s", 
The Pacific Review, Vol.4, No.2., 1991, pp.141-2. 
325 The 24th Session of the Standing Committee of the Seventh National People's Congress approved this 
law on 25 February 1992. See FEER, 12 March 1992. Quoted in Mark J. Valencia, "Spratly solution still 
at sea", op.cit., p.155. 
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China reaffirmed and promised to protect the company with force. 326 Li Peng and Vo 
Van Kiet then met in Vietnam to find a way to resolve the problem.327 China proposed 
to divide the overlapping area and each separately develop by its own way while 
Vietnam proposed a joint development idea. 
In any case, the disputes are not primarily about oil but rather about the strategic 
significance of the islands and sovereignty. Thus, access to potential oil is not really the 
primary objective of such a settlement. It should be considered carefully in long term 
and in various ways, particularly when 'territory' is involved, as it becomes more 
complex. 328 
Claims to the Spratly Islands 
Because the claims to the sovereignty over the Spratly Islands are multilateral, 
the issue is complicated. Importantly, the claims are incomplete and caution inconsistent 
historical data, different concepts of ownership and imaginative interpretations of 
international law of the sea. 
There have been various methods used to display and to support their rights over 
the Spratlys by the claimants. These have included using military force, showing the 
flag, occupying islets, establishing structures and markers on islands, establishing 
scientific research station, enacting laws, uniting the area into nearby provinces, 
publishing maps and releasing historical documents to verify claims, allowing tourists 
and journalists to visit islands, and granting concessions to oil companies.329 
326 "China, Vietnam to hold talks to settle dispute over Spratlys", The Straits Times, 3 July 1992; "China's 
Spratlys deal has oil firms in Hanoi worried", The Straits Times, 27 June 1992. 
327 Supapohn Kanwerayotin, "China, Vietnam fail to resolve territorial rows", Bangkok Post, 3 December 
1992, p.6. 
328 Valencia, "Spratlys solution still at sea", op.cit., p.159. 
329 Ted L. McDorman, "The South China Sea islands dispute in the 1990s: a new multilateral process and 
continuing function", Duke International and Comparative Law Journal, in press. Quoted in Mark J. 
Valencia, "Spratlys solutions still at sea", op.cit., p.158. 
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China has presented historical documents to support the argument that the 
Spratlys archipelagoes have belonged to China since ancient time. 331 The islands of the 
South China Sea are collectively described in Chinese mythology as the "Tongue of the 
Dragon" and are seen as an inseparable part of China. 332 
China claimed that these islands were discovered, developed and administered 
by China during the Han Dynasty in 206 B.C. to 24 A.D.333 During the 10th-16th 
centuries, the South China Sea was used as a principal Chinese transit route for world 
trade. The Chinese claim to have surveyed, worked and administered the Islands in the 
period 206-220 A.D.334 Guoxing has stated that China began to exercise jurisdiction 
over the Paracels during the Tang Dynasty (AD 618-907), and over the Spratlys during 
the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644).335 Historical claim includes a Sino-French treaty on 26 
June 1887. Chinese government spokespeople have pointed out that both the Paracels 
and the Spratlys lie east of the delimitation line as provided and were transferred to 
China in the 1887 Conventions; therefore, they are a part of Chinese territory.336 In the 
330 Since the separation of China and Taiwan in 1947, claims to occupy the area were dealt with 
separately. However, this chapter focuses only Chinese and Vietnamese claims. For more details of other 
claimants, see Ji Guoxing, The Spratlys Disputes and Prospects for Settlement (Malaysia: Institute of 
Strategic and International Studies, 1992), pp.8-14, Lee G. Cordner Am Ran, op.cit, pp.35-42 and Mark J. 
Valencia, China and the South China Sea Disputes, op.cit., pp.8-24. 
331 The ROC's rule over the Spratly Islands was fully restored after the Second World War. See, "ROC 
has sovereignty over Spratlys", The Free China Journal, 17 November 1992, p.7. 
332 Lee G. Cordner Am Ran, op.cit, p.35. 
333 It was first recorded that the Chinese used the Spratlys for fishing activities. See "ROC has sovereignty 
over Spratlys", The Free China Journal, 17 November 1992, p.7. And Ji Guoxing, The Spratlys Disputes: 
Prospects for Settlement, op.cit., pp.8-14. 
334 Haller-Trost R., "The Spratly Islands: A study on the limitations of international law", op.cit., pp. 
54-5. Quoted in Lee G. Cordner Am Ran, op.cit., p.38. 
335 Ji Guoxing, The Spratlys Disputes and Prospects for Settlement, op.cit., p.3. 
336 After Vietnam became a protectorate of France in 1884, a Convention respecting the Delimitation of 
the Frontier between China and Tonkin (Vietnam) was signed on 26 June 1887. For more details of claims 
of historical claims of China over the Spratlys, see Hung Dah Chiu and Choon-Ho Park, "Legal status of 
the Paracels and Spratly Islands", Ocean Development and International Law Journal, Vol.3, No.1, 1975, 
p.11. However, it is argued that at that time the islands are not named, territorial limits are not specified, 
and interpretation of the Convention is questionable. 
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first half of the 20th century, the Chinese government repeatedly reaffirmed its 
sovereignty over the South China Sea islands. 337 
Since its founding, China has continued to administer and develop the Spratly 
Islands. Over the years, its troops have patrolled the islands; its scientific workers have 
surveyed them; and large amount of fishermen from Qiongghai County in Guangdong 
Province have been to the Spratlys for fishing and other economic activities.338 
Significantly, China reasserted its rights over all of the Spratly Islands by declaring "The 
Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone" 
on 25 February 1992. It is specifically indicated in Article 2 that the Nansha (Spratly) 
I 1 d . Ch' . 339 s an s are 1n 1nese territory. 
However, according to Cordner Am Ran, the Chinese historical claim of the 
Spratly Islands is invalid. Evidence is inadequate and disconnected. It does not 
demonstrate continuous occupation, administration or effective control as occasional 
transit by marines and infrequent visits made by fishermen. The case for the Treaty of 
1887 is vague and non-specific. Rather, it is weakened by the fact that a Chinese official 
drew a chart excluding the Spratlys in 1928.340 Besides its occasional diplomatic 
protests, Chinese occupation and effective control in the Spratlys did not occur until 
1988 when naval facilities and garrisons were established on a small number of features 
and when China clashed with Vietnam over the islands in 1988. 
On the other hand, some writers have argued that the Chinese claims are valid 
and well-founded. For example, Guoxing has argued that judging from the international 
337 For more details of Chinese claims, see Ji Guoxing, The Spratlys Disputes and Prospects for 
Settlement, op.cit., pp.4-5. 
338 Ibid., p.5 
339 Order of the President of the People's Republic of China No.55, Law of the People's Republic of 
China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, First Edition 1992, 25 February 1992. Quoted in 
Lee G. Cordner Am Ran, op.cit., p.39. 
340 Ibid. 
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laws, the Chinese claims are stronger as they meet the requirements of 'acquisition by 
discovery' (the earliest discoverer of the Spratlys).341 
Vietnamese claims 
The Vietnamese claim over all the Spratly Islands comes from its historical 
arguments based upon events before, during and after French occupation. Recent official 
Vietnamese documents claim that ownership can be traced back to 1650-53. 342 The 
Spratlys under the name of "Van Ly Troung Sa" were claimed as part of Vietnamese 
territory under Emperor Gia-Long's governance from 1816, and in 1838.343 When the 
Philippines first claimed to the Spratlys in June 1956, the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) 
protested. As a result of this action, Vietnam declared that it reaffirmed its ownership of 
the Spratlys. Later on, after issuing a communique in June 1956, Saigon sent troops to 
occupy Spratly Island ·in August 1956. On 22 October 1956 the islands were assigned, 
by the R VN, for governance by Phuoc Tuy Province. 344 
Vietnam's activity in the Spratlys was non existent over the next 15 years due to 
civil war. After the oil crisis in 1973, Saigon started to place more attention on oil 
development. In July 1973, Saigon began to issue oil exploration permits to foreign 
companies in the areas near the Spratlys and in September 1973, it went further by 
announcing the formal incorporation of the 11 main islands in the Spratlys into Phuc 
Tuy Province and occupied five. 345 When Vietnam was reclaimed by the North in 1975, 
341 Some more reasons have been raised to support an argument of Chinese stronger claim. For more 
details of the argument, see Ji Guoxing, The Spratlys Disputes and Prospects for Settlement, op.cit., 
pp.14-9. 
342 Nevertheless, the basis for this claim is not identified. See, Haller-Trost, "The Spratly Islands: A study 
on the limitations of international law", op.cit., p.41. Quoted in Lee G. Cordner Am Ran, op.cit., p.39. 
343 Hungdah Chiu and Choon-Ho Park, op.cit., p.11. 
344 In fact, before the reunification of Vietnam, there were some contradictions over the Spratlys claim 
between the North and the South. The North-Vietnam government supported China for the ownership of 
the Spratlys that was against the South government claim. 
345 Ji Guoxing, The Spratlys Disputes and Prospects for Settlement, op.cit., p.8. 
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the sovereignty claims over the Spratlys were reaffirmed although the North previously 
supported the Chinese claim. This led to the deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese ties.346 
In addition, since the adoption of the 1982 UN convention on the Law of the 
Sea, Vietnam has stepped up its occupation of the Spratlys to gain the best benefits and 
declared that its territorial waters included the Spratlys and Paracels. After June 1989, 
taking advantage of China's domestic difficulties, Vietnam seized three more reefs , 
increasing its number of occupied islands and reefs to twenty four. 347 
However, Vietnam's historical claim for ownership is weakened because of the 
absence of Vietnam's exercise of sovereignty over the disputed area before and during 
the French occupation of Vietnam. Vietnam asserts that the occupation by King Gia 
Long in 1816 has been recorded. Nonetheless, no record of the 'occupation' is found in 
history books.348 The claims are more deficient when France pronounced that the 
Spratlys were never transferred to Vietnam in 1933. Moreover, North Vietnam had 
backed China's claim which was against South Vietnam in 1956 and 1958. 
Subsequently, the reversal of that position in 1975 weakened Vietnam' s historical claim. 
Despite the deficiencies in its historical claims, Vietnam has occupied several islets and 
other insular features since 1973. This may give more recent claims some validity.349 
Utility of the Law of the Sea 
For centuries, there have been disputes over the scope of extension of 
jurisdiction to the outer sea. The continental shelf concept was brought about mainly by 
the need to accommodate technological innovations, anticipation of the existence of 
seabed resources and the capacity to exploit them. Due to this concept, the United 
346 Vietnam has been maintaining precarious garrisons on up to 22 features in the Spratlys and has been 
supporting a claim to effective occupation of the Spratlys since 1973. 
347 Three of them are Bombay Castle, Prince of Wales Bank and Vanguard Bank. See Ji Guoxing, The 
Spratlys Disputes and Prospects for Settlement, op.cit. , p.10. 
348 Ibid., pp.10-1. 
349 Lee G. Cordner Am Ran, op.cit., p.39-41. 
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Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was first held in 1958 in Geneva. Four 
conventions, relating to the high seas, territorial sea, fishery and the continental shelf, 
were drafted, however, no agreement was reached.350 The most crucial conference on 
the Law of the Sea was the third one in 1982 (The United Nations Conference on the 
LOS). It includes the traditional form of 'complete jurisdiction' which is identified as 
territorial sea and adds the notion of 'partial jurisdiction' .351 
The main conflict in the Spratlys dispute is that of sovereignty over the islands, 
islets and cays of the archipelago. The 1982 LOS Convention poses little help, "as it 
begins with an unstated premise that sovereignty of land territory is established prior to 
consideration of maritime issues."352 Application of the relevant Articles in the 
Convention and the UN mediatory agencies, which were established to resolve of these 
conflicts, can only be of use if the sovereignty issues are resolved. Following the 
underlying principle, each state makes some reference to the law of the sea to justify its 
sovereignty claims. Observations on the apparent strengths and weaknesses of 
respective sovereignty claims are made, the provisions of the 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention are considered and the strength and weakness of sovereignty claims are 
discussed. 353 
According to Valencia, the United Nations Convention on the LOS provides 
only a guide for solutions. It indicates that islands are naturally formed features that are 
above water at high tide. 354 
350 The Second UN Conference on the LOS was held in 1960 and also fail because of disagreement on the 
territorial sea. The third one was held from 1973-1982. In 1982, it was called the United Nations 
Convention on the LOS. For more information, see Ji Guoxing, The Spratlys Disputes and Prospects for 
Settlement, op.cit., p.19-20. 
351 For example, Article 3 stipulates that every state has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial 
sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nm. See details of the agreements of the 1982 LOS Convention in Ji 
Guoxing, Ibid., op.cit., p.20. 
352 Lee G. Cordner Am Ran, op.cit., p.42. 
353 Ibid. 
354 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was done on 10 December 1982. UN. Doc. 
A/CONF.62/122, Article 83 (3). Quoted in Mark J. Valencia, "Spratlys solution still at sea", op.cit., 
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They are entitled to 200 nm EEZs and continental shelves. Rocks which cannot 
sustain human habitation or economic life of their own may only have 12 nm 
territorial seas and 12 nm contiguous zones. Discovery in and of itself does not 
create permanent title to such features. It must be followed by long, 
continuous, peaceful occupation and effective jurisdiction by a state authority. 
But this applies only if the feature is claimed by another state or if another 
claimant state fails to publicly oppose the granting of title. 355 
It can be concluded that the historical sovereignty claims of China, Taiwan, and 
Vietnam are incomplete, intermittent and unconvincing as none of them support a 
concept of "effective control, administration and governance" of sovereign territory. 
Permanent occupation by citizens of any state was notably lacking and administration 
consisted primarily of lodging occasional diplomatic protests if another nation's 
dalliance in the Spratlys was deemed to be too long. In fact, the first effective control of 
the Spratlys was the 1939 Japanese occupation. Naval garrisons were established on 
some islands. The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty and the 1952 Japan-Taiwan Treaty 
offered the resolution in the sense of contemporary international law. 356 
It seems that China had issued a legal sovereignty claim in 1958 and 1992. 
Chinese occupation has been continuous since 1988. Nevertheless, Cordner Am Ran 
points out that "photographs of PLA-N troops standing thigh deep in water, guarding 
some of the claimed territory, bring to question Article 13 of the 1982 LOS Convention 
on low-tide elevations, and Article 121 on islands. Such features do not qualify as 
islands nor are they 'low-tide elevations' within the meaning of the Convention. To 
qualify, they must be at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from 
the mainland or an island."357 Although the Chinese claim is likely to be legally weak, it 
cannot be ignored because of its great power status as well as its recent physically-
persistent presence in the Spratlys. 
p. 157. 
355 Valencia, "Spratlys solution still at sea", op.cit., p. 157. 
356 Lee G. Cordner Am Ran, op.cit., pp.42-3. 
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In fact, Vietnam may be able to claim the western part of the Spratlys as its 
continental shelf because it seems to be a "natural prolongation" of the Vietnamese land 
territory, as prescribed in Article 76.1 of the 1982 LOS Convention. Indeed, the 
sedimentary deposits that formed this area stemmed from the Mekong River outflow 
and another great river that was submerged about 10,000 years ago.358 
A country can extend its continental shelf throughout the national prolongation 
of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin to a maximum of 350 nm 
or to 200 nm from its baselines if the continental margin does not extend that far. The 
continental margin is defined as the submerged prolongation of the land mass consisting 
of the shelf, slope and rise. Malaysia and Vietnam could claim parts of the area as 
extensions of their continental shelves. Nonetheless, Valencia noted that such claims 
would contradict shelf claims based on the islands themselves. 359 Although the Crestone 
concession is clearly on Vietnam's geological continental shelf and within 350 nm of its 
coast, China may argue that "the area is within its EEZ because it falls on its side of a 
median line between its westernmost claimed island and the nearest Vietnamese 
territory. "360 
4.2.2. The Gulf of Tonkin 
This dispute has deep historical origins. After Vietnam became a French colony, 
China signed a boundary agreement that formed the frontier between China and Tonkin 
(French Vietnam). With the end of Vietnam War and the development of Vietnam-
Soviet relations, the delineation of the Gulf of Tonkin is one of the main maritime 
concerns between China and Vietnam. The hydrocarbon and marine-resources are so 
357 The nearest Chinese island, Hainan, is 900 miles away. For more details of the legal claims over the 
Spratlys, see Lee G. Cordner Am Ran, Ibid., p. 43. 
358 Dato' Haji Mohammad Ali bin Alwi, "Conflicting claims in the South China Sea", op.cit., Asian 
Defence Journal, June 1992, p.10. 
359 Valencia, "Spratlys solution still at sea", op,cit., pp. 157-8. 
360 Ibid. 
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rich that both China and Vietnam have assertively advanced their sovereignty claims in 
the Gulf of Tonkin. In June 1992, for example, China sent a drill ship to Vietnamese 
territorial waters. 361 Thayer has added that in August-September 1993, the Chinese ship 
'Nan Hai Five' sailed into Vietnamese-claimed waters and engaged in exploration 
activities. Vietnam made verbal protests and threatened to use force to expel it.362 
Later, China agreed to negotiate the issue. In 1993, China and Vietnam discussed 
the situation in the Gulf of Tonkin at high-level talks in Beijing. Both sides announced 
the formation of two working groups with responsibility for the Gulf of Tonkin and the 
land border. 
Despite progressive negotiation, some conflicts remain. China still prohibits all 
maritime activities in the area extending to within 20 nm of Vietnam's coast so that 
China could carry out pre-exploration activities in areas claimed by Vietnam.363 In 1994, 
the Vietnamese Navy detained three Chinese fishing boats in the vicinity of Bach Long 
Vi island. China protested and claimed that those fishing boats were in 'traditional 
fishing waters'. 364 The Gulf of Tonkin dispute is unlike the South China Sea conflict as 
there are only two claimants, China and Vietnam. However, it is a part of the South 
China Sea. Therefore, if the bilateral talks on this issue progress, they may contribute to 
the bilateral or multilateral talks on the Spratly settlement. 365 
361 In 1887, a boundary convention was signed in Beijing stipulating that longitude 108°3' 18'E formed 
the 'frontier' between China and Tonkin. See, Mark J. Valencia, China and the South China Sea Disputes, 
op.cit., p.33. 
362 Thayer, Beyond Indochina, op.cit., p.36. 
363 Valencia, China and the South China Sea Disputes, op.cit., p.34. 
364 Thayer, Beyond Indochina, op.cit., p.36. 
365 Apparently, China initiates to solve the dispute through bilateral talks. It views as a concession its offer 
to share the Gulf Tonkin fifty-fifty with Vietnam. For more information, see Mark J. Valencia, China and 
the South China Sea Disputes, op.cit., p.34-35. 
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4.3. Other Sino-Vietnamese disputes 
Although the amount of land in dispute is comparatively small, most involved 
are concerned about the technical issue of border delineation such as constructing the 
exact placement of border markers. Border-dispute settlement remains complicated 
because it also deals with sovereignty and national prestige. 
4.3.1. Border conflicts 
In February-March 1979, China and Vietnam fought a frontier war. In 1987, 
"both sides reached a modus vivendi and permitted cross-border trade. "366 They have 
withdrawn military forces since then. In 1993, four border posts were officially opened, 
increasing the number of official crossing points to five ( an additional 31 unofficial 
crossings were also reported to be operating). These new border posts joined Yunnan 
with Lao Cai, Ha Giang and Cao Bang. 367 
However, despite the 1991 Sino-Vietnamese rapprochement, some border 
conflicts have occurred. In 1992, Vietnam alleged that the Chinese guards at the 
Guangxi border post ousted Vietnamese farmers from the disputed area, burned their 
huts and used firearms to fight Vietnamese border guards.368 In addition, in the same 
year, Vietnam accused China of a military occupation of 8,400 hectares of land at 15 
disputed areas along the border. The Sino-Vietnamese border is marked by 314 markers 
of which about 70o/o are still in place. Vietnam claims that the People's Liberation Army 
has moved forward 142 border markers and occupied 80 km2 of land.369 
In May 1992, Chinese workers began constructing a railway signal box at 
Friendship Pass 500m inside Vietnamese claimed territory, causing the postponement of 
the railway reopening between the two countries. Furthermore, Chinese workers 
366 Thayer, Beyond Indochina, op.cit., p.37. 
367 Thayer, "Vietnam: Coping with China", in Singh, op.cit., p.361. 
368 "Guards exchange fire at border", Asian Defence Journal, August 1992, p.95. 
369Thayer, Beyond Indochina, op.cit., p.38. 
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resumed road building in the same area. Vietnam added that the Chinese moved the 
boundary marker at Friendship Pass 400m inside Vietnam. 370 
4.3.2. Cross-border smuggling 
Another concern about border conflict is the remarkable growth of cross-border 
smuggling. Because of the increasing volume of traffic between China and Vietnam, the 
flow of illegal goods into Vietnam is causing serious harm to Vietnam's local industry. 
Despite the senior-official discussions between both sides and their political 
normalisation in 1991, progress appears to have been little in resolving these territorial 
disputes. 
In September 1993, Vietnam's Minister of Commerce, Le Van Triet, held talks 
with his counterpart in Beijing. Later, two Chinese firms opened representative offices 
in Hanoi. Significantly, in late November 1993, China and Vietnam signed agreements 
on customs and anti-smuggling co-operation. During 1993 Vietnam kept on repairing 
and expanding its rail service to the border including the vital lines between Lang Son 
and Dong Dang, and between Hanoi and Lao Cai. It has been reported by the Anti-
Corruption and Smuggling Central Committee that after five months of implementation 
of the prime minister's instruction No. 701 on suppressing sea smuggling, 8,903 cases 
of smuggling and seizures of goods worth 174 billion dong and 38,812 dollars have 
been recorded by various anti-smuggling units.371 Thus, the number of smuggling cases 
per month has dropped compared to the early months of 1995. Rice smuggling has 
basically ceased.372 
However, Thayer has pointed out that despite these positive developments, the 
cross-border rail service was not resumed due to a continuing dispute over where to 
370 Ibid., p.37-8. 
371 "Smuggling much reduced after prime ministerial instruction", BBC Monitoring Service, 10 May 1996. 
372 Ibid. 
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place border markers and customs posts.373 The railway lines between China and 
Vietnam were only reopened in February 1996 that has caused a Sino-Vietnamese trade 
boom worth about US$ 900 million. 374 In 1996, the most important task has been 
stopping the smuggling of over 10 tonnes of drugs into Vietnam each year. It was 
reported that much of it was being smuggled from the north, north-west and south-west 
of the country, a clear reference to China, Laos and Cambodia.375 
4.3.3. Vietnamese refugees 
As a result of the upheavals in Indochina in the 1970s, thousands fled Southeast 
Asia as refugees and economic migrants, particularly from Vietnam. During this period, 
it was estimated that one million Vietnamese migrated from Vietnam to the West and 
about 250,000 Vietnamese, mainly Hoa people, are currently living in southern China. 
Some Vietnamese form an ethnic community in Cambodia. Several Vietnamese 
refugees who left Vietnam for economic reasons have returned to Vietnam. It 1s 
estimated that about two million Vietnamese live overseas. 376 
The massive amount of refugees from Indochina has prompted a variety, of 
international responses. In the late 1980s, the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) set up a programme to manage Vietnamese repatriation. Over 
40,000 Vietnamese have participated in the 'voluntary repatriation programme' from 
Hong Kong which began in September 1991. 377 
373 Thayer, "Vietnam: Coping with China", in Daljit Singh, ed., op.cit., p.362. 
374 James Pringle, "Vietnam and China reopen raillines to extend trade links" , The Times, 15 February 
1996. Importantly, as a Chinese official stressed, as long as both countries follow international practices, 
other problems can be smoothly resolved. See Achara Ashayagachat, "Rail link restored in bid to give 
Vietnam-China relations a boost", Bangkok Post, 15 February 1996. 
375 For more details, see "Vietnam grapples with growth in heroin smuggling", Reuter News Service, 15 
May 1996. 
376 Several thousands of Vietnamese who were sent to the former Soviet Union and Central Europe as 
guest-workers still live there. For more information of Vietnamese refugees, see Carlyle Thayer, 
"Vietnamese refugees: Why the outflow continues", in Amin Saikal, ed., Refugees in the Modern World. 
(Canberra: The Australian National University, 1989), pp.45-96. 
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Some 30,000 Vietnamese refugees remain in camps in Southeast Asia, with the 
largest number in Hong Kong. The United Nations will end financial aid to the host 
countries in 1996. This has forced the immediate repatriation of Vietnamese refugees. 
The Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong have been a trouble for the Chinese 
government as Hong Kong will be governed and administered by China from 1997. 
It is likely that the Vietnamese government will be hesitant and slow to receive 
the refugees. More importantly, the Vietnamese refugees do not want to go back to 
Vietnam because of the socialist political system. Thus, China has tried to step up 
pressure to force them back to Vietnam. While the repatriation process is continuing, 
clashes have broken out as police and guards round up migrants for removal from the 
centre in Hong Kong. 378 Cui Tiankai, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, 
expressed that the incident has adversely affected Hong Kong's social stability, and the 
Chi . 1 d b . 379 nese government 1s great y concerne a out 1t. 
Currently, there are approximately 84,000 Vietnamese refugees living in 
overseas camps. More than half of them are in Southeast Asian centres and the rest in 
Hong Kong. The repatriation issue has been high on the agenda. China, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines have repeatedly pressed Vietnam to accept all 
refugees for repatriation. 380 
4.4. Seeking settlements and recent Sino-Vietnamese relationship development 
The resolution of the Spratly dispute has been mentioned in the 1982 Law of the 
Sea Convention. For example, Article 279 following the Charter of the United Nations 
377 Thayer, Beyond Indochina, op.cit., p.40. 
378 For more information, see Peter Humphrey, "Second day of riots at Hong Kong Vietnamese Centre", 
Reuter News Service, 11 May 1996 and Peter Humphrey, "Fresh violence erupts in Hong Kong 
boatpeople camp", BBC Monitoring Service, 11 May 1996. 
379 "China says HK riots a danger to social stability", Reuter News Service, 14 May 1996. 
380 Ibid. 
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encourages all concerned parties to settle disputes by peaceful means, without force. 
Part XV of the Convention introduces guidance and suggests forums to address 
maritime disputes by the Law of the Sea. Article 298 emphasises optional exceptions to 
"Compulsory and Binding Decisions" over interpretation of Convention provisions. 
Ran has noted that countries can make written declaration that they do not accept 
rulings on disputes involving delimitations of EEZs (Article 74) and continental shelves 
(Article 83), where the dispute involves concurrent consideration of any unsettled 
sovereignty dispute over continental or insular land territory which shall be excluded 
from such submissions. This Article rules out the jurisdiction of Convention 
instrumentalities in the Spratlys dispute, until territorial claims are resolved. Several of 
the protagonists have had bilateral and multilateral discussions in recent years. 381 
While China has emphasised bilateral negotiations on the Spratlys, Vietnam has 
preferred multilateral talks concerning all the claimants. However, some multilateral 
talks have been held, with varying levels of success. Since the 1991 normalisation of 
relations between China and Vietnam, there have been negotiations on border problems. 
Although the negotiations have been slow, there have been some progress. The regional-
security concerns over the Spratlys dispute seemed to be more easy to resolve when 
China offered a more co-operative line on the region's other flashpoint. In June 1991, 
Chinese President Yang Shangkun proposed a joint exploration programme of the area 
exploration and suggested cordial consultations to resolve the conflict. 382 
The Sino-Vietnamese expert-level talks on boundary delineation in the Gulf of 
Tonkin were held in late February 1993.383 Their desire to continue this process was 
clearly demonstrated in October 1993, when they signed a crucial accord on basic 
381 Lee G. Cordner Am Ran, op.cit., p.43. 
382 Straits Times (Singapore), 9 June 1991. Quoted in Michael Antolik, "The ASEAN Regional Forum: 
The Spirit of Constructive Engagement", op.cit., p.122. 
383 Valencia, China and the South China Sea Disputes, op.cit., p.36. 
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principles for peaceful resolution of territorial and border issues. 384 Both sides agreed to 
settle disputes over the land and sea boundaries in the Gulf of Tonkin and the South 
China Sea and refrain from using force. Although it seems that the settlement has not 
been adhered to seriously, it has had a positive impact on relations between Vietnam and 
China.385 
For the South China Sea resolutions, the South China Sea multilateral workshop 
series were originally set up as an unofficial process to explore the conflicting claims in 
the area. The first workshop was held in Bali in July 1990.386 The workshops are 
neither formal nor informal negotiations. They are hosted and co-chaired by the 
Indonesian Foreign Ministry and financially supported by the Canadian International 
Development Agency. The participants are academics and officials from the seven 
ASEAN economies, as well as China, Taiwan and Laos. A few academics from 
Canadian universities have also participated in the process as 'resource persons'. The 
agendas covered merely the dispute in the South China Sea. 
Fu Ying, a Chinese deputy division chief in the Asian section of the Foreign 
Ministry, mentioned at the 1992 Jogjakarta informal workshop on the South China Sea 
that "we're aware that there are differences, so we've suggested shelving the dispute and 
establishing joint cooperation first." 387 In light of 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the 
South China Sea the dispute was called for a resolution by peaceful means. 388 
384 China Daily, 21 October 1993, p.1. 
385 Valencia, China and the South China Sea Disputes, op.cit., p.35. 
386 Since 1990, a series of workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea have been 
held in Indonesia under the auspices of the Research and Development Agency with its Department of 
Foreign Affairs. These unofficial meetings were attended by government officials and some invited 
academic experts from each concerned country (including Canada). The first meeting was held in Bali, 
1990; the second in Bandung, 1991; the third in Jogjakarta, 1992; the fourth in Surabaya, 1993; the fifth 
in Bukittinggi, 1994 and the sixth workshop in 1995. See Mark J. Valencia, China and the South China 
Sea Disputes, op.cit., p.50. 
387 "Cooling off a flashpoint", Asiaweek, 17 July 1992, p.21. 
388 "25th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Manila, 21-22 July 1992, Joint Communique", ASEAN Economic 
Bulletin, Vol.9, No.2., November 1992, pp.240-1. 
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It seemed that the disputes would be resolved easier because of the Sino-
Vietnamese development of relations. Thayer has added that, in 1994, Vietnam's Chief-
of-Staff, Sr. Lt-General Dao Dinh Luyen, met General Zhang Wannina in Beijing. They 
reiterated the agreement on the friendly relations between the two peoples and the two 
armies. 389 In 1994, Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited Do Muoi, the leader of the 
Communist Party of Vietnam. They agreed to put the differences aside and focus on 
improving relations. More importantly, they agreed to find out a long-term solution to 
the South China Sea disputes. They also agreed to establishment of a separate joint 
working group to recommend solutions for the Spratly disputes. The third and fourth 
round of talks were held in Hanoi in December 1994 and in April 1995. 390 
Sino-Vietnamese relations have grown greatly. High-ranking officials of both 
sides have exchanged visits on more frequent occasions. In November 1995, Do Muoi 
held an official visit to meet Li Peng in China to promote the good relationship and 
traditional cooperation between the two countries. Both of them agreed on the further 
development of bilateral relations. 391 
Apparently, both sides exchanged views on related issues and made positive 
progress at another round of talks of the joint Vietnam-China working group on their 
land border which took place in Beijing from 6th-11th May 1996.392 China has 
expressed a willingness to negotiate peacefully with Vietnam to resolve territorial 
disputes. It has urged that both sides must be patient because this dispute is very 
389 Thayer, Beyond Indochina, op.cit. 
390 Valencia, China and the South China Sea Disputes, op.cit., p.38. 
391 Do Muoi and Li Peng also expressed that the two sides would increase exchanges in every field , 
especially in scientific and technological cooperation and trade. See "China: Premier Li Peng meet Do 
Muoi", BBC Monitoring Service, 30 November 1995. 
392 Minutes of the meeting was signed on 10th May 1996 in the presence of Chinese Deputy Foreign 
Minister Wang Yingfan and Vietnamese Ambassador to China Dang Nghiem Hoanh. See, ''Vietnam-
China working group on land border meets in Beijing", BBC Monitoring Service, 22 May 1996. 
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complicated. Moreover, they both agreed to use the principles of international law for 
. . 1 1 393 terntona sett ement. 
However, the dispute over the South China Sea is long-running and very 
complicated. It appears that the tension between China and Vietnam over the Spratlys 
remains high. Vietnam continues to construct lighthouses and scientific research stations 
on the land features it occupies. The Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation in scientific 
research in the Spratlys provoked China.394 In 1995, Mobil started drilling its second 
exploration well in the Blue Dragon field. 395 In addition, Vietnam said in 1996 that it 
had discovered archaeological relics from the 15th century proving the validity of its 
sovereignty claim over the South China Sea. 396 The situation further worsened when 
Vietnam signed an offshore exploration and production deal with the U.S. firm Conoco 
Inc. in an area near the Spratlys. China, in reply, rejected it. Vietnam reiterated its 
sovereignty over the area and issued statements to support its position and reject 
China.397 
4.5. ASEAN and China 
After the end of the Cambodian conflict, it is necessary to seek ways to avoid 
South China Sea disputes and transform them into cooperation because any re-
occurrence of the dispute could cause instability in the region. The 25th ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting in Manila in 1992 noted that the workshop on managing potential 
conflicts in the South China Sea initiated and hosted by Indonesia had called for dispute 
resolution by peaceful means, without resort to force and recommended all concerned 
393 Lee G. Cordner Am Ran, op.cit., p.39. 
394 "Russia helps Vietnam in Spratlys surveys", Reuters, 26 December 1994. 
395 "Mobil drills second Vietnam well", Associated Press, 7 August 1995." Quoted in Mark J. Valencia, 
China and South China Sea Disputes, op.cit., p.39. 
396 "Vietnam makes historical claim to disputed islands", Reuter News Service, 9 May 1996. 
397 "Vietnam sounds off over Chinese territorial claim", Reuter News Service, 17 May 1996. 
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parties use the principles contained in the TAC in Southeast Asia as the basis for 
establishing a code of international conduct in the South China Sea. 398 
The workshop at Jogjakarta in 1992 also issued a joint economic development 
programme by the establishment of 'growth triangles' between some ASEAN members 
and Vietnam, Lao and China. There seemed to be the prospect of joint development of 
resources in the South China Sea. The 1992 AMM recognised that the workshops had 
contributed to a better understanding of the issues of concern. Subsequently, in June 
1993, a marine research workshop was held in Manila. 399 Later on, at the 1993 AMM, 
the Chinese Foreign Minister Qian emphasised that China would not impose hegemony 
and power politics on others and would not threaten any countries, and furthermore 
believes that the dispute can be addressed through friendly negotiations.400 
However, while the 1992 Indonesian-sponsored workshop was meeting 1n 
Jogjakarta to seek solutions to the dispute, China sent more troops to six islands it 
occupies.401 This indicates that the informal multilateral talks were not as effective as 
originally expected. Valencia stresses that China has since shown its strong preference 
for bilateral negotiations on the issue and may try to play some ASEAN claimants off 
against Vietnam.402 Awanohara adds that China may attempt to use certain tactics to 
gain advantages ahead of negotiations.403 However, judging from past experiences, one 
398 The ASEAN economies urged all parties concerned to ~xercise restraint with the view to create a 
positive climate for the eventual resolution of all disputes. For more details of ASEAN Declaration on the 
South China Sea, see "Twenty-Fifth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Manila, 21-22 July 1992, Joint 
Communique", op.cit., pp.240-1. 
399 In fact, the Indonesian workshops are separated from other ASEAN meeting that were hosted 
and sponsored by Indonesia. A series of technical working-group meeting have also been organised, 
including: Marine Scientific Research (Manila 1993 and Singapore 1994); Resource Assessment (Jakarta 
1993); Protection of the Marine Environment (China, July 1995); and Legal Issues (Phuket, 
July 1995). 
400 Raphael Pura, "Beijing pursues good-neighbour image at ASEAN meeting", Asian Wall Street Journal 
Weekly, 2 August 1993, p.4. 
401 Moreover, China landed troops to erect a sovereignty marker on the Vietnamese-claimed Da Lac Reef, 
the nearest feature to the Crestone concession area. See Mark. J. Valencia, China and the South China 
Sea Disputes, op.cit., p.14. 
402 Valencia, "Spratlys solutions still at sea", op. cit., p.160-1. 
403 Susumo Awanohara, "Washington's priorities", FEER, 13 August 1992, pp.18-9. 
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cannot assume that China will not use force as an instrument to achieve its objectives. 
Although China has repeatedly assured the ASEAN states that it believes in peace, its 
use of force in February 1979 and also in 1988 have discredited its image as a peace-
loving nation.404 However, it may be argued that economic cooperation and economic 
imperative in the 1980s and the 1990s affected China's perspective of Southeast Asia, as 
economic cooperation between China and the ASEAN economies has increased greatly. 
In July 1994, ASEAN established the ARF as a multilateral security consultative 
forum (as previously discussed in Chapter 3). A code of conduct for the Spratlys was 
also proposed by representatives. This code is designed to help contribute to the 
promotion of stable regional order in the South China Sea. The fundamental principles 
of the code are the existing multilateral agreements such as United Nations conventions 
and other ASEAN treaties. They include the "renunciation of the use of force, and the 
need for self-restraint so that no more expansionist attempts are made in the area. It 
should also explore cooperation on peaceful uses of the South China Sea and agreement 
that disputes would not affect the development of normal bilateral relations."405 
ASEAN's statement on the Spratlys, and subsequent pressures mounted by 
individual member, put China on the defensive. At the 27th AMM in 1994, China, 
Vietnam and the Philippines all had bilateral discussions on the Spratlys. ASEAN and 
China also discussed this issue at a meeting in Hangzhou in April 1995.406 
The Spratly disputes have been a striking topic for discussion in AMM, and a 
focus of debate in both the 1994 and 1995 ARF meetings. The ministers agreed that the 
ARF process should move at a pace comfortable to all.407 China stated at the 1995 ARF 
meeting that it was prepared to settle the disputes on the basis of UNCLOS and also 
404 Shee Poon Kim, "China's changing policies toward the South China Sea", op.cit., pp.315-6. 
405 "ASEAN senior officials discuss Pacific concord", Jakarta Post, 9 May 1996, p.2. 
406 Thayer, Beyond Indochina, op.cit., p.33. 
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assured the peaceful resolutions and commitment to the 'safety and freedom of 
navigation' within the contested waters.408 However, in a change of policy, China 
occupied Mischief Reef in the Spratlys, claimed by the Philippines.409 
The dispute remains unsolved. In May 1996, China also announced that it was 
expanding the area of sea under its jurisdiction by extending its 200 miles off its coast 
(by more than 965,000 square miles) and repeated that this move ensured it abided by a 
UN maritime convention on LOS.410 China stressed that all concerned parties should 
refrain from any activity which would cause the situation to deteriorate further. 
Importantly, the People's Liberation Army, Navy (PLAN) of China is gradually 
improving its operational capabilities, including its ability to employ attack submarines. 
The PLAN has also added to its 'force inventories new Luhu-class destroyers and 
Jiangwei-class missile frigates with fire control systems, mine warfare ships and 
1 · , 411 e ectron1c countermeasures . 
Vietnam, as a new member of ASEAN may use ASEAN to mobilise the 
international community to restrain China in this conflict. Importantly, it appears that 
none of the ASEAN countries have wanted to do anything to provoke China412 when 
China has maintained that the conflict must be resolved bilaterally. 
U.S. involvement in the region is another factor which has influenced ASEAN 
foreign policy towards China as the U.S. attention towards the region are still 
407 This information of the second ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Thailand. 
408 The basis of UNCLOS establishes a 12-mile territorial limit and 200-mile EEZ for islands. See more 
details in Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow, A US Strategy for the Asia-Pacific, Adelphi Paper 
No.299 (New York: Oxford University Press, December 1995), pp.39-44: 42 and Mark Valencia, China 
and the South China Sea Disputes, op.cit., pp.23-4. 
409 In deference to Chinese wishes, the Spratly Islands were not mentioned among the eight points in the 
Chairman's report on discussed issues. See Carlyle Thayer, Beyond Indochina, op.cit., p.35. 
410 For more information, see John Gittings, "China: Alarm as China charts an ocean takeover", Guardian, 
17 May 1996 and "Vietnam sounds off over Chinese territorial claim", Reuter News Service, 17 May 
1996. 
411 This would allow China to undertake naval operations at greater capacity. See Douglas T. Stuart and 
William T. Tow, A US Strategy for the Asia-Pacific, op.cit., p.36. 
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uncertain.413 It is clear that the U.S. strategic objective in the post-Cold War era is 
economic, which has replaced political ideology. For example, the U.S. has separated 
China's MFN status from human rights issues and lifted the trade embargo on Vietnam 
. d A . b . 414 1n or er to get mencan us1ness support. 
There are glimmers of hope. "ASEAN' s leaders pay attention on not letting the 
controversy block its goal of creating a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in 
Southeast Asia and the economic development. ASEAN should take a united stand 
against China to persuade China to resolve the issue peacefully and multilaterally.415 At 
the AMM in Brunei in July 1995, ASEAN Foreign Ministers urged all claimants to 
'refrain from taking actions that could destabilise the region, including possibly 
undermining the freedom of navigation and aviation in the affected areas' .416 At the 
1 V 1 · 417 east, as a enc1a notes: 
Such a united front could moderate China's future actions in the area and push 
the dispute towards an interim solution. There was some urgency about taking 
a united stand before Vietnam joined ASEAN in order to avoid China's viewing 
ASEAN as a vehicle for Vietnam's agenda. There still may be a need to take a 
stand before Deng's death and the inevitable uncertainty it would bring. 
It may be risky if ASEAN (with Vietnam) confronts China as a group, because 
this may worsen the situation. In fact, there are differing views among ASEAN 
members toward China. Since ASEAN makes decisions by consensus, this divergence 
could reappear under stress. If Sino-Vietnamese relations deteriorate, other ASEAN 
members will try to prevent the organisation from being dragged into the Vietnam-
412 Nayan Chanda, "Divide and rule: Beijing scores points on South China Sea", FEER, 11 August 1994, 
p.18 . 
413 Leszek Buszynski, "ASEAN security dilemma", Survival, Vol.34, No.4, Winter 1992-93, 
pp.103-5. 
414 Murray Hiebert and Susumu Awanohara, "Making up for lost time", FEER, 17 February 1994, p.16 
and David Lague, "Clinton's China backdown: US serves MFN-human rights link", The Weekend 
Australian, 28-29 May 1994, p.13. 
415 "Taking a united stand on the Spratly issue", The Nation (Bangkok), 13 February 1995. 
416 "China reassures ASEAN Meeting", Japan Times, 22 August 1995, p.4. 
417 Valencia, China and the South China Sea Disputes, op.cit., p.42. 
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China rivalry. Malaysia and Singapore prefer to encourage China's participation in a 
network of regional organisations.418 Nevertheless, if China's strategy is clearly to 
divide and dominate, ASEAN may yet see the wisdom of jointly proposing a 
1 ·1 1 1 . 419 mu t1 atera so utlon. 
However, Vietnam's membership of ASEAN seems to have implications for the 
resolution of territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Thayer has noted that "in terms 
of realpolitik, what is essentially a bilateral dispute between China and Vietnam might 
tum into a dispute between ASEAN and China."420 Hence, China has to think carefully 
if it wants to use force to support its claims. Along with constructive engagement, the 
response from the ASEAN leaders to Chinese actions has been positive. China needs to 
concentrate on modernising its domestic economy, and a China with peaceful and 
prosperous neighbours will increase the prospects of growth in the region.421 
Conclusion 
Despite the great improvement of Sino-Vietnamese ties since the end of 
Cambodian conflict, their relationship seems to be one of 'comrades but not allies' .422 
Currently, the most complex problem is the territorial disputes in South China Sea, over 
the Spratly Islands. Thayer has pointed out that the Spratlys are of strategic interest for 
three reasons: marine resource abundance; possible large undersea deposits of oil and 
natural gas; and strategic lines of communication passing through the South China Sea 
between the India and Pacific oceans.423 There is such little commonality among the 
418 "China nibbles, ASEAN dithers", Asian Wall Street Journal, 10-11 March 1995. 
419 Valencia, China and the South China Sea Disputes, op.cit., p.43. 
420 Thayer, Beyond Indochina, op.cit., p.35. 
421 Antolik, "The ASEAN Regional Forum: The spirit of constructive engagement", op.cit., p.127. 
422 Thayer, "Coping with China: Vietnam's strategic readjustment", Paper presented to the workshop on 
China as a Great Power in the Asia-Pacific: Myths, Realities and Challenges, op.cit., pp.9-11. 
423 Thayer, Beyond Indochina, op.cit., p.31. 
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claimants that the Spratlys dispute represents a major security concern to Southeast Asia 
as a whole. 
Each country concerned has its own reasons to claim sovereignty over the 
disputed area such as historical evidence and the LOS to all or some parts of them. 
However, their claims are incomplete, intermittent and unconvincing as none of the 
claims advocate a concept of "effective control, administration and governance" of 
sovereign territory and permanent occupation by citizens of any state is lacking.424 
Sovereign territorial issues require resolutions beyond the scope of the LOS.425 
Some aspects of the 1982 LOS are relevant variously by all parties concerned to support 
arguments for territory. Overall, with respect to the dispute resolutions,426 
The Spratly Islands situation highlights the limitations of the law of the sea and 
international law in general to provide a framework for the dispute resolution. 
Patience and conciliation are being urged without tangible evidence of the 
willingness to compromise. The players are far from finding a common playing 
field or an agreed game, which must first be achieved, before interpretation of 
the rules can be considered. 
What will happen if regional security and international diplomacy fail to deter 
China in the South China Sea? Vietnam is seemingly unwilling to revert to a tributary 
relationship with China, and also unwilling to become too dependent upon outside 
powers for security guarantees - such a course might antagonise China. Vietnam clearly 
is working to build a strong and independent Vietnam that is economically prosperous, 
and politically and socially cohesive. Vietnam has a tradition of pragmatic 
accommodation with powerful China and hopes to strengthen its relations with its 
northern neighbour. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the downgrading of US 
military power in the region affects the development of relations with China. 
424 Lee G. Cordner Am Ran, op.cit., p.42. 
425 Ibid., p.44-5. 
426 Ibid. 
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It is likely that Vietnam does not want to provoke China. Nevertheless, its 
different interests and approach to China and those of some other ASEAN economies in 
the South China Sea dispute may provide some potential conflicts as Vietnam has been 
involved in this dispute more than any other ASEAN members. 
Vietnam has sought to maintain its omni-directional foreign relations in 
particular with the ASEAN countries. However, membership in ASEAN, as Thayer 
notes, does not assure that Vietnam's relations with China will become easier. ASEAN 
stands to gain little if Vietnam become a new front-line state.427 Although Vietnam 
would not expect any direct ASEAN assistance in a possible confrontation with China, 
it would, at least, gain diplomatic support. Frost has suggested that,428 
Thus while Vietnam brings to ASEAN substantial military capacities and 
diplomatic skills, its accession to membership may pose some medium term 
challenges for ASEAN in maintaining a cohesive approach towards the most 
important regional security issue the members face, the growing power of 
China. 
In fact, ASEAN has traditionally been unable to formulate a coherent multi-
lateral security policy, especially after the Mischief Reef occupation by China. While 
U.S. support in the South China Sea is not assured, the U.S. might intervene in a high-
intensity conflict, but may be unwilling to do so. However, economic interests would 
not compel the U.S. to defend Vietnam or any other ASEAN country if their garrisons in 
Spratlys were attacked by China. Announced formally in May 1995, the U.S. position on 
the Spratly dispute is that the U.S. opposes the use of force as a means of dispute 
resolution and freedom of navigation throughout the South China Sea should not be 
affected by whatever solution is reached.429 
427 Thayer, Beyond Indochina, op.cit., p.58. 
428 Frost, Vietnam's Membership of ASEAN: Issues and Implications , op.cit. , 1995, p.8. 
429 The announcement includes that the U.S. takes no position on competing sovereignty claims. For more 
details, see Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow, A US Strategy for the Asia-Pacific, op.cit., pp.39-44: 
43 and Mark Valencia, China and the South China Sea Disputes, op.cit., pp.25-30. 
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At present, it seems that China will not use force to settle the dispute because it 
needs to promote good relations with its neighbours.43° China's major concern is neither 
Vietnam nor the Soviet-Vietnamese military alliance. Rather, it needs to focus on rapid 
global economic development and its own economic improvement.431 Thus, China has 
to focus on its economic improvement. China has no pressure to use an aggressive 
policy towards other claimants as long as Russia and the U.S. are not directly involved 
. h d. 432 1n t e 1spute. 
It is evident that China wants to promote joint development on the basis of 
mutual interests. This would be of immense benefits to all parties as a peaceful 
environment is much better than one of war which can cause the loss of lives and 
prosperity. However, the Chinese PLAN is still improving its operational capabilities. It 
is possible that clashes between China and Vietnam, which have happened in 1979 and 
1988, could occur again. 
430 Qimao Chen, "New approaches in China's foreign policy: The post Cold War era", Asian Survey, 
Vol.33, No.3, March 1993, pp.242-3. 
431 Bonnie S. Glaser, "China's security perceptions: Interests and ambitions", Asian Survey, Vol.33, No.3, 
March 1993. 
432 Shee Poon Kim, "China's changing policies toward the South China Sea", op.cit., pp.319-21. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
Vietnam was admitted to the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) in 
July 1995, as the first communist member of the regional grouping. The event 
marked a turning point in Vietnam's political and economic history, and will 
serve to quickly heighten Vietnam's regional and international profile after 
years of relative isolation. Vietnam's admission to ASEAN occurred within a 
short timeframe ... Vietnam and ASEAN partners have put aside the political 
difference of the past, and have publicly emphasised the potential for regional 
. . 433 economic cooperation. 
5.1. Changes in international political arena during the 1980s 
After several years of fighting, the situation in Indochina seems to be stable. The 
re-emergence of Vietnam has taken place due to the changing strategic environment 
after the end of Cold War and by Vietnam's own economic imperatives. China's role is 
also a driving force for the re-emergence of Vietnam because of its coercive diplomacy. 
As a result of the termination of Soviet military support to Vietnam during the late 
1980s, Sino-Soviet ties have developed. 
It is certain to say that bipolarity in Southeast Asia has ended. The prospects for 
ASEAN-Indochina integration are good. The integration process is a part of the 
challenge for ASEAN to maintain its role in a changing world. By expanding ASEAN 
membership into larger gatherings such as ARF, AFTA and APEC, ASEAN has 
displayed its determination to maintain the association's momentum. ASEAN pushed its 
"The Zone of Peace of Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN)" concept to neutralise the 
Southeast Asian region in order to insulate it from great power rivalry.434 The approach 
433 "Vietnam: December 1995", Country Economic Brief (Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, 1995), pp.18-9. 
434 Carlyle Thayer, "ASEAN and Indochina: The dialogue", in Alison Broinowski, ed., ASEAN into 1990s 
(London: Macmillan Publishers, 1990), pp140-45. 
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includes a balance of external powers in a multi-polar world and one of the means 
towards the survival of Southeast Asia. 
5.2. The re-emergence of Vietnam in the 1990s 
The bottom-up pressures for reform pushed Vietnam to industrialise and 
modernise its country to promote its open door policy which caused the increase of 
foreign direct investment, economic growth and an improvement in people's living 
conditions.435 Domestic and external pressures for change cause further renovation 
from central planning to a market economy.436 It is likely that the mono-organisational 
socialism or Vietnam's one-party system will be transformed into 'soft 
authoritarianism'. 
The collapse of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union that caused the cut off of 
aid to Vietnam, Sino-Soviet normalisation in 1989, Gorbachev's new political thinking 
on reform, and the end of the Cambodian conflict influenced Vietnam to change its 
attitude toward foreign policy.437 Vietnam normalised the relations with China in 1991 
and the U.S. in 1995. In 1994, the U.S lifted its trade embargo on Vietnam and dropped 
its opposition to development aid to Vietnam by international financial agencies such as 
IMF, WB and ADB. These sources of financial aid improve the prospects for economic 
development in Vietnam. 
However, Vietnam still has some internal problems which need to be solved 
such as infrastructure, the legal system, the public sector, inflation, smuggling, 
corruption and other urgent social issues. Education and personal training to create 
qualified people to meet the requirements of the industrialisation process need special 
435 These are stressed in the 1996 Eighth Congress draft. Human resources are emphasised as important 
factors for the success of industrialisation. "Party Chief Do Muoi stresses importance of industrialisation", 
BBC Monitoring Service, 12 January 1996. 
436 Carlyly Thayer, Beyond Indochina (New York: Oxford University, 1995), p.62. 
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attention. The 1996 Eighth Party Congress is an important re-endorsement of ten years 
of doi moi policy. Harmonious economic and social development; and the reduction of 
h · · · · 438 poverty are t e main pnontles. 
The fundamental solution is to improve the efficiency of the state-managed 
economic sector and of the economy as a whole.439 It is certain that Vietnam will take a 
long time to achieve this. Nonetheless, if the legal and political systems are developed to 
be more effective, Vietnam can expect more foreign investment. 
Vietnam has moved to open its door to all new comers both socialist and non-
socialist countries. Vietnam needs to adjust its foreign policy outlook to be more 
practical to the present world. Vietnam's membership of ASEAN was the first step to 
integrate into the world economy. 
5.3. ASEAN and Vietnam 
Since 1967, ASEAN has been able to play a considerable role in stabilising 
Southeast Asian security. For example, it promotes dialogue over security issues in the 
region and in the wider Asia-Pacific region through the ARF.440 In the post Cold War 
era, ASEAN needs an expanded membership. In 1995, Vietnam, the first Indochinese 
state to join ASEAN, became a full new member. Vietnam also expected to join the 
wider-regional cooperation to request acceptance in APEC when that group is willing to 
consider new members.441 Laos and Burma have shown their interest in joining ASEAN 
437 Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle Thayer, Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam, op.cit., pp.77-80. 
438 For more information on the Eighth Vietnam Party Congress in 1996, see Schwarz, Adam, "Safety 
first", FEER, 11 July 1996, pp.14-6 and "Planning Minister interviewed on economic tasks and problems 
in 1996", BBC Monitoring Service, 2 February 1996. 
439 Two ways to resolve the problems are suggested. First is enhancing the business efficiency and 
competitiveness of state· businesses by improving business management and modernising technologies. 
Second is continuing the reorganisation of businesses to improve the competitiveness. For more details, 
see, Ibid. 
44° Frank Frost, Vietnam's Membership of ASEAN: Issues and Implications (Canberra: The Department of 
the Parliamentary Library, 1995), p.11. 
441 "Vietnam hopes to draw up tariff reduction list on time", Bangkok Post, 29 July 1995. 
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ASEAN has tried to embrace all ten Southeast Asian countries to bring 
greater stability to the region and to increase foreign trade and investment. 
AFT A is a very important aspect of Vietnam's membership because there are 
some problems which Vietnam has to adjust to this new type of economic cooperation. 
Vietnam also needs to catch up with the other economies. Moreover, Vietnam's 
membership of ARF is questioned if it would cause some troubles because of the 
different political system and unresolved territorial disputes. It might become more 
difficult to reach a consensus. 
Vietnam's membership may affect the cohesion of ASEAN and the security of 
Southeast Asia because of the incompatible political and social system of Vietnam with 
that of ASEAN. The Spratly dispute might cause some troubles for the relations 
between China and ASEAN as a whole. However, ASEAN with Vietnam would indeed 
act as a counter-weight to China.443 
In the case of conflicts between Vietnam and Thailand, they have begun a new 
friendly relationship based upon economic interests. Therefore, this relationship reduces 
historical political animosity between them.444 However, the idea that Thailand, 
Vietnam, Burma and Cambodia would create a new group of cooperation is unlikely to 
happen because Thailand and Vietnam indeed still have some unresolved problems such 
as fishing rights. Moreover, the political environment in Cambodia and Burma remain 
unstable. They must take a long time to develop their economies. 
Vietnam has tried to convince ASEAN members that its entry would not obstruct 
ASEAN' s process and development. Vo Van Kiet, Vietnam's premier, stated at his first 
442 Cambodia may join ASEAN before 2000. See Saritdet Marukatat and Surapohn Kanwerayotin, 
"Thailand: Laos signals it wants to become ASEAN member", Bangkok Post, 24 July 1994. 
443 Carlyle Thayer, "Keating's vision: SE Asia free from China orbit", The Australian, 18 December 1995, 
p.2. 
444 Surin Maisrikrod, "The peace dividend in Southeast Asia: The political economy of New Thai-
Vietnamese relations", Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.16, No.l, June 1994, p.46. 
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appearance at the 1995 ASEAN Summit that Vietnam's integration has affected some of 
ASEAN' s working mechanisms and may disrupt the grouping's dynamism. He also said 
that Hanoi can make a "small but constructive contribution as the youngest member of 
the ASEAN family."445 
Vietnam's entry into ASEAN would not produce problems for the other 
members as it joins ASEAN with political goodwill. Vietnam is indeed reforming and 
has successfully developed its economy. ASEAN with Vietnam, as Y eow has noted, 
will be an association of greater importance with a larger market, a rich and diversified 
culture.446 Importantly, if Vietnam can improve domestic stability and manage the 
socialist and free-market system, it may become the next Newly-Industrialising 
Economy of Southeast Asia. 447 The most important challenge for ASEAN is to continue 
its vitality, international credibility and capacity to continue to contribute to regional 
b·1· 448 sta 11ty. 
5.4. Towards dispute settlement 
Although the development of Sino-Vietnamese relations has been improved 
greatly, their relationship seems to be one of 'comrades but not allies' .449 The most 
complex problem is the South China Sea disputes because of marine resource 
abundance, possible large deposits of oil and natural gas and crucial Sea Lines of 
Communication (SLOCs) passing through the South China Sea between the India and 
445 Kulachada Chaipipat and Rita Patiyasevi, "Vo Van Kiet to tell leaders that VN will not weaken 
ASEAN", The Nation (Bangkok), 14 December 1995, p.A6. 
446 Jimmy Yeow, "Vietnam outlines 3 keys factors for joining ASEAN", op.cit. 
447 Gary Klintworth, "Forces of change", in Dean K. Forbes, Terence H. Hull, David G. Marr and Brian 
Brogan (eds.), Doi Mai: Vietnam's Renovation Policy and Performance (Canberra: Australian National 
University, 1991), p.232. 
448 Frost, Vietnam's Membership of ASEAN, op.cit., p.11. 
449 Carlyle Thayer, "Coping with China: Vietnam's strategic readjustment", Paper presented to the 
workshop on China as a Great Power in the Asia-Pacific: Myths, Realities and Challenges, op.cit., pp.9-
11. 
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Pacific oceans.450 It remains unresolved as each party concerned has its own reasons to 
claim sovereignty over the area but none of the claims demonstrates an "effective 
control, administration and governance" of sovereign territory.451 The Law of the Sea 
requires a framework for the dispute resolution. Patience and conciliation are being 
452 urged. 
The different interests and approach to China and those of some other ASEAN 
economies in the South China Sea dispute may provide some potential conflicts. 
Vietnam has been involved in this dispute more than any other ASEAN member. In 
joining ASEAN, Vietnam's relations with China may or may not undergo change. 
Vietnam is no longer alone in its supposed "battles" with its former antagonist. China, 
on the other hand, may feel threatened by the fact that the Vietnamese are now, by virtue 
of their membership, backed in their efforts to stand up to China. However, Vietnam 
realises that it does not stand to be backed militarily in a war, but on the other hand, it 
may be able to rely on the economic and diplomatic support of other ASEAN members 
to prevent the use of force to resolve the problem. 
The U.S. might also become involved in a high-intensity conflict. In May 1995, 
the U.S. announced its position on the Spratly dispute that it opposes the use of force to 
resolve the dispute. Moreover, it stressed that freedom of navigation throughout the 
South China Sea should not be affected by whatever solution is reached.453 
450 Thayer, Beyond Indochina, op.cit., p.31. 
451 Lee G. Cordner Am Ran,"The Spratly Islands dispute an the Law of the Sea", Journal of the 
Australian Naval Institute, May/June 1994, p.42. 
452 Ibid., p.44-5. 
453 The announcement includes that the U.S. takes no position on competing sovereignty claims. For more 
details, see Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow, A US Strategy for the Asia-Pacific, Adelphi Paper 
No.299 (New York: Oxford University Press, December 1995), pp.39-44: 43 and Mark Valencia, China 
and the South China Sea Disputes, Adephi Paper No.298 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 
pp.25-30. 
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China, a military power, is not likely to use force to enforce its claims over the 
Spratly islands if Russia and the U.S. are not directly involved in the dispute.454 The 
changes in the world's power balance have necessitated a rapprochement between 
Vietnam and China. China wants to focus on its own economic improvement and to 
promote joint development on the basis of mutual interests. This would be of immense 
benefits to all parties as a peaceful environment is much better than one of war which 
can cause the loss of lives and prosperity. 
However, it must be noted that despite China's declaration of its desire that 
peaceful means be used to resolve the Spratly dispute, the Chinese PLAN is still 
improving its operational capabilities. Vietnam must recognise that a course taken to 
antagonise China would not be in its best interests. China and Vietnam have fought in 
the past in 1979 and 1988. If the concerned countries are not careful about this issue, 
conflagration can occur and destroy the peace in the region again. 
In sum, this study argues that it is a must for Vietnam to modernise and 
industrialise its economy. Therefore, Vietnam has to open the country to everyone to 
attract foreign trade and investment. Its membership of ASEAN is beneficial for both 
Vietnam and other ASEAN members. At least, it is the way to strengthen the regional 
stability through cooperation. ASEAN with Vietnam would not cause too many 
problems because of political goodwill that may be able to make ASEAN a greater 
association with a larger market, a rich and diversified culture. 
However, the study argues that it is necessary to find means to transform those 
potential conflicts into potential areas of cooperation. To resolve the disputes, in 
particular the South China Sea dispute, in a short time, the study agrees with Djalal that 
regional states have to open free discussion, identify various areas, divide problems into 
454 Shee Poon Kim, "China's changing policies toward the South China Sea", American Asian Review, 
Winter 1994, Vol.12., No.4, pp.319-21. 
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several subjects such as protection of the maritime environment, safety of navigation, 
institutional mechanisms for cooperation, and so on.455 He also supports the idea of 
Joint Development or Joint Cooperation to overcome the dispute by studying the various 
models of Joint Development around the world and applying in the South China Sea 
d. 456 1spute. 
Importantly, it is a good idea to resolve the dispute multilaterally. However, the 
more the other major powers, in particular the U.S., become involved in the issue, the 
more complicated the problem is. Therefore, cooperation and patience must be urged 
and a sense of "community" in the region should be developed. 
455 For more details of his suggestions, see Hasjim Djalal, Territorial Disputes at Sea: Situation, 
Possibilities, Prognosis, Paper presented to the 10th Asia-Pacific Roundtable in Kuala Lumper, 5-6 June 
1996, pp.1-13. 
456 A special Technical Working Groups (TWG) on Resources Assessment has been formed in 1993 to 
deal with the problem. However, few details have been made. Djalal has noted that if we know how to 
define the "JD Zone" for the multiple claim areas in the South China Sea, then it would make substantial 
progress. For more information, see, Hasjim Djalal, Ibid. 
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Appendix A: Vietnam: Country Fact Sheet 
General Table 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
population (mils.) 66 68 69 71 72.54 
GDP (thousand bil. dong) 42 77 110 137 177 
GDP/capita(US$ per year) 190 192 200 220 224 
Real GDP Growth(%) 4.9 6.0 8.6 8.1 8.8 
Inflation(%) 45 67 18 5 14.4 
Foreign debt (US$ mils.) 2704 2739 3775 4024 4700 
Exports (US$ mils.) 1731 2042 2475 2850 3600 
Imports (US$ mils.) 1770 2105 2535 3505 5000 
Trade surplus (US$ mils.) -41 -63 -60 -655 -900 
Foreign investors (mils) 0.25 0.34 0.44 0.67 1.00 
Food production (mil. 21.4 22.0 24.2 25.5 26.0 
tonnes of rice equivalent) 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU),30 November 1995 and "Vietnam: December 
1995", Country Economic Brief (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
1995) 
131 
I 
I"· 
Appendix B: Map 1: Claims, Oil Fields and Concessions 
Map 1: Claims, Oil Fields and Concessions 
Q ' ~:~~~f:~~~-}~;;~i·~l. ~,~· 
. . .... ,.,_,.~, •... "" --t .... ,- .. ,v 
"'"'.' ..,! · ;~:~~ .. 1"1 · .. -- , ... ~ ... - :,ir •.: . 
;<_· .-,f . ...,_-. . 1J 'i.:;~~c;~.: -~~-a~·~ .. ~-~:tl ... ~. '. · l: '-
__ ., .. ' ,T ,; .:.,.(_ .. -.·. TAIWAN 
,. •• .• , .~i.:. "*1.;.. .... ·,-.... . \ .,. - - ,., •• 
~-~ .. : ·~f.J::f~{~?\J;:~~:~t.\~;)~:~i~1S:t·'.~-C H N A 
o ... ... ......... HONG KONG r '"Y ,, • "-••. --. "' .. r :. -- c" ~ -
.. ~ -· ··:. -· p ~ ~~~~;~:I;~-~~tif.t4:;s:?~:~~~-':i~!f ~;;;-:~::~~~--:.~.-~: ·;:·~:-~-}~0-.~ -~:~:.~ 
·- .. ....... ~ - "'~ ;';~i~~f.;'?,~•1·~~~~ey.t:1~..,..~::.-t. f1:.~-<-.;..,!,,',).,._ ·, ,·.,_; ···-,.· ~ ....... ~, :;.-,. 'i ', 
~ .. ,.J&-7r:~~:ii~r-i ~:,~:>~--~ -. ~ .. ~;.:~1:_,:t~:~~~~~~~::;r:~~4 ;.~a:~ ... ~·1;~l .,-:~~;\1~~;-t'\~~;t.r·-~ .::;.~~~:.:.-.: ~:~----- .··.·.- .--:~-- ~ ~ -~~ .. ~-~::~·;. \: :~~ . ~\ 
- ..-<· ,.-~-.,-,.. .. . ,~;,.~.,a .• -,.,"1,\''"-~T,.....,:.:;~,.,};•~~~m:..., ,,,,;,.t"-~-.1< -"'' -, ..... - ,-~~••• ,,, ,· >· •>t • .. .- ···rU ""'· ·• , ·,,,( ~• 
. _.?.~~:ttlft~li?J-1~; j r~~~\t~~~~~¥jt?:-p(ai~i~?{j.t,flt~~:f\t{\)ttt~: \_ 
·. -~:'/ '.;~,£.ft.fJi-f.~1,; ty;t .- 1-~~~~'11~~;~~2-t~,.:.r..::'1 Island.:--'?. .,i~.: -'\1{, >·, 1.,.~-:·,.r?::: !-:-_.::,; ~-.- • 
.· ;r~i~~~r1l;}., .. ·,;~,~~~IY~l~i~s~:I~~;f ~;~:::t_:r!:.,!;::~:;:f ??~N· 
I ... /',-,.$.:.. ---.. -...... »~...,- ~..:-·;,.f'""" .:..·- ... ""' ~ ....... -~-.-::-·;-, i ~; --· .•. .. ., .,_ . . . .. .... · .•• .. __ ,.. , .· - I 
\ )ff ,~:j;J:f ttJ~{!~~-;;\.~7t ~500~. . . : . . · 1 
\ 
- . •• -·· • .•.. .- , ---- - .. • - - • 117, . ... . .. . . . . · I . ~ .. ' ~ - ,,. :- ... _err, 
.. .-~. . -·-· .. - . . .·· .. .. amp / 
\
. ..- · , .. ··· ::- · :------ · o, .. .. et,. .. · .... .. .. ·-·< o,ec, .... 'Ole 
· \ .... · .... . , ) ./ _:;~·;:~,-~--~~>{/~:·,~· ::::,:.~\~:/· ··_. _-~ · . ,lfC!a;'"r,;-'-'..~ ... ·- / 
\ 
' 
.... # - • ,,........... ' 
""<If/..., ': , ~ .\ . , . o ' ....... --,, ~·" I J .. , p · 1 . "J . ,. ' •• . . ' .... , arace ,,. ;,_ • ..·· .. ·· >· , 
. Islands .. •")' :.~"- ~:/~:=: ... · :~·-.:..::,:.~·~.-~ .. ~.-/, ... : .. < ... ' ·· ' I 
'l:. ·.. ... ·. . . ···-----·· · Macclesfield ~ · ··· 
· · 
0 
~--··· • • aank , I 
• .. '- \J"' , I • •-.,. 
, · . , -
:-
0 - i,._r,; . . ' 
- ... . .• • ' ', ? 
\ . _ ·. ' · ----------~--~·:_-::. -< Sca~oro;l! ._OQm f . :1 5\°N~ 
\ . ,/ ~ ! l -. Cl) ' 
I --- ~ ' .. ·' .,..... .. . . --"· ' ' . 
f • • I • • _.,--* - - " ' 
\ .. ··- , _.~ . ~ - • . I \ [fJ 
\ 
~ .·· -_.;-- , .... - -, -. "' I , - ,/ · . .. . .... . \' z 
- ·, • • -' ., ~ • • :·: • . J ;' • • . - •• ; • ' • • .. • ~ • ' 
\'\ 
-... :::\.. . _  , ... {:_:;: -··SOUTH-~~ CHINA ,·, . 
I . . - · ' " 
C:. l-... . I/ . . .... . ' . ·~ 'SEA' ... A . • ~ 
...... J . . ~;· .. ,... . ··_: -,~<.. _- .· ' 
' . . _. .. , . "' .. ~ :..,...- . 
...... 
~ 
• .,. I , : ' ... ., .f;•, - :._ ,- I - :.: 
. - ;· .: ~ . ' . ! • . . . . • •,. ,I: 
I : ... -· -·-· / .' / '/:. .,:.:-_.:, .. :, 
- _.;:. / . ~· - ., - .. . , , . 
I . I : ~ : .. ..... · ..... )..'"· t ": - ~ 
·- - .... . _:'1 -. \ •• ..; .' . .; , ·· -- ::.: ~ ---~ ,' ~ . ... ... . 
I . I . ~ ... . ~ , . . ., ., --- , 
I 
- -::. --r --·:. , -- /. -· :-,.:J '.. .· ... 
• , - i • 
• ,t .. -r . :.·~:.-~;: -) ·· · / . : · ;.~-:· .; .. ~ i"? '; · ~ 1_ .- ·, • ·~ •• ·r · .. · ..  ·::-: ·. 
. I 1--- ·-~-:..c : Fiery crois·~e~t ;·-· ·--- -_- -;., ... --·-
s1ue Drag~n ··1: -~-~-... /. ··~.;. .... . ·: / , ... . . s p" r a { I Y .. ,. 
, •• # 
oil field /: / _ • 
Big Bear : > X.· ,,· ..... oil_ field ... : .... --. , ·• ,'__ ., · .. 1 . .,,< ... · .· ~·'Reef.// 
! .- _ ...... / ~ ,· .: .. •" .. ··~ t :.:>'c. ,'-: .. A Malaysian r/ 
Vanguard [1~ .. . _ : . ~ . ,, - .... - - _- - 9pl - -:- -~; ••••• ~ •• ",,Y 
"' / ···· · - · .c: .. .. ' ·· • ', - · • .Clam},· ; , 
·:·-~--)-·. :: .. ~·:;-;\ , • , ·::· .... . , 1~- -=.:-~t--"\>>";·:fi).'~ ":::·:-·.\ .. : / ', . . '. 
.l t'\es\,.aJ ~ ~-... ·;...."' '.::- :.:::; ·;;·,...,-_ ~ ·... . ~. 't ..: .. ,,:'a.. .... · .-l~ :>. ·~ •. :-/ / ~ / 
\{\Uq •" • J, :--.~ ;.,. ,. ,\. !_-·_..__.~ _.~ ,. • .... ,. C .• '! • . - ~ ··- .• ,-,9.,. ,. : ....,_.,,~ · ,;· / · ·· '·· · / 
- - \13.\(\'\ ··- --~ ...,,,,. .:. .-':..• . - · 1- - - :-· ~ ...... ... ..... . ,'T - 1. ·. ·'-. / .· c ..... \ - - .·. ~:.. . · · ·"" .. ~ .. :·f -~. c .. ~ --,· .. ·. ~--, · · . . . . .-:- :::·.\::;..~ .->- ~' - · ~ ~ . .;.. .. ).. - . ... - ~ ' ... · ... ;..._:, ..... /..~ .. ':; .,-. • ,,. -:-... -~,- ·-~~- ~-.,-· ........ ~;.... ~-·~: Vietnam_,.. fbwsa. ~~ .. :Z-?:--. : - . ·/· .. , .i.. . 
• • , ... ~ ,. ·, .. .... .. .... - .. -·, ,· - ;.. . ; cv. • • Petroleum Reef 1 - '/ .. &/ .. - · ., -
· -<·· ··;,;._- \ --~· .,. . .,·-,.;:;; •... X .:-BlockClai :.~ ' ·" -.. ;:.,,_.~/-,:~~ •. ;i,r 
-~: :. ~ _::~? .. :: '.~·:~~f-:"?:: '~~~;fr:·: · -~~~;;~~!~:~ ,:-/~-:Ii!...: ; i 
~ ·.,·;;'!:,~-::-~'..~; : \ -:;.~~,-~~~'?;_ :';.:;,.f,:: ~~~;~_i:- •< 1 l.,{· ~ 7~(~~ ~.;.; ! { 6---· 7;-;:~-;, -
·: .. ~ . {:-:2:~:;-;~-:-_-·,\.;._~1~:;:t·;- .~~,::~t~.c'0?,,,.:: ·.;~;-:;-·: J .\.= :.~ ,.t~-~ ·:~:- . : .if:~ .. ~~ /0. 
' _ ... . --.....4 ~,it - 1....-i .... "1. \;J;:,. ...~.--~ I t;.~· 1:"'t.""':--; • •• k-r- ... .i,,r-..... ~ .. 4.,.,..4"" ., . ,;;, -,~ ' .il•L.. ' •.• ~ .... / - -· ~ · t .. ~ .. ·->t~ ... ,,.,._, .... ~-~ .. .:._ ,°T· '"""· \--::,0 ... . tl :,t:° -e . ·~ ..... cl" -..1 ... ;;i ;- ·.; ,z-......... ,~ ~" JIT: · ~~ ... ' ... -'·-~ ... . .... . )~,..<? : ·~~--· .,,,. ~~..;.; .. ~.;i!':;,::-;.~~7~.f~. ,~ _,..:.r-:-- 7· ;,..c-r--· 
.. ~ . .'. ·::~ ~-· :~~;:::·~·.·:,:.·~ ~- i'""; ~ ... ; •. :..:;...:.-~-:.:s--=--~·:. ~3 "Ar~· ... -:~ · ... ;.;..._-:_..;..~.. ,..: .. . 
• • • ...;.~·.;."i;1,.·"'\-i~-- ,...:::=-).• · t. ·-,~ .. /., .. 1,:·" i ,~•....:' ~ .- .: ... ·.,.·-r: ·._.._, - "'ft '.._r-"""' . , · • 
. J-!.;.;_ :. · ;~":.{V~~~ ... I .:· '-~-1.. "l; .. t(.~ -~ .g~_;-; ~~':f"""') .. ~~5: , ... ,: , . ,...,., ;-. --·N tu .. - ,. ' ~", . ..,. ·" ,.4.',, 1·' --· .. , ... :i:,,.';;;,.~ .. • --;;- • 
. -'\.:~(.. . .. a nat:=:-=-.... "J.·~._~;r:::.:.-1:~·~;. ·~~~:;:-,..;~-;!..:.-:- ... ,~~· ·, ,:-~ .. 
· _i_ , ls/an~ .. ~.,-,:; ~ ~J-..... ~.-:..r.~~.;.~ ... ~.:.· .. ~""'"' ~.4, ,1; 
·u __ ~ :~~r~~ ·. 1~~-:::.:~~ ·~;.{::;_~~::i~ ;~-::..d}0t:.~;r]Z·:·' .. 
INDONESIA -'.;l~;?.J19. E,r-i.4'i--/q.f/~.~..,->::_,..;;./. .. 
•• - • ·-~· - ,.., •• \ • - ~ i. ...... : •• •'• l '·'~._,. _ _ ...s, .... . , ... - , .. <(.•;-. ·-'7:'J'" ..... ., . 
132 
BRUNEI 
~ 
115°E 
0 
Kirkland 
·r •-r 
.-
....... _ 
-=- - i" -i,.~·,· .. ,.:" 
.. _..,. ... .. -
,-,~ .- ;:.;: :2·~·--?~~f,} 
-~·~ - ;_: ~. r~l{:~: d 1_ 
. 
'-~··: Ps'oN 
200 
nautical miles 
·:· · .:;·_J20~E 
I 
jM, 
Ii~ 
Appendix C: Map 2: Occupation of the Spratly Islands 
~, " ,·· 
Map 2: Occupation of the Spratly Isl.ands y·~t.:j,~;~:f~ Occu~ied in 1995 by: 
-..; ~ ~1 .'.'":.~ry~ .. r~; :.·. ;\. . ~;: . .,,_:i,-f ... :) ,;,r!: ;_:::!-, . .'·( k. ~:;;'~"; ·: , ~: ·'t/_i!!.1 ~-:-;. ~7,\ ~:t: "1~ :r·~-.~.~ ' t·_i.·.'i-\ :1-:-~:.;~·~~r\· ~ . ,· ·~ ·s; A China 
., •.• --,. ~ , - ', ,. ' - _ ,, . ,<\ •. ~ . ;.,,: --t, .,,. j _, .. '"L '·, .• , .. ,• -----· ..I' . ····>, ".' . ' - • • M I . 
. · ·. "'' · - - .... - -- ... " ····- , ·· !.'· , . a ays1a • ",'. ~, '", .,, J'· - ,, ._ '1 \-.,: ,.., . ._ • ."".'. . .,. ,.,_. .: , \ ,. • f. ........ ··a ...... • ' • .. • .. -. • 
·:.· T -t-· ·.•,i:: .. . .-1 , 'l,~ .- ,,, 1,.:, ~t.··~ .. ~s.,:- ,1 _,_:,-~ :'i ·· --- . c. .,,<._,.,._-,, :;- .c.,.,_-·, ~- c,, ,·.~··.·"' + Philippines 
. : /i~.;~L, >~:_'~ ·ifr:.- .. t:·~=~~:J-,.- i:;(i~~}·::]~:-.~t:/'··t \~,,'7~;::::·-~:-~·;:'~:~.;- : · './.:_:· ·.-  'Y Taiwan -·N ~.:-~·~·..c: "!, ~· ..::- '· ·1.- ·:.k.f, -":'· ~ ~w;.: .1 }· ..t.. ..... -,, '-1»r· ·'),.\ ,.. _::::;.· • ·:1/ '~J~-t-·~ -" ·11,c '" "l .. · ~- •• -• - .. . ·>; 
- •• J;. . ... J .. . r,.,.,,,,_ ..__ .... L,, !.1'1...- ... , ...... ,,.-"TW ~ J'!. .. <;1 .;,-\: ..i. ~ .-,.J·~ "-- .. Y· ""'·-..I,~ .. -~ .... ,.1_, ,,., . • - II v· t 
~-.·:. ~. ::;f··.~:~~~t~ .. ~>:-_;;·.: ;s~~-~,;_\_ ·~:_;'.t:~··~~,;~_!i·=:~·1/:.r~~~~,~ .-;-~~~;:;::=:i· _~;~,.~;--~~·l: ~;:~~~ ~.··- .. J .. ::.. 1e nam 
· - .,.{ .,. J,,.,.,,'ul:,: ,;,., , v-r,.~·,:,i.•:"°$:'Paracef ,f1--L-'-'"·"'" ~--.-~ ... *,: __ ')l,i.., ;;";.:·.:,:;"''(r:,ef,~- ·~-~ ,"'-'-''·•' M k d b 
· ,::i~:~·;:'2~.r.::;~r:::i:~:i. ;.\ ~ -~--~:··"· ~:.}:-;.t.:f:~;J\i .. ,t-,:_t::~J(5)' ar e y: 
,- .,·,·'.: . '.',>; .. ,•-,> ... ·.~ .:: -,"'s'an,ls <t: .• - ' ,.-7;;-~,..A -;;,'..zr..F tr .1· "\/'"\::<-)l ,·.~,~--~···'·' t -'· • _,. ,: Ch" (b t 
'J ... -~ ~ -, .·· er··· •· \ r·• . . ~ • 9 " Ii u, ~., . 'I I ·· ! rtJ. ... - \.;-,.:.." .... .. , /' · ~ 'j ; • . -·' ~ • ~ . . ....... . • .• · -1- ... "\-- ':' ... . · .. : __ ........ :_ . .r:.:. ........ '.")- ... · '! ·-.~ ......... ; ,. ': . '""'.:"~., ... .. \_, __ ~..., . .E ... " · .... '- · ... :.:·· . .J;"iY.·""'",i.-· ... \ , _J,.°'"!..t .. _. ~ 1na u 
~·'I.ttif.:'ft~.·;:::· . .'-:i)'~f:t·./\:.{})~ ;.~~;(;;/i·;,il:ik~t:{;::~~~-.7.;;.·.·f~.··.\ .·~.-:~-.;t. not occupied) 
" ..... :-" ' .. ,·,- \•. :· . .. _.,, ' · - .... -:,J,,r•,,,-'.,s;·.· '' '1' Macclesfield'-1).r .. ~,. _-,-, : ;,· ' .. ,:; :...: .. i& ;-,~:,:~:.~  ~-~:~;:R;.,·:·:-:_. . -~~:·~-:f.:..' ,·~:·"'~~-:-~~-~~~~-~-;, " • '• ~ 1, •,· ~; -.i:-.. ~I,:·••;,..,' j' .. :.· ·:,·::• '~ • - \ ! \ ~ 
. '.c-;:: ~c .~1 . .-::~ "':.-,~, :>, ;-r-n :{''f-~ _..!•5:?t").t';;;·~~r; Bank :·:--::~:r~'.·-"4~· Y.'· 1 ~::,···.? '.' Scarborough '··200m :· '-·: 15°N 
~ 
• ·· -- • • .... - - 1 ' 4 " - ·,, • ~-' } ·SOUTH ~-CHINA 
\. ;.-''•.··_ ,-~\(t_F~/?<:<~ :'= "s:- E~ A:'"~ ·_·._ ·· ;· 
.... " :.- · I.. •• - ••• - • • • • , - • • 
-.... __ r"' :,~ .. -~-:-~-.: :~~t~ ~/~ .' __ \:i·-/ ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~-~- : ~ ! -~ ·. . ·~ ·:' •• --· • -· · · . • . . ' . 
c:t 
; 
z ··;" 
J-
· · · · · · · · ·--. - .  .,.. __ _ "'-.-,--------·, "'- ·- ··~·-·-·· ·· Nanshanl · , · - ~!!:!:' 
i :J :. \ i\;q{,~,irf ,,:: ~j&:ff ~~--:-~;~ .. ,_  _r:2r;~~-i-,,'.):;l . ·;, 
,,- :, t,.t(i ·: ~;:· ./•! , '" .. ,,.:·.:, ·} ;,~,{ :s::.~· South R. )\ iorth-eastC. -. .?. t .... Ba l .-'; :.~ .'.' .. : 
LU 
--~ 
;·--. " l . \-~:~·:.:.~~--' .. t/ .:::-:_~··\:'.':/;· l,\\'_Thffu /~ ?·. _,-r·._·. ·c_.· {i_~~\ -~. · ~;,,/ ·::: ~;-~ ·.. :' --- ~; ,/ . 
,·,,; ·> .. : - ··,--', •c:'!: .Sprat/y ~--s .·R -~ . .,. • . -- : • -..-· · · · ~-~ - . __ , ·· : 
- \ J ... .. -, - _ .... ,., ..... .. =, ~ _ .. ..._ r -":: 't- ~ --!'- .... - • ! .. .- . • • - oaita I. ~ . .. • :·· " ' •· ••• • ·-· • 0 ubi ~~··· ~ ' "o • ' - ' .. , . '. •·· : - ,. ·. • · - .. -. ' . · ,-- '" . ~-, ·. . ~ Sand. C . A ·- -~ .9>l J'" .I. . J '· · .... i: :_· 4 : .. J·. ·\-~ / • .::; -· ·- :;:r:,_ --. _.: .. _~ ·:n~-~::--~::~ . · nkiainC .. • -~ -:,, ... ,-. 9J ..... _: ~ ...... 
. . .. . . : ../ ; .. , C§J_ -~--~-~-~ . .a:·Gayen_R. : ·, /tu Aha I. . etJey R. • ·: · · "'1! ' , ~· -/ 
0 '· • · · \ ; : · · · -' . ··. · - f ·· ' ··.- · · Discovery Great R. · · ~.• · .,;, I · :· ackson"ff. : 10 ~ - . ' . ' a -rvam,.. . - . , . f R ( • ·-,¥ F b }· : .·. ···:. -- .., . ... . >..,·.-. : ·.-._ . ·,:·. ' / ; ---.··; '.7.--:t -~· ennanR .·. Miscfue . occuprcv e. 
::· :-:..r. '! ' · · ~ -r . ,._ Fierytross R-.,Jr.·· Sin Cowe f. :. . , ·¥ '-"' _ 1995 by,.China 
. _ • .. , ... :. ~_- . ··----~---·· • . · Johnson J. ._ en Dao ~-- _ , . _... 
· · · · · · -· · · · · ..... ·· · • · · · · · First Tl,o=s · . . .. - ;: .. ,. ··.'' CentralR . ' '·.~ . :., . . ;· . ~... ... Ill '"IP ,' _.,, \ . ' . . ., .. • . - . -· . - t"' ' - .... ,_ - - ~ ' , 
·-· · . . ~ . · • •• • · . , ShCMi/ / . . . West R. , Cuarteron earson R. p· R · '\ : -
-· -· · : · · Spratfy f. ~ • _.. R. · • a • ,g~ · AHalf M~on 
- \ · Ladd R. _.. 111 East R. · - Alison R, "comwalfis ~outh R. . Shoal 
. . /rince:f f Wales_ ~nk : : •· Barque .. : .. ;-: ~'tommodore R. 
Pnnce Consoft Bank ~ . • ; : • Canada R. • M . eles R. r n 
. :. IF II' . f, . : a . r:~ . V ' : •. .W AmboynaC ,· ·:a: . . , · · : Grainger . ,. · · -;;, • · " 
Vanguard Reef _ _._. R Rifleman .,. . . . "- · Ardasier and Dallas Reefs 
· · · · · · . Bank · ~- -Swalfaw R. • : 
·;_:,a - Louisa R. G 
' ~ ' : :c 
. ·-. ./, 
- ··-····--.. ,. ,. ______ __ .. -~?( ·1 
~
' . 0 .. .. ," - .. _ .. _____ , ... "' .. , .. 
' ~ 
() o· -
'1, 
~·; ~ ~'.,., 1· . · . . 
N
·...+,·na ~ ·· ·, :. ·<:. · :. • '.~. -. , '·' 
ls';is , t ... ,~ . ·:_ 11_0°E··,· · .. -~ 
. . .._ .> ., ,.,,, ·;:' -f _t. I~=--: ' .. ··~ ".;..-: 
,.~~~.: 
Key to Maps 1 and 2 
... 
• ··-:. .:·. # ,r .; ; 
. , ..... 
- international boundaries 
- · - equidistance line 
1 
baseline 
- - China and Taiwan's 'historic claim line' 
133 
./~ i· 
, .. ' ~ o•o 
.· "'-"' 
115°E 
other claim lines 
g~~;<;1~'.j oil concessions 
sea depths 
~(;;) 
~~ -
- ~ 
~~v 
5°N 
100 
nautical miles 
c. Cay 
,. Island 
R. Reef 
"' 
//f: 
Bibliography 
Akrasanee, Narongchai and Stifel, David. "A Vision of Southeast Asia in the Year 
2000: Towards a common economic regime". Contemporary Southeast Asia. 
June 1994. Vol.16. No.I: 1-13. 
Alagappa, Muthiah. "Regional arrangement and international security in Southeast Asia: 
Going beyond ZOPF AN". Contemporary Southeast Asia. March 1991. Vol.12. 
No.4: 269. 
Amer, Rames. "Sino-Vietnamese relations and Southeast Asian security". 
Contemporary Southeast Asia. March 1993. Vol.14. No.4: 314-331. 
Anh, Vu Tuan. "Process of economic policy reform". Vietnam's Economic Reform: 
Results and Problems. Hanoi: Social Science Publishing House, 1994: 15. 
Antolik, Michael. "ASEAN's bridges to Vietnam and Laos". Contemporary Southeast 
Asia. September 1993. Vol.15. No.2: 201-210. 
______ , "The ASEAN Regional Forum: the spirit of constructive engagement". 
Contemporary Southeast Asia. September 1994. Vol.16. No.2: 120. 
Ashayagachat, Achara. "ASEAN: Customs procedures on ASEAN agenda". Bangkok 
Post. 29 November 1995. 
________ , "Rail links restored in bid to give Vietnam-China relations a 
boost". Bangkok Post. 15 February 1996. 
, ________ , "Vietnam stalls on list of goods for tariff cuts scheme". Bangkok 
Post. 6 December 1995. 
________ , "VN relaxes visa rules for ASEAN passport holders". Bangkok 
Post. 9 November 1995: 2. 
Attan, Ahirudin and Mansor, Lokman. "Thailand: Call for greater cooperation, freer 
trade". Business Times. 27 July 1994. 
Awanohara, Susumo. "Washington's priorities". Far Eastern Economic Review. 13 
August 1992: 18-19. 
Birsel, Robert. "Feature-Asia's young dragons see strength in unity". Reuter News 
Service. 11 January 1996. 
Bowring, Philip. "Into a Wider World". Far Eastern Economic Review. 22 November 
1990: 10. 
Brown, Frederich Z. Second Chance: The United States and Indochina in the 1990s. 
New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1989. 
134 
111, 
~ 
I 
i 
IIJ! 
11 
f ... 
i 
Buszynski, Leszek. "ASEAN security dilemma". Survival. Winter 1992-1993. Vol.34. 
No.4: 103-105. 
Buszynski, Leszek. Gorbachev and Southeast Asia. London: Routledge, 1992. 
Cao, Ky. "Indochina's prospect for stability". Contemporary Southeast Asia. March 
1994. Vol.15. No.4. 
Chaipipat, Kulachada and Patiyasevi Rita. "Vo Van Kiet to tell leaders that VN will not 
weaken ASEAN". The Nation (Bangkok). 14 December 1995: A6. 
Chalmers, John. "U.S. puts MIAs at top of broadening Vietnam Agenda". Reuter News 
service. 19 January 1996. 
Chanda, Nayan. "China acquires sensitive military gear". Asian Wall Street Journal. 23 
March 1992: 2. 
, ______ , "Party reformists attack the conservative leadership". Far Eastern 
Economic Review. 5 October 1989: 24. 
. ______ , "Taking a soft line". Far Eastern Economic Review. 8 December 1988: 
27. 
, _____ , "Divide and rule: Beijing scores points on South China Sea". Far 
Eastern Economic Review. 11 August 1994: 18. 
Chen, Qimao. "New approaches in China's foreign policy: The post Cold War era". 
Asian Survey. March 1993. Vol.33. No.3. 
Chiu, Hung Dah and Park, Choon Ho. "Legal status of the Paracels and Spratly Islands". 
Ocean Development and International Law Journal. 1975. Vol.3. No.I: 11. 
Cima, Roland J. "Vietnam in 1989: Initiating the Post-Cambodia Period". Asian Survey. 
January 1990. Vol. 3. No.I: 88-95. 
Cordner Am Ran, Lee G. "The Spratly Islands dispute and the Law of the Sea". Journal 
of the Australian Naval Institute. May/July 1994: 35-46. 
Crone, Donald. "Growing Pain". Far Eastern Economic Review. 28 July 1994: 23. 
Dinh, Do Due. "The Public Sector of Vietnam". In Forbes, D.K., Hull, T.H., Marr, D.G. 
and Brogan, B. eds. Doi Moi: Vietnam's Economic Renovation: Policy and 
Performance. Canberra: The Australian National University, 1991: 54-67. 
Djalal, Hasjim. Territorial Disputes at Sea: Situation, Possibilities, Prognosis. Paper 
presented to the 10th Asia-Pacific Roundtable in Kuala Lumper. 5-6 June 1996. 
Do, Levien. "Vietnam's revised constitution: Impact on foreign investment". In Thayer, 
C. and Marr, D. eds. Vietnam and the Rule of Law. Canberra: The Australian 
National University, 1993: 116-123. 
135 
Doanh, Le Dang. "Economic renovation in Vietnam: Achievements and prospects". In 
Forbes, D. K., Hull, T. H., Marr, D. G. and Brogan, B., eds. Doi Moi: Vietnam's 
Renovation Policy and Performance. Canberra: The Australian National 
University, 1991: 79-94. 
Fforde, Adam. "The political economy of "Reform in Vietnam-some reflections". In 
Ljungren, Borje, ed. The Challenge of Reform in Indochina. USA: Harvard 
Institute for International Development, 1993: 293-326. 
Forbes, Dean K. In Forbes, D. K., Hull, T. H., Marr, D. G. and Brogan, B., eds. Doi 
Moi: Vietnam's Renovation Policy and Performance. Canberra: The Australian 
National University, 1991: vii-vix. 
Frost, Frank. Vietnam's Foreign Relations: Dynamics of Change. Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1993. 
, , Vietnam's Membership of ASEAN: Issues and Implic_ations. Canberra: The 
Department of the Parliamentary Library, 1995. 
Gittings, John. "China: Alarm as China charts an ocean takeover". Guardian. 17 May 
1996. 
Glaser, Bonnie S. "China's security perceptions: Interests and ambitions". Asian Survey. 
March 1993. Vol.33. No.3. 
Goodman, Allan E. "The political consequences of normalisation of U.S.-Vietnam 
relations". Contemporary Southeast Asia. March 1996. Vol.17. N o.4: 420-429. 
Guoxing, Ji. The Spratlys Disputes and Prospects for Settlement. Malaysia: Institute of 
Strategic and International Studies, 1992. 
Handley, Paul. "Japan's clarion call". Far Eastern Economic Review. 28 January 1993: 
21. 
Hernandez, Carolina. "The ASEAN Free Trade Area: A step towards economic 
integration". In Moellers, W. and Mahmood, R. eds. ASEAN: Future Economic 
and Political Cooperation. Malaysia: Institute of Strategic and International 
Studies, 1993. 
Hiebert, Murray and Cheung, Tai Ming. "Comrades Again". Far Eastern Economic 
Review. 22 August 1991: 8-9. 
Hiebert, Murray and Awanohara, "Making up for lost time". Far Eastern Economic 
Review. 17 February 1994: 16. 
Hiebert, Murray. "Comrades Apart". Far Eastern Economic Review. 17 December 
1992: 9. 
______ , "Obstacle course". Far Eastern Economic Review. 5 September 1991: 
62-64. 
136 
''1 
I 
Hiebert, Murray. "The Cost of Care". Far Eastern Economic Review. l O January 1991: 
16-17. 
, ______ , "The Rise of Saigon". Far Eastern Economic Review. 5 September 
1991: 65-66. 
, ______ , Far Eastern Economic Review. 19 January 1989. 
Hom, Robert C. "Soviet policy in Southeast Asia in the Gorbachev era: Change or 
continuity". In Thambipillai and Matuszewski. eds. The Soviet Union and the 
Asia-Pacific Region. New York: Praeger, 1989: 60-75. 
Humphrey, Peter. "Fresh violence erupts in Hong Kong boatpeople camp". BBC 
Monitoring Service. 11 May 1996. 
Jawhar, Mohammed. "The making of a new Southeast Asia". In Ball, D. and Homer, D. 
eds. Strategic Studies in a changing World: Global, Regional and Australian 
Perspective. Paper on Strategic and Defence No.89. Canberra: The Australian 
National University, 1992: 301-303. 
Ji, You and Xu, You. "In search of blue water power: The PLA Navy's Maritime 
strategy in the 1990s". The Pacific Review. 1991. Vol.4. No.2: 141-142. 
Johnson, Chris. "Southeast Asia asks world to back nuclear pact". Reuter News 
Services. 16 December 1995. 
_____ , "Tough terms for poor Indochina joining rich ASEAN". Reuter News 
Service. 13 December 1995. 
Juichi, Inada. "Japan's aid freeze to Vietnam: Historical process and its diplomatic 
implications". In Tadashi, M. ed. Indochina in transition: Confrontation or Co-
prosperity. Tokyo: Japan Institute for International Affairs, 1989: 195-214. 
Kanwerayothin, Supapohn and Ashayagachat, Achara. "Vietnam becomes latest 
member of ASEAN family". Bangkok Post. 29 July 1995: 1. 
Kanwerayothin, Supapohn. "China, Vietnam fail to resolve territorial rows". Bangkok 
Post. 3 December 1992. 
Kassim, Yang Razali. "Vietnam joins ASEAN as its seventh member". Business Time 
(Singapore). 29 July 1995. 
Kerkvliet, Benedict J. Tria. "Rural society and state relations". In Thayer, C. and Marr, 
D. eds. Vietnam and the Rule of Law. Canberra: The Australian National 
University, 1993: 65- 96. 
Khanh, Huynh Kim. "Vietnam's reform: Renewal or death". Indochina Issues. 
September 1988. No.84: 2. 
137 
i 
I 
!Iii 
\1 •. 
/"' 
, .. . 
1 .. . 
~-
Kim, Shee Poon. "China's changing policies toward the South China Sea". American 
Asian Review. Winter 1994. Vol. 12. No.4: 301-321. 
, , "The March 1988 skirmish over the Spratly Islands and its 
implications for Sino-Vietnamese relations". In Hill, R.D., Owen, N.G. and 
Roberts, E.V. eds. Fishing in Troubled Waters: Proceedings of an Academic 
Conference on Territorial Claims in the South China Sea. Hong Kong: 
University of Hong Kong, 1991: 177-191. 
Klintworth, Gary. "Vietnam: Forces of change". In Forbes, D. K., Hull, T. H., Marr, D. 
G. and Brogan, B., eds. Doi Moi; Vietnam's Renovation Policy and 
Performance. Canberra: The Australian National University, 1991: 215-233. 
Kristof, Nicholas D. "China Gropes Toward Market Leninism". International Herald 
Tribune. 7 September 1993: 1, 4. 
Kumar, Sree. "Assessing AFTA". In Sandhu, K.S., et. al. (comp.). The ASEAN Reader. 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, 1992: 516-518. 
Kurns, Bilson. "Understanding ASEAN: Benefits and Raison d'etre". Asain Survey. 
August 1993. Vol.33. No.8: 819-31. 
Lague, David. "Clinton's China backdown: US serves MFN-human rights link". The 
Weekend Australian. 28-29 May 1994: 13. 
Leifer, Michael. "Indochina and ASEAN: Seeking a new balance". Contemporary 
Southeast Asia. December 1993. Vol.15. No.3: 269-279. 
Ljunggren, Borje. "Beyond reform: On the dynamics between economic and political 
change in Vietnam". Paper presented to Vietnam Update Paper 1994. Canberra: 
The Australian National University, 1994: 52-53. 
Luoc, Vo Dai . "Some problems in renovating Vietnam's foreign economic policy in the 
new situation". In Forbes, D.K., Hull, T.H., Marr, D.G. and Brogan, B. eds. Doi 
Moi: Vietnam's Economic Renovation: Policy and Performance. Canberra: The 
Australian National University, 1991: 136-142. 
Luoc, Vo Dai and Ishida, Akie, et. al. Vietnam's Economic Renovation and Foreign 
Economic Policies. Hanoi: Social Science Publishing House, 1995. 
Maisrikrod, Surin. "Thailand's policy dilemmas towards Indochina". Contemporary 
Southeast Asia. December 1994. Vol.I. No.3: 385-406. 
______ , "The peace dividend in Southeast Asia: The political economy of 
New Thai-Vietnamese Relations". Contemporary Southeast Asia. June 1994. 
Vol.16. No.1: 46. 
138 
I 
~ 
''I 
I 
Manibhandu, Anurak, Marukatat, Saritdet, Sawatsawong, Nussara and Tasaneeyavej, 
Banyat. "Regional unity under ASEAN a "necessity" and "PM lists peace and 
security as ASEAN's prime concerns". Bangkok Post. 15 and 22 December 
1995. 
Marr, David G. "Where is Vietnam coming from". In Forbes, D. K., Hull, T. H., Marr, 
D. G. and Brogan, B., eds. Doi Moi; Vietnam's Renovation Policy and 
Performance. Canberra: The Australian National University, 1991: 12-20. 
, , "The Vietnam Communist Party and Civil Society". Paper presented to 
Vietnam Update Paper 1994. Canberra: The Australian National University, 
1994: 14. 
Marukatat, Saritdet and Kanwerayothin, Supapohn. "Thailand: Laos signals it wants to 
become ASEAN member". Bangkok Post. 24 July 1994. 
Mcbeth, John and Tiglao, Rigoberto. "Profitable partnership". Far Eastern Economic 
Review. 28 July 1994: 30-31. 
Mecham, Michael and Mann, Paul. "Clinton lifts Vietnam embargo". Aviation Week 
and Space Technology. 7 February 1994: 20-21. 
Mehta, Harish. "Vietnam: Enticing investors into industrial sector". Business Times 
(Singapore). 26 December 1995. 
_____ , "Vietnam: Viet industrial growth to hit 15%". Business Times. 18 
December 199 5. 
Mohammad Aii bin Alwi, Dato Haji. "Conflicting claims in the South China Sea". 
Asian Defence Journal. June 1992. No.6: 10. 
N asution, Anwar. " Open regionalism: The case of ASEAN Free Trade Area". In 
Moellers, W. and Mahmood, R. eds. ASEAN: Future Economic and Political 
Cooperation. Malaysia: Institute of Strategic and International Studies, 1993. 
Naya, Seiji and Imada, Pearl. "Implementing AFTA, 1992-2007". In Sandhu, K.S., et. 
al. (comp.). The ASEAN Reader. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, 
1992: 513-515. 
Nguyen, Kieu. "Vietnam-US Relations". Vietnam Courier. June 1991. No.20: 4. 
Pao-Min, Chang. "A new cradle for the South China Sea Islands". Contemporary 
Southeast Asia. 1990. Vol.12. No.20: 25-29. 
Paribatra, Sukhumbhand. "From ASEAN Six to ASEAN Ten: Issues and prospects". 
Contemporary Southeast Asia. December 1994. Vol.16. No.3: 243-258. 
Patiyasevi, Rota and Chupaka, Surachai. "Vietnam encouraged to promote one-Asia". 
The Nation (Bangkok). 14 December 1995: Al, A2. 
139 
ht 
~ 
I 
l 
Perera, Sanjai. "ASEAN: Ways sought to improve relations". Straits Times. 31 
July1995. 
Porter, Gareth. "The Politics of Renovation in Vietnam". Problems of Communism. 
May-June 1990. Vol.39. No.3: 72-88. 
Pringle, James. "Vietnam and China reopen raillines to extend trade links". The Times. 
15 February 1996. 
Pura, Raphael. "Beijing pursues good-neighbour image at ASEAN meeting". Asian Wall 
Street Journal Weekly. 2 August 1993: 4. 
, _____ , "Nukes, neighbours and trade to dominate ASEAN Summit". The Asian 
Wall Street Journal. 14 December 1995. 
Richardson, Michael. "Southeast Asia wins Vietnam trade, investment share". The 
Australia Business Asia. 17-30 August 1994: 8. 
Ross, Robert A. "China and the Cambodian peace process: The value of coercive 
diplomacy". Asian Survey. December 1991. Vol.16. No.12: 1170-1185. 
_____ , The Indochina Tangle: China's Vietnam Policy 1975-1979. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1988. 
Schelhorn, Kai M. "Political and economic reforms in Vietnam". Contemporary 
Southeast Asia. December 1992. Vol.14. No.3: 235-239. 
Schwarz, Adam. "Safety first". Far Eastern Economic Review. 11 July 1996: 14-16. 
Stuart, Douglas T. and Tow, William, T. A US Strategy for the Asia-Pacific. Adephi 
Paper No.299. New York: Oxford University Press, December 1995. 
Sudto, Smam. "Vietnam: Rice export giants urged to be allies". Bangkok Post. 6 
December 199 5. 
Tasker, Rodney, et.al. "Growing pain". Far Eastern Economic Review. 28 July 1994: 
23. 
Thakur, Ramesh and Thayer, Carlyle. Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam. London: 
Macmillan Academic and Professional LTD, 1992. 
Thayer, Carlyle. "ASEAN and Indochina: The dialogue". In Broinowski, A. ed. ASEAN 
into the 1990s. Hong Kong: The Macmillan Press, 1990: 138-159. 
, _____ , "China's domestic crisis and Vietnam responses, April-July 1989". In 
Klintworth, G. ed. China's Crisis: The International Implications. Canberra: 
The Australian National University, 1989: 81-97. 
, _____ , "Comrade plus brother: The new Sino-Vietnamese relations" . The 
Pacific Review. September 1992. Vol.5. No.4: 402-406. 
140 
/Jf: 
~I: 
!!Ji 
~; 
I 
Thayer, Carlyle. "Coping with China: Vietnam's strategic readjustment". Paper 
presented to the Workshop on China as a Great Power in the Asia-Pacific: 
Myths, Realities and Challenges. Canberra: The Australian National University, 
1993. 
_____ , "Indochina". In Thakur, R. and Thayer, C. eds. Reshaping Regional 
Relations: Asia Pacific and the Former Soviet Union. Oxford: Westview Press, 
1993: 205. 
_____ , "Keating's vision: SE Asia free from China orbit". The Australian. 18 
December 1995: 2 . 
. _____ , "Mono-organisational socialism and the state". In Kerkvliet, B.J.T. and 
Porter, D.J. eds. Vietnam's Rural Transformation. Colorado: Westview Press, 
1995: 39-64. 
_____ , "Political Reform in Vietnam: Doi Moi and the Emergence of Civil 
Society in Communist System". In Miller, R. F. ed. The Development of Civil 
Society in Communist Systems. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1992: 110-129. 
_____ , "Recent political developments: constitutional change and the 1992 
elections". In Thayer, C. and Marr, D. Eds. Vietnam and the Rule of Law. 
Canberra: The Australian National University, 1993: 50-80. 
_____ , "Renovation and Vietnamese society: The changing roles of government 
and administration". In Forbes, D.K., Hull, T.H., Marr, D.G. and Brogan, B. eds. 
Doi Moi: Vietnam's Economic Renovation: Policy and Peiformance. Canberra: 
The Australian National University, 1991: 21-33. 
_____ , "Sino-Vietnamese relations: The interplay of ideology and national 
interest". Asian Survey. June 1994. Vol.34. No.6: 513-528. 
_____ , "Stability depends on economic reform". The Australian. 26 June 1992. 
, , "The challenges facing Vietnamese communism". In Singh, D. ed. 
Southeast Asian Affairs 1992. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1992: 68-73. 
. _____ , "The Soviet Union and Indochina". Paper for 4th World Congress for 
Soviet and Europe Studies. Great Britain: Harrogate, July 1990: 4. 
, , "Vietnam and the Soviet Union". In Thambipillai and Matuszewski. eds. 
The Soviet Union and the Asia-Pacific Region. New York: Praeger, 1989: 137. 
, , "Vietnam: Coping with China". In Singh, D. ed. Southeast Asian Affairs 
1994. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994: 351-367. 
, _____ , Beyond Indochina. New York: Oxford University, 1995. 
141 
,, 
·~ 
·• 
f 
Thayer, Carlyle. Political Developments in Vietnam: From the sixth to Seventh National 
Party Congress. Paper no. 5, presented to "Vietnam 1991: An Update". 
Canberra: The Australian National University, 25 October 1991. 
_____ , Security Issues in Southeast Asia: The Third Indochina War. Canberra: 
The Australian National University, 1987. 
Theeravit, Khien. "Indochina and security in Southeast Asia". In Scalapino, R.A., et.al. 
eds. Internal and External Security in Asia. Berkeley: University of California, 
1986: 227. 
Tin, Bui. "The Road Away from Disaster". Vietnam Commentary. March-April 1991. 
No.20: 11-15. 
Tri, Vo Nhan. Vietnam's Economic Policy since 1975. Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 1990. 
Tuan, Hoang Anh. "Vietnam's membership in ASEAN: Economic, political and 
security implications". Contemporary Southeast Asia. December 1994. Vol.16. 
No.3: 261-262. 
Tuan, Hoang Anh. "Why hasn't Vietnam gained ASEAN membership?". Contemporary 
Southeast Asia. December 1993. Vol.15. No.3: 280-291. 
Valencia, Mark J. "Spratly solution still at sea". The Pacific Review. 1993. Vol.6. No.2: 
155. 
, , China and the South China Sea Disputes. Adelphi Paper No.298. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. 
Vatikiotis, Michael. "Feeling the Heat". Far Eastern Economic Review. 9 August 1990: 
8. 
Vietnam Courier. March 1992. No.29: 1. 
Wain, Barry. "Vietnam Weathers Economics Transition". Asian Wall Street Journal. 3 
August 1992. 
Waitz, Nancy. "U.S. eyes Vietnam as agricultural market". Reuter News Service. 30 
November 1995. 
William, Evans. "Regional meeting decides boat people must return". BBC 
Monitoring Service. 16 January 1996. 
Womack, Brantly. "Sino-Vietnamese border trade". Asian Survey. June 1994. Vol.34. 
No.6: 495-512. 
Yeow, Jimmy. "Vietnam outlines 3 keys factors for joining ASEAN". Business Times 
(Malaysia). 20 December 1995. 
142 
.. , 
"ADE to grant Vietnam $1.5 billion loans by 1999". Reuter News Service. 3 February 
1996. 
"ASEAN approves joint drive to develop Mekong". Reuter News Service. 16 December 
1995. 
"ASEAN senior officials discuss Pacific concord". Jakarta Post. 9 May 1996: 2. 
"ASEAN FMs to sign $1 M fund Transfer Agreement". Bangkok Post. 21 July 1994. 
"Asia 1994". Far Eastern Economic Yearbook. 1994: 223-224. 
"China's Spratlys deal has oil firms in Hanoi worried". The Straits Times. 27 June 1992. 
"China's, Vietnam to hold talks to settle dispute over the Spratlys". The Straits Times. 3 
July 1992. 
"China nibbles, ASEAN dithers". Asian Wall Street Journal. 10-11 March 1995. 
"China reassures ASEAN Meeting". Japan Times. 22 August 1995: 4. 
"China says HK riots a danger to social stability". Reuter News Service. 14 May 1996. 
"China stirs the pot". Far Eastern Economic Review. 9 July 1992: 14-15. 
"China: Premier Li Peng meets Do Muoi". BBC Monitoring Service. 30 November 
1995. 
"Cooling off a flashpoint". Asiaweek. 17 July 1992: 21. 
"Do Muoi urges industrialisation of agriculture". BBC Monitoring Service. 29 
December 199 5. 
"Economic news". Vietnam Business Opportunities. 1994. Vol.3. No.24: 2. 
"Economic news". Vietnam Business Opportunities. 28 January 1995. Vol.4. No.9: 3. 
"Foreign aids being used to restore main highway". Reuter News Service. 6 December 
1995. 
"Foreign Ministry welcomes restoration of full U.S.-Vietnamese relations". BBC 
Monitoring Service. 28 July 1995. 
"Guards exchange fire at border". Asian Defence Journal. August 1992: 95. 
"Intelligence". Far Eastern Economic Review. 26 April 1990: 8 . 
"Israeli Minister visits Vietnam to strengthen ties". Reuter News Service. 23 January 
1996. 
"Li Peng in Vietnam". Economist. 5 December 1992. 
143 
"Living with contradiction". Economist. 2 December 1995. 
"Party Chief Do Moui stresses importance of industrialisation". BBC Monitoring 
Service. 12 January 1996. 
"Planning Minister interviewed on economic tasks and problems in 1996". BBC 
Monitoring Service. 2 February 1996. 
"Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet discussed measures to achieve 1996 target". BBC 
Monitoring Service. 9 January 1996. 
"Red tape and new trade add to burdens of Vietnam's creaking infrastructure". South 
China Morning Post. 11 January 1996. 
"ROC has sovereignty over Spratlys". The Free China Journal. 17 November 1992: 7. 
"Russia helps Vietnam in Spratlys surveys". Reuters. 26 December 1994. 
"Russia, Vietnam aim to improve relations". Reuter News Service. 16 June 1994. 
"Russia: Deputy Foreign Minister Panov promises closer links with Vietnam". BBC 
Monitoring Service. 5 February 1996. 
"Russia: Pacific fleet commander visits Cam Ranh naval base in Vietnam". BBC 
Monitoring Service. 7 February 1996. 
"Russian delegation in Vietnam to seek continued cooperation". BBC Monitoring 
Service. 15 April 1996. 
"Second day of riots at Hong Kong Vietnamese Centre". Reuter News Service. 11 May 
1996. 
"Smuggling much reduced after prime ministerial instruction". BBC Monitoring 
Service. 10 May 1996. 
"Taking a united stand on the Spratly issue". The Nation (Bangkok). 13 February 1995. 
"Tension in East ease as Vietnam makes peace". Bangkok Post. 29 July 1995. 
"Tokyo to provide 800m dollars in loans and grants". BBC Monitoring Service. 6 
December 199 5. 
"Twenty-fifth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Manila, 21-22 July 1992, Joint 
Communique". ASEAN Economic Bulletin. November 1992. Vol.9. No.2: 241-
241. 
"Vietnam's government issues list of products with reduced tariff'. BBC Monitoring 
Service. 3 January 1996. 
144 
~ 
11:1 
J 
]lf 
r~ 
"Vietnam December 1995". Country Economic Brief Canberra: Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, 1995: 14. 
"Vietnam grapples with growth in heroin smuggling". Reuter News Service. 15 May 
1996. 
"Vietnam hopes to draw up tariff reduction list on time". Bangkok Post. 29 July 1995. 
"Vietnam makes historical claim to disputed islands". Reuter News Service. 9 May 
1996. 
"Vietnam reports U.S. acknowledgment of death of reported MIAs". BBC Monitoring 
Service. 23 May 1996. 
"Vietnam seeks $42 billion in investment capital". Reuter News Service. 30 November 
1995. 
"Vietnam sounds off over Chinese territorial claim". Reuter News Service. 17 May 
1996. 
"Vietnam to export 680,000 tonnes of rice-report". Reuter News Service. 12 February 
1996. 
"Vietnam to feel stiff winds of competition". Bangkok Post. 24 July 1995. 
"Vietnam-China working group on land border meets in Beijing". BBC Monitoring 
Service. 22 May 1996. 
"Vietnam: Booming Viet oil industry's exports top US$ 1 billion". Business Times. 25 
January 1996. 
"Vietnam: Country forecast summary". Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). 30 
November 1995. 
"Vietnam: Food production in 1995". BBC Monitoring Service. 17 January 1996. 
"Vietnam: Foreign direct in investment in 1995 detailed". BBC Monitoring Service. 10 
January 1996. 
"Vietnam: New investment". Bangkok Post. 9 January 1996. 
"Vietnamese and Russia communist parties to strengthen ties". BBC Monitoring 
Service. 5 February 1996. 
"Vietnamese Finance Minister attends ASEAN Free Trade Meeting". BBC Monitoring 
Service. 12 December 1995. 
"Yasser Arafat feted on arrival in Vietnam". Reuter News Service. 19 January 1996. 
145 
